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“Frontiers are indeed the razors edge on which hangs suspended the 
modern issues of war and peace, life or death of nations.” 1 Spatial 
boundaries have ambiguous features: they divide and unite, bind the 
interior and link it with the exterior, are barriers and junctions, walls and 
doors, organs of defence and attack and so on. Frontier areas (borderlands) 
can be managed so as to maximise any of these functions. They can be 
militarised, as bulwarks against neighbours, or be made into special areas 
of peaceful interchange.2 This paper explores the core issues surrounding 
Africa national boundaries within the context of national sovereignty and 
international laws. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
When the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government at their 
eighth ordinary session in January 2002 mandated the AU Commission3 to pursue efforts 
towards the structural prevention of conflicts particularly through the implementation of the 
AU Border Programme on the delineation and demarcation of borders the apex body 
commendably opened a new and an illustrious chapter in the history of African relations and 
perhaps international peace and stability. 4  The Commission in furtherance of the border 
programme immediately produced a 2004-2007 ‘Plan of Action’ which aimed inter alia at 
identification of trans-border areas that would serve as a basis for cross-border co-operation, 
consolidation of trade and free movement of people and goods. Pursuant to this minister in 
charge of border issues in the Member States deliberated on means and measures geared 
towards the achievement of greater unity and solidarity among African countries and peoples 
and the reduction of the burden of borders separating African States. This ministerial body 
drew up a Declaration on the African Union Border Programme and its Implementation 
Modalities in 2007.5 
                                                         
1 Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy of India 1898-1905 and British Foreign Secretary 1919-24 1907 
Romanes Lecture, Oxford. 
2 R. Strassoldo, “The State of the Arts in Europe” Asiwaju and Adeniyi (eds), Borderlands in Africa: A 
Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa (Lagos: University of Lagos 
Press, 1989) p. 359. 
3 Hereinafter referred to as the Commission; materials relating to the African Union (AU) are available 
at www.africa-union.org . 
4 “AU moves to ease border conflicts in Africa” The Guardian (Nigeria) Wednesday, May 23, 2007.                         
5 Declaration on The African Union Border Programme and its Implementation Modalities as Adopted 
by the Conference of African Ministers in Charge Of Border Issues held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 
on 7 June 2007 available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/publications/PSC/Border%20Issues.pdf 
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A component of the Commission's 2004-2007 plan of action, in its border programme 
is the identification of trans-border areas that would serve as a basis for cross-border co-
operation, consolidation of trade and free movement of people and goods. The Commission 
correctly noted that the transformation of border areas could be achieved through effective 
demarcation and monitoring by way of control logistics and infrastructure capacity building at 
both national and regional levels. Other objectives of the AU Border Programme include 
harmonisation of the integration policies of regional and sub-regional organisations, 
strengthening the capacity of decision-makers in the area of border management and regional 
integration, and funding of cross-border development projects. These noble aims rest on the 
principle of the respect of borders existing on achievement of national independence, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Resolution 
AHG/Res.16(I) on border disputes between African States, 6  and article 4 (b) of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union,7 (ii) the principle of negotiated settlement of border 
disputes, as provided for notably in Resolution CM/ Res.1069(XLIV) on peace and security in 
Africa through negotiated settlement of boundary disputes. 
The determination of the AU to address comprehensively the problems of boundary 
and frontier determination and demarcation could not have come too soon as the tensions, 
skirmishes8 and outright war over boundaries have since the independence era (late 1950s) 
caused severe problems among African states and its peoples.9 The problems are indeed as rife 
in interstate relations as they are in intra state affairs. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
continue to trade accusations of boundary incursions (some involving aerial raids) and many 
civilians have lost their lives10, abductions have taken place along the Angolan-Namibian 
border and not even aid workers are not spared violence.11 Similar problems exist between 
Chad–Sudan, Mali–Mauritania 12  Burundi–Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea– Gabon, Eritrea–
                                                         
6 Adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, 
held in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1964. 
7  This provision reiterates the age-old directive philosophy of African states regarding territorial 
boundaries by protecting, “[r]espect of borders existing on achievement of independence;” Constitutive 
Act of African Union, July 11, 2000. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) was officially replaced 
by the African Union on July 9, 2002. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479 U.N.T.S. 
39, entered into force Sept. 13, 1963. 
8 Sudan Liberation Army fighters and nomads frequently have deadly skirmishes involving humans and 
even camels over boundary positions. See the AU Mission in Sudan Ceasefire Commission, “CFC 
Ceasefire Violation Report No. 37/05: Alleged SLA Attack on Nertiti on 16 Feb 05” 
AMIS/CFC/G/VIO/1 March 2005 pp. 1-2 available at http://www.africa-
union.org/DARFUR/Reports%20of%20the%20cfc/37-05.pdf visited 9/12/2008. 
9 Saïd Djinnit, Commissioner for Peace and Security at the African Union in a speech had reason to note 
that since African States gained independence, borders inherited from colonisation have been a factor of 
recurrent conflicts, adding that most of these borders were ill-defined and un-demarcated.                                                         
AU, “Report Of The Meeting: Preventing conflicts, Promoting integration” Preparatory Meeting of 
Experts on the African Union Border Programme Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Conference of African 
Ministers In Charge Of Border Issues 4 - 7 JUNE 2007, BP/EXP/RPT(II), p. 1. Available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2007/june/PSC/7/Report_final.doc visited 9 
December 2008. See also Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of 
Globalization, Security, and Governance (Oxon: Routledge 2008) pp. 18, 75-76. 
10 BBC Online, Guinean forces shoot Liberian Helicopter, Wednesday, 18 October, 2000, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/977835.stm. 
11  BBC Online, Hundreds killed in Guinea attack, Thursday, 7 December, 2000, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1059818.stm. 
12  Joe Bavier, “Chadians Concerned Over Growing Tensions With Sudan” Voice Of America 28 
December 2005, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-12-28-voa35.cfm. 
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Sudan, Ethiopia–Kenya. 13  Togolese rebels create refugee problems in Ghana by shelling 
border villages, Sudanese Lord’s Resistance Army, frequently attack Ugandan border villages. 
It is necessary to note that in the African experience, the end of judicial and arbitral 
proceedings in relation to boundary conflicts do not necessarily indicate the end of the danger 
to the affected population. For instance, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border situation remains volatile 
and dangerous to the population therein despite the award of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary 
Commission (EEBC).14 It needs however be mentioned that territorial, boundary and border 
disputes are not unique to Africa and that they are indeed of global dimensions.15 
 
2. AMBITIOUS DATES AND REALISM OF BOUNDARY MAKING, DELIMITATION 
AND DEMARCATION 
 
It may be fair to say that since the Berlin conference of 1885 no comprehensive effort 
has been made to consider collectively the legal and political providence of African 
boundaries. The partitioning of Africa at the Berlin Conference in The mid-nineteenth century 
marked the beginning of the renewed interest in the continent of Africa by the imperialist 
powers of Europe. Of particular interest to them at the time were the hitherto unexplored 
central African regions, comprising modern-day Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This interest 
was based on the relentless rush for raw materials and investment that these territories 
provided for Europe’s continuing industrialization. Competition between the European powers 
was severe as they coveted the opportunities that colonial subjugation assured. Much interest 
was concentrated on the Congo region (modern Zaire) upon which King Leopold II of 
Belgium had set his sights (it later turned out to be a lucrative source of rubber). However, the 
old colonial nation of Portugal, with African interests in Angola and Mozambique extending 
back over three centuries, also saw the Congo region as its historical sphere of influence. 
International rivalry and diplomatic conflicts between the principal European powers 
prompted France and Germany to suggest the notion of a European conference to resolve 
contending claims and provide for a more orderly ‘carving up’ of the continent. The 
Conference met at Berlin from November 1884 through February 1885 and resulted in an 
important agreement titled The Berlin Act of 1885. The participating states that sent 
representatives were Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the U.S.A.  
It will be the very unusual scholar who will stand behind the proposition that the 
Berlin Conference did a good job of the delimitation exercise of the African continent on 
nearly every level of enquiry. Despite the reality that cartography and mapping techniques 
have gradually improved over the years the very premise of colonial delimitation and 
demarcation which is the premise of what most of Africa is comprised is deeply flawed in very 
many ways. As far back as 1890, Lord Salisbury admitted: 
 
We have been engaged . . . in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s 
feet ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to 
                                                         
13 Troops Deployed On Border, Kenya Times 25/03/1999, 25/3/99 (FBIS-AFR-1999-0325). 
14 VOA News, UN: Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Remains Potentially Volatile, 29 December 2005 available 
at http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-12-29-voa43.cfm. Visited January 14 2006. 
15 Severe problems are currently been faced by many of the states that were in the former USSR, as a 
result of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in Northern Ireland and in the Basques area of the Franco-
Spanish Border. See also below notes 169-173. 
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each other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we 
never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were.16 
 
Not only was the delimitation largely arbitrary but the mapping exercise was far from 
a precise art. As Botswana successfully advanced in relation to the maps in Kasikili Sedudu 
case early maps show too little detail, or may be too small in scale, to be of value. The World 
Court significantly also admitted of colonial maps as follows: "maps merely constitute 
information which varies in accuracy from case to case; of themselves, and by virtue solely of 
their existence, they cannot constitute a territorial title.”17 As alleged by Nigeria in its written 
submissions to the ICJ in the land and maritime dispute, it was not unknown for colonial 
surveyors ‘‘to round things up’’ in order to save themselves from further bother or 
embarrassment at doing a shoddy job and coming up with unsupportable maps. Thus, on 
mapping and cartographic grounds alone the AUBP initiative could not have come sooner. 
The distinction between the two terms is exemplified by the experience of China 
which has delimited up to 90% of its 22,000km long international boundary with a total of 14 
states but of which it has demarcated only about 10 boundary lines.18 The problem with much 
of delimitation and demarcation work achieved by the colonial powers is that it is much less 
the product of disciplined colonial record keeping romanticised by the leading international 
courts but has proven to be far less accurate and useful by demarcators in practice. This 
credibility gap is yet to receive the required attention it deserves in much of legal writing on 
African boundaries save by few but highly respected and candid writers and commentators 
from those peoples at the receiving end of the injustices perpetrated by colonial boundary 
making.  
The problem is arguably complicated further by the conspiracy of silence involving 
both foreign and African writers and statesmen regarding the providence of the maps made by 
various colonial authorities presumably on the assumption that silence is necessary if the myth 
of uti possidetis is to have any meaning at all. There is, however, no reason to believe that the 
policy and determination of the AU expressed several times in the past to keep states faithful 
to the territory they inherited after colonialism will be irreversibly damaged if scientific 
methods are employed to verify boundaries. Those charged with delimitation and demarcation 
ought to be aware that they must remain watchful of the possibility that shoddy surveying and 
cartography may have become fossilised into boundary reality and there ought to be a healthy 
debate as to how to deal with this reality and perhaps prevent such output from surviving into 
present documents and treaties. It in fact accords with the true interests of all concerned not to 
be seen to give effect to absurdities. After all it is recognisable that the documents and 
provisions were products of previous centuries where scientific attainments was far more 
modest than at present. Brownlie in his seminal work African boundaries noted of the Benin-
Niger border as follows: 
 
                                                         
16  See Memorial of Libya in the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Vol.1, 25, 
para.3.01, quoted from The Times, 7 August 1890. 
17 Frontier Dispute (Burkinu Faso/Republic of Mali (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 582. 
18 China is said to have inherited a boundary line full of problems when founded in 1949 and has had to 
settle up to 12 territorial disputes with its neighbours. Fu Fengshan, “China’s Experience in Settling 
Boundary Disputes and its Border Management Practice” Paper Presented at 2nd International 
Symposium on Land, Maritime River and Lake Boundaries: Maputo, Mozambique 17-19 December 
2008 p.  10- 13. 
African Journal of Law and Criminology Vol. 1 Number 1 (2011), pp. 140 - 203 
 144
The alignment depends upon certain French arrêtes, of December 8, 1934, 
December 27, 1934, and October 27, 1938. The entire boundary consists 
of sectors upon the rivers Mekrou and Niger but the precise division of 
the rivers, and thus the allocation of islands, remains the subject of doubt 
since the relevant French instruments are not sufficiently precise.19  
 
The imprecision of the delimitation and the inordinate apportionment of territory 
principally along the lines of mere convenience of colonial rule, have produced untold 
confusion, conflict, tensions and wars among African peoples that have reverberated around 
the continent at least in the last five decades and up till the present.20 The declaration on the 
African Union border programme and its implementation modalities as adopted by the 
conference of African ministers in charge of border issues is potentially, therefore, one of the 
most significant legal events of the last century in relation to the African continent. The 
declaration is quite clear on the imperatives of the AU Border Programme particularly 
regarding the demands of an Africa wide delimitation and demarcation exercise. It also very 
significantly appears to have set a strict timetable for the implementation principles and 
processes in a manner that deserves closer scrutiny. It was stated: 
 
The delimitation and demarcation of boundaries depend primarily on the 
sovereign decision of the States. They must take the necessary steps to 
facilitate the process of delimitation and demarcation of African borders, 
including maritime boundaries, where such an exercise has not yet taken 
place, by respecting, as much as possible, the time-limit set in the Solemn 
Declaration on the CSSDCA. We encourage the States to undertake and 
pursue bilateral negotiations on all problems relating to the delimitation 
and demarcation of their borders, including those pertaining to the rights of 
the affected populations, with a view to finding appropriate solutions to 
these problems.21 
 
This particular significant decision appears to have originated earlier in the 
propositions and work of the Preparatory Meeting of Experts on the African Union Border 
Programme.22 The body of experts were in turn attempting to give life to the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) 
adopted in July 2002, which provided for the delimitation and demarcation of African 
boundaries, where such an exercise has not yet taken place, by 2012 latest. That particular 
instrument was not followed up by any concrete plan to facilitate the implementation of the 
ambitious plan –at least not one that is recognised as fast succeeding. Presumably therefore the 
AU has decided to give life to the noble aims expressed in the 2002 MOU. In this manner that 
                                                         
19 Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979) p. 161. 
20  Indeed it is widely recognised that European colonialism continues to underlie most territorial 
disputes in Africa. Recent examples include the Nigeria–Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula; 
the Gabon–Equatorial Guinea dispute over the islands of Mbanié, Cocotiers, and Conga in the Corisco 
Bay; the Mauritius–United Kingdom dispute over the Chagos Archipelago; and the Comoros–France. 
Mi Yung Yoon, “European Colonialism and Territorial Disputes in Africa: The Gulf of Guinea and the 
Indian Ocean” Vol. 20, Mediterranean Quarterly No. 2, Spring 2009, pp. 77-94. 
21 Paragraph 5 (a )(i), Declaration On The African Union Border Programme, supra note 3.  
22  The meeting of government experts preparatory to the Conference of African Ministers in charge of 
Border Issues, scheduled for 7 June 2007, was held in Addis Ababa from 4 to 5 June 2007. 
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African ministerial conference appears to have set a timetable of 2012 for the AU to complete 
or at least significantly achieve its desired aim of delimiting and demarcating African 
boundaries. 
It is recognisable that for lawyers, surveyors, cartographers, scientists etc. there is an 
attraction for the certainty and specificity of clearly demarcated boundaries rather than 
vagueness of mere frontiers.23 But the optimism for generating more precise boundaries across 
Africa must be balanced against the realism of the vastness of the frontiers that potentially 
have to be covered. Africa has approximately 28,000 miles of international boundaries. The 
national boundaries are recognisably of high level of Porosity with up to 109 of its 
international boundaries characterised by permeability. It is significant that experts agree that 
up to 25% of African international boundaries are completely undemarcated.24 Less than 50% 
of the world’s maritime boundaries have been agreed upon, in Africa, the number is even less 
than the average. Africa has 27 mainland coastal states. There are also seven sets of island 
states whose impacts in various ways presence on the maritime fortunes of the mainland 
coastal states.25 It is relevant that up to eight African states have utilised the avenue created 
under the law of the sea to make applications in order to extend their continental shelf by 
making Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982.26 The aim of these states is 
to secure the valuable energy/natural resources that are found therein for national 
development.27  
                                                         
23 The near esoteric discussion of the spatial demarcation between airspace and outer space has not 
escaped heated academic discussion. Hence the present writer has been moved to consider this issue 
(and some may argue ab absurdum) elsewhere. See Gbenga Oduntan, “The Never Ending Dispute: 
Legal Theories on the Spatial Demarcation Boundary Plane between Airspace and Outer Space” 
Hertfordshire Law Journal, (2003) pp. 64-83 available at 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/fms/documents/schools/law/HLJ_V1I2_Oduntan.pdf visited 10 December 2008. 
24 African international boundaries are ‘protected’ by about 350 official road crossing points, or one for 
every 80 miles of boundary. Wafula Okumu, “Border Security in Africa” Presentation made at the 
African Union Border Programme Regional Workshop Windhoek, Namibia 22-23 October 2009, p, 3. 
25 Tim Daniel, “African Maritime Boundaries” in Jonathan I. Charney, David A. Colson, Robert W. 
Smith eds., International Maritime Boundaries Vol V (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) p. 3429. 
26 UNCLOS III ILM 1245 (1982). Joint submission by the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of 
Seychelles - in the region of the Mascarene Plateau, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Joint submission by France 
and South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius - in the region of Rodrigues Island, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa 
- in respect of the mainland of the territory of the Republic of South Africa. 
27 A geomorphological description of the continental shelf encompasses the gently sloping platform of 
submerged land surrounding the continents and islands, normally extending to a depth of approximately 
200 meters or 100 fathoms at which point the seabed falls away sharply. The legal definition of the 
Continental Shelf as contained in Article 76 of the LOSC (1982) reads: “The continental shelf of a 
coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial 
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, 
or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.” Note that 
according to paragraph 3, the coastal State may also establish the outer edge of the continental margin 
wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured, by either: (i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by 
reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 
per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or (ii) a line 
delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles 
from the foot of the continental slope. (b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the 
continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. Aware 
of the immense resources that lay buried in the continental shelf, certain coastal states from the mid 
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After a submission of Continental shelf claims to the UN Division of Ocean Affairs 
and Law of the Sea, and to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS),28 
the deliberations and negotiations may involve a period of up to two and a half years. During 
this time, the African state will have to maintain a core team of experts that will have to be 
present at the UN offices. A fully fledged and equipped office will have to be maintained in 
New York by and there will be several rounds of technical deliberations and question-and-
answer sessions, where the submitting state will be asked to defend portions of its submissions. 
Presumably this again is one of the areas which the AU and indeed the AUBP will prefer an 
early rather than latter finalisation of claims. The ambitious dates set for the completion of the 
AUBP will be further tested on this front. 
Sight must also not be lost of two factors. First there is something quite African about 
adoption of frontiers as separating value between one village, community or peoples from one 
another rather than strict 'line in the sand' demarcation of late modernity (consisting of WGS 
1984 Datum System of coordinates and derived from orthorectified satellite imagery) which 
has caught the imagination of European scholars. Admittedly this question is slightly more 
than of rhetorical value in the modern world which Africa has embraced in most respects but 
the practical difficulties this reality throws up are many. The pre-existing and historical 
attitudes of African peoples may also have had an effect on the archiving practice and low 
investment of time and efforts on records, thus, complicating further the enormity of the task. 
The place names and feature names that the local populations recognise and which have been 
given defacto legitimacy for decades and centuries are in many cases different from the 
scientifically generated ones in government or colonial archives. Proper scientific surveying 
have not been done over vast territories and even where such exist they predate the use of 
modern technology and quality control methods. Deliberate destruction and alteration of 
boundary markers and pillars are as a general rule common in rural largely illiterate areas.  
Second, there is a possible argument that an inordinate and poorly executed rush 
towards strict demarcation in a continent that is held together by a controversial Latin 
American construct of uti possidetis (roughly described: snap shot of territory at 
independence) can produce potentially dangerous consequences. The issues should be handled 
with the utmost care especially where it is often the question of exactly what was inherited at 
independence that is in issue. 29  There is an undue optimism in academic writing that 
          _________________________ 
1940’s, introduced declarations to secure a beneficial utilisation regime for themselves over this 
maritime zone. 
28 Materials relating to the CLCS are available at  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm 
29 The ascendancy of the uti posidetis principle in the jurisprudence of African international law and 
relations via its manifestation as a Latin American principle and as enshrined in Article paragraph 3 of 
the OAU Charter has theoretically transfixed African boundaries. Yet there is some merit to the 
argument that the limits of uti possidetis as policy must be recognised. The true target of the principle is 
the doctrine of protection of boundaries and borders. Uti possidetis was not even in the Latin American 
sense designed to answer neither back to separatists nor to trump the right of self determination. It 
definitely should not be an incantation against well founded exercise of the rights of a people to self 
determination. For critical views on uti possidetis see Ratner’s excellent article op.cit., See e.g. 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (1979); Ardent supporters of the principle like 
Santiago Torres Bernardez, admit the uti possidetis doctrine still has to be reconciled with developments 
in law  and “the evolution of the rules of international law governing, for example succession, self 
determination, acquisition of title to territory, frontiers and other territorial regimes, treaty law, 
intertemporal law, etc. ” See e.g. Torres Bernárdez, `The "Uti Possidetis Juris Principle" in Historical 
Perspective', in K. Ginther et al (eds), Festschrift für Karl Zemanek (1994), p. 436. International Crisis 
Group, “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential” p.6. Reports of the International Crisis 
Group are available at www.crisisgroup.org accessed June 5 2007. 
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uti possidetis is a magic wand that can resolve every territorial and boundary contest in ex 
colonial settings. There is indeed a certain danger that if the AU Border Programme is not 
successfully prosecuted events may conspire to endanger the delicate balance achieved under 
the uti possidetis principle in Africa.  
The merits and demerits of the uti possidetis doctrine are beyond this paper and will 
not be delved into save as it may concern the AU Borders Programme. Yet it is possible if not 
desirable to question the time scale set for the programme. Perhaps instead of the 
present effort at simultaneous consideration of all undelimited and undemarcated territories 
across the continent time it may be better to proceed by adoption of a phased regional 
approach. Thus, for instance, West Africa may be the focus of the next 10 years followed by a 
move of the programme to East Africa, South Africa and then Africa north of the Sahara.30 A 
phased approach reduces the severity of costs, risks and the overall demands on the institutions 
and experts involved. Lessons may be learnt from earlier phases and the experience would 
prove valuable during latter stages.  
The phased implementation option in fact accords with international practice of 
demarcation and consideration of delimitation task by international courts. Sectoral analysis 
and demarcation in phases was applied by both the Courts and implementation bodies in the 
Cameroon-Nigeria and Eritrea-Ethiopia processes.31 For the AU Border programme to succeed 
it requires the input of a large number of experienced experts to undertake the enormous tasks 
ahead. These include competent and independent geologists, surveyors, hydrographers, 
cartographers and lawyers. There is also the need for capacity development in the requisite 
African international courts and tribunals in order to be able to competently handle complex 
boundary matters particularly of a maritime nature and to be able to develop a regional 
jurisprudence that will be able to cope with a possible upsurge in delimitation and demarcation 
disputes. It is fair to say that the required institutional and skilled capacity may be lacking 
presently unless drastic strategies are adopted. The choice is not really between allowing 
sleeping dogs lie and waking them up. It is arguably that of waking them up selectively and 
managing events in a controlled fashion and to deal with unexpected cases of rabid reactions 
not only among states but even within them.32 
In relation to the above it is reasonable to raise three queries. Could it be said that the 
dates set in 2002 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government allowing for a ten year 
                                                         
30 It has been suggested that the African border programme itself emanated from the desire to expand on 
achievements of the West African region. It may be that what is needed is to consolidate this further and 
then move on sequentially to other areas. OECD, Cross-Border Diaries West African Borders And 
Integration Bulletin On West African Local-Regional Realities Issue 06, June 2007. The Cross-border 
Diaries are published both in French and English and are available on www.oecd.org/sah ; 
www.afriquefrontieres.org ; visited 21 December 2008. 
31 The EEBC adopted the three-sector delimitation of the international boundary between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. 
32  One of the consequences of changes and shifts in international boundaries is that it may create 
traumatic and irreversible changes within national boundaries. This phenomenon may be hardest hitting 
on resource rich federal states. As a result of the recent handover of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon by 
Nigeria in 2008, the Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) redefined the 
entire maritime territory of the federal states abutting the pertinent section of the Gulf of Guinea. As a 
result the entire maritime territory of Cross River State became ceded to its neighbouring Akwa Ibom 
state. The former state became declassified as a littoral state and became required to transfer 76 oil wells 
in favour of the latter. Cross River State Government, “RMAFC, Imoke Receives Report, Frowns at 
Data Collection News & Press Releases 2009/7/8  
http://crossriverstate.gov.ng/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=49 visited 8 Jan 10; News & Press 
Releases: Elders condemn delisting of Cross River as Oil Producing State 2009/7/1 available at 
http://crossriverstate.gov.ng/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=44 visited 8 Jan 10. 
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period to complete such a major programme was in the first place very ambitious? Could that 
inscription have been an expression of a desire to begin to address seriously the issue and put 
in place a credible programme of action by 2012?  Considering that the programme is just 
about to be meaningfully addressed could it be perhaps unrealistic for those charged with 
various aspects of the implementation to still stick to the 2012 date?33 Indeed the period 2002 
and 2012 would perhaps be best recognised as the consultative period for the Border 
Programme and the remainder of this period be judiciously and ever so seriously committed to 
deep studies and sociological, scientific and legal enquiries in to the nature of the important 
tasks before African states in terms of the delimitation and demarcation of international 
boundaries.   
Perhaps a more practical strategy and one which in a very cynical world will present 
the African Union as a competent intergovernmental organisation is to cast the African Union 
Border Programme within a 30 year completion period. As will be argued below the 
delimitation of territory and the subsequent demarcation are complex tasks the seriousness of 
which may be sacrificed by underestimation and under-preparation by the parties and interests 
involved. Assuming for arguments sake that all factors necessary for achieving delimitation of 
remaining and yet to be demarcated African boundaries are presently available (including 
scientific data, adequate funds, reliable satellite imagery, cartographic evidence, appreciable 
political will etc.; it would hardly be possible to complete the task even within 10 years from 
now simply on the grounds of a dearth of qualified and experienced surveyors alone. 
Employment contracts will have to be developed, qualified and adequately experienced staff 
will have to be attracted to Africa from abroad. They will be relocated with their families, 
language and logistic problems will be significant and questions of impartiality that is required 
in international survey work will have to be reconciled in the employment pattern. There are 
also local realities that may make progress extremely difficult if not impossible. Example may 
be made of boundary areas that need to be cleared of mines from previous wars and conflicts 
before any reaffirmation or reconnaissance surveying work can be done. This is the case in 
certain boundary areas between Mozambique and Zimbabwe.34  
Since negotiations are the prescribed means by which Maritime delimitation is 
achieved it is clear that negotiating the important multilayered jurisdictional zones known to 
the law of the sea are not events that can be meaningfully rushed.  The LOSC 1982 recognised 
12nautical miles (nm) for the territorial sea, 24nm for the contiguous zone, 200nm for the EEZ, 
and the 350nm maximum for the extended continental shelf.  Delineating these zones in the 
special circumstances and under the influence of opposing coasts, competing islands, rocks, 
reefs etc have been known to last for decades between some countries. There is no doubt that 
this will also be the case in the African maritime setting. Having said this it is also fair to note 
that where there is good political will and determination much can be achieved in considerable 
little time even by African states. Example may be made here of the tremendous successes of 
Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria Sao Tome and Principe maritime negotiations. 
                                                         
33 After the inception of the programme in 2002 about 5 years appear to have been lost whilst the 
infrastructure and funding for the programme was sought and put in place. Thus, the period of serious 
activity by the AUBP is quite recent although its productivity in that short time is clearly commendable 
given the immense tasks before it. 
34 A writer notes of this zone “these are bombs - not time bombs so much as timeless bombs - that have 
been strewn recklessly across the path of development in countries like Angola and Mozambique, a 
deadly legacy of the region's long agony of war. And they are primed, quite literally, to go off: again . . . 
and again”. Alex Vines, “The southern Africa minefield”, vol. 11 Southern Africa Report Archive no 1. 
p. 19. Available at http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=3915 Visited 14 Dec. 2008. 
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Perhaps a few examples from the ongoing Cameroon-Nigeria exercise will be 
pertinent as illustration of the resource requirements and the extensive time scale of 
delimitation and demarcation work in a contemporary context. Comparisons may also be made 
with the implementation of the Namibia-Botswana judgment. The Land and Maritime case 
culminated decades of tensions between the two states. 35  The delimitation instruments 
governing the land boundary were many but easily agreed upon by the parties and the 
delimitation of the court in this case is in a sense not new as its task was to give recognition 
and effect to long standing colonial treaties.36 On the whole, the Court’s delimitation involved 
some 17 points that were in dispute along the entire land boundary.37 In the Botswana Namibia 
case the international boundary between both countries was determined by delimitation 
attained in the provisions of article 3 of the Anglo-German Agreement signed in Berlin on the 
1st July 1890. Similarly the implementation stage of the judgment was guided by the colonial 
treaty as well as the Agreement between Namibia and Botswana establishing the joint 
Commission among other varied but easily agreed upon.38  
                                                         
35  Relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have long been strained due to problems along their 
common border, which is more than 1700 kilometers long and extends from Lake Chad to the sea. 
These problems were aggravated by the mutual challenge of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula and 
Lake Chad. On 29 March 1994 the Republic of Cameroon filed in the Registry of the Court an 
Application instituting proceedings against The Federal Republic of Nigerian a dispute concerning the 
question of sovereignty over the Peninsula of Bakassi, and requesting the Court to determine the course 
of the maritime frontier between the two States in so far as that frontier had not already been established 
in 1975. See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment, Preliminary Objections [1998] ICJ 2, 11 June 1998 
(www.worllii.org/int/cases/ICJ/1998/2.html); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 
1998 in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon) (www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_19990325_frame.htm); Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), 
Judgment, Merits, 10 October 2002 (www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icnjudgment/); see particularly 
para.30. For a brief pre-independence era outline of the disputed area see Mendelson op.cit., 224-227. 
Maurice Mendelson, “The Cameroon-Nigeria Case in the International Court of Justice: Some 
Territorial Sovereignty And Boundary Delimitation Issues” vol. LXXV BYIL (2004). 
36 The Court noted in para.82 that both States agree that the land boundary between their respective 
territories from Lake Chad onwards has already been delimited, partly by the Thomson–Marchand 
Declaration (Declaration made by the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and the 
governor of the French Cameroons defining the Boundary between British and French Cameroons. Ian 
Brownlie, See African Boundaries: a legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst & 
Company, for the Royal institute of International Affairs, 1979) pp 570 -578.) as incorporated in the 
Henderson–Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931, partly by the British Order in Council of 2 August 
1946 and partly by the Anglo–German Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913. The Court likewise 
noted that, with the exception of the provisions concerning Bakassi contained in Arts XVIII et seq. of 
the Anglo–German Agreement of 11 March 1913, Cameroon and Nigeria both accept the validity of the 
four above-mentioned legal instruments which effected this delimitation. 
37 See ICJ Reports 2002, 360, para.86. The interpretation and application of the Thomson–Marchand 
Declaration of 1929–30 constituted the major part of the Court’s work. 
38 Other  important working documents adopted for the demarcation exercise are the: Eason Survey 
report of 1912, Kalahari Reconnaissance of 1925; Kalahari Reconnaissance of 1943; 1943 aerial 
photographs of the area1897 map by Schultz and Hamar; 1905 map of Ngamiland by Franz Seiner and 
Stigands, compiled between 1910 – 1922; 1987 mosaic with flight index and photography from shaile 
up to Lake Liambezi; Eason Survey report of 1912, Kalahari Reconnaissance of 1925; 1925 aerial 
photography; Kalahari Reconnaissance of 1943; Kalahari expedition of 1945; 1943 aerial photographs 
of the area1897 map by Schultz and Hamar; 1905 map of Ngamiland by Franz Seiner and Stigands, 
compiled bet 1910 – 1922; 1987 mosaic with flight index and photography from shaile up to Lake 
Liambezi; Swampy Island correspondence of 1910. 
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The modus operandi of the parties in giving effect to the judgment of the court in both 
processes is widely regarded as the gold standard in contemporary post-boundary dispute 
demarcation work. 39  But it also reveals in its detail the painstaking work that attends a 
demarcation effort and the potentially time consuming nature of the task. In order to achieve 
the objective listed above, both Nigeria and Cameroon appointed six (6) members each to the 
Cameroon Nigeria Mixed Commission. The Federal Government of Nigeria appointed Prince 
Bola Ajibola (former judge of the ICJ) as Chairman to the Nigerian side. 40  Cameroon 
appointed His Excellency Amadou Ali as Chairman to the Cameroonian side.41 The activities 
and meetings are chaired from 2002 till 2007 by the United Nations Special Representative for 
West Africa, His Excellency, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah who was replaced in late 2007 by H. E. 
Lamine Cisse and in 2008 by Saïd Djinnit. In addition, the Mixed Commission found it 
necessary to establish the six Sub-Committees to handle the various facets of its assignments. 
They include: the Sub-Commission on Demarcation which subsumes a Joint Technical Team 
(JTT);42 Sub-Commission on Affected Populations;43 Working Group on the Resettlement of 
those affected by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judgment in the Lake Chad area;44 
Working Group on Maritime Boundary;45 Mixed Commission Observer Personnel;46 Working 
Group on the Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority.47 
The Namibia-Botswana process was much shorter in time frame but of course the 
issues involved in the implementation exercise were different and perhaps not as complex as 
the Cameroon-Nigeria. The agreement for the establishment and the Terms of Reference of the 
Joint Commission of Technical Experts for the delimitation and demarcation of the boundary 
                                                         
39 See Said Djinnit, “Opening Speech by the Chairman of the Mixed Commission” Twenty -Third 
Meeting of the Mixed Commission Yaounde 9 October 2008; Amadou Ali Chef De La Delegation  Du 
Cameroun A L’Ouverture De Le La 23eme Session De La Commission Mixte Yaounde , Le 09 Octobre 
2008; See also G. O. Uzochukwu Okafor, “Namibian Boundary: Experience With Delimitation and 
Demarcation”, Paper presented at the Regional Workshop on African Border Programme (Windhoek 
22-23 October 2009).   
40 Other members to the Nigerian side are: Mrs. Nella Andem-Ewa; Barrister Mohammed Monguno; Lt. 
General A. F. K. Akale OFR (rtd); Amb. Femi George; National Boundary Commission (Secretariat). 
41 Other members of the Cameroonian side are H. E. Martin E. Belinga; H. E. Prof. Maurice Kamto; 
Gen. Pierre Semengue; H. E. John Dion Ngute; Mr. Ernest Bodo Abanda. 
42  The Sub-Commission on Demarcation was established to ensure the demarcation of the land 
boundary between two countries in line with the ICJ judgment. This body continues impressively to 
carry out its important work along the estimated 2000 kilometre land boundary. The JTT is made up of 
technical officials from Nigeria, Cameroon and the United Nations and are responsible for the physical 
demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries. 
43 This Committee was established to identify and assess the situation of the people affected by the ICJ 
judgment and establish modalities for the protection of their rights. The Committee has since concluded 
its assignment. This Committee has since concluded its assignment of resettling Nigerians in the Lake 
Chad area. 
44 This Committee has since concluded its assignment of resettling Nigerians in the Lake Chad area. 
45 This is made up of Surveyors, Oceanographers and Lawyers from Nigeria, Cameroon and the United 
Nations. They are responsible for the delineation of the maritime boundary in accordance with the ICJ 
ruling. 
46 This is the group that goes to all the areas affected by the ICJ judgment on the land boundary. In 
particular, however, the group visits Bakassi every two months to assess the human right situation, 
violations of any type, economic and social issues and problems of the environment and ecosystem. 
47 With particular reference to the Bakassi Peninsula, the Mixed Commission established a Working 
Group on the Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority from the Bakassi Peninsula. The Working Group is 
made up of ten (10) officials each from Nigeria and Cameroon with representations from the United 
Nations. This body has met twice since its establishment. Given the complex and sensitive nature of the 
assignment in this sector, its work has to move step by step and each step strictly has to be approved at 
the highest level of Government particularly by the two Heads of State and the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. 
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between Namibia & Botswana along Kwando/Linyanti/Chobe river was signed in 1999. A 
team of 8 Commissioners divided equally between both countries was appointed. The 
Commissioners consisted of permanent secretaries and Directors from the relevant agencies. 
The Commissioners are supported by a technical team consisting of surveyors, lawyers and 
hydrologists. The first meeting was held on 8 March 2000 in Windhoek. The meetings (just as 
latter became the practice in the Cameroon-Nigeria process) alternated between the two 
countries and a total of 23 meetings were held before the conclusion at the 23rd meeting was 
held from 22- 23 June 2002.48 
 
The mandate of the Joint Commission was to use scientific methods to best interpret 
the provision of the original colonial boundary treaty based on the Berlin Conference of 1884. 
The difficulties before a demarcation tribunal charged with the technical and politically 
fraught task of transforming legal judgments into reality was exposed in many ways in both 
processes. With regard to a major river feature in the Namibia-Botswana process the Berlin 
1884 treaty documents indicate the river boundary as the middle of the river. However, on this 
river there are multiple channels and in some cases the river is not visible (no water flowing on 
the surface). The Commission took a reconnaissance trip, by helicopter over the area. The joint 
technical support team inspected the reference beacons along the river, after which they drew 
up an action plan that was approved by the Commission. Aerial photos/orthophotos of 0.5 
resolution were acquired. Apart from the master negatives all other documents were delivered 
in duplicates. Where stripes of negatives fall entirely on either country, that particular country 
will take custody of the complete strip of negatives. In case of overlaps, negatives are shared 
such that one party takes the odd numbered negatives while the other takes the even ones.49 
It is clear that the task of demarcation of boundaries in Africa much like that of 
demarcation anywhere in the world is difficult and complex nature. The work is very sensitive 
and cannot in the best of circumstances be rushed.50 It is notable that the establishment of joint 
commissions and mixed implementation working groups on a multilayered level is now a 
standard practice of boundary making and management on the African continent and 
elsewhere. It may be necessary for one single state to engage in such arrangements with all its 
neighbors and to operate them simultaneously. Indeed the requirement to do so has become 
unavoidable for many states as a result of the AUBP.51 Note may be taken of the experience of 
Burkina Faso in the maintenance of its approximately 3,500 km common boundary with six 
other states -Benin Republic, Cote-d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Togo. Although the 
argument is advanced here that the AU Border Programme appears to be ambitious in terms of 
time frame it is hoped that this is not taken to mean that its intentions are not based on the 
noblest intentions of the pertinent policy makers or not laudable. Indeed the question that 
suggests itself is why the policy took so long in coming.  
                                                         
48 Okafor op.cit., pp. 13-24.  
49 Ibid., pp. 13-24. 
50 The Namibia-Botswana process was perhaps quite expeditious in comparison with the Cameroon 
Nigeria process. It included: Ground Marking (26-07-2000 to 20-08-2000); Photography (20-08-2000 to 
31-08-2000); Mapping (31-08-2000 to 15-01-2001); Delimitation and Digitising (01-09-2000 to 15-03-
2001) Study Report (Technical) (15-03-2001 to 15-04-2001); Study Report (Commission) (15-04-2001 
to 25-05-2001); Report Approval by the Commission  (01-06-2001) Demarcation (25-06-2001 to 24-
08-2001) Commission Draft Report (24-08-2001 to 14-09-2001) Commission Final Report (30-09-
2001). 
51 Claude Obin Tapsoba ‘‘La Politique De Gestion Des Frontieres AU Burkina Faso’’2eme Symposium 
International Sur La Gestion Des Frontieres Terrestres, Maritimes, Fluviales Et Lacustres Maputo, 
Mozambique 17 – 19 Decembre 2008, p. 3.  
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The continent has had more than its fair share of international disputes and boundary 
related problems that it is to near universal acclaim that the policy is received.52 It goes 
without saying that the African Union Border Programme if it is to succeed at all must 
complement the exercise of sovereignty among African States through mutual respect for 
national governments. 
 
3. STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION BORDER 
PROGRAMME 
 
The implementation of the AUBP was designed to be effected at several levels – 
national, regional and continental. It is also notable that the responsibility of each of these 
levels should be determined on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity and respect for the 
sovereignty of States. In this regard, the Declaration specifies the respective roles to be played 
by Member States, the Regional Economic Communities and the AU with respect to the 
various components of the AUBP, namely border delimitation and demarcation, local cross-
border cooperation and capacity building. With respect to resource mobilization and 
partnership, the Ministers requested the AU Commission to coordinate and implement the 
AUBP on the basis of an inclusive governance involving the Member States, the RECs, locally 
elected representatives, parliamentarians, and civil society, as well as the European border 
movement, particularly the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR),53 the United 
Nations and other AU partners having experience in cross-border cooperation. 54 
In order to launch the AUBP, in accordance with the decisions as adopted by the 
Conference of African Ministers in charge of Border Issues, held on 7 June 2007 a number of 
initial measures to be taken by the Commission were identified. These include: launching of a 
Pan-African survey of borders, through a questionnaire to be sent to all Member States, in 
order to facilitate the delimitation and demarcation of African borders; identification of pilot 
regions or initiatives for the rapid development of regional support programmes on cross-
border cooperation, as well as support for the establishment of regional funds for local cross-
border cooperation; working out modalities for cooperation with other regions of the world to 
benefit from their experiences and to build the necessary partnerships; initiation an assessment 
with regard to capacity building; preparation of a continental legal instrument on cross-border 
cooperation; and the launching of a partnership and resource mobilization process for the 
                                                         
52 Department of Public Information News and Media Division “Secretary-General Pledges Support for 
African Union Border Demarcation Efforts”, In Message To Seminar On Implementation Of Regional 
SG/SM/11309AFR/1626, New York Available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11309.doc.htm visited 8 December 2008; Federal 
Foreign Office, “Speech by Dr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the 
luncheon for African Heads of Delegation” (New York, 23 September 2008) available at 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Rede/2008/080924-BM-UN-
DelegationsleiterAfrika.html visited 12 December 2008. 
53 The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) was founded in 1971. It acts for the benefit of 
all European borders and cross border regions. The aims of the AEBR include making their particular 
problems, opportunities, tasks and projects intelligible; representing their overall interests to national 
and international parliaments, organs, authorities and institutions; initiating, support and co-ordinate 
their co-operation throughout Europe (creation of a network); exchanging know-how and information in 
order to formulate and co-ordinate common interests on the basis of the various cross-border problems 
and opportunities, and offering adequate solutions.Visit http://www.aebr.net/ 
54 African Union, “Report of the Commission on the Implementation  of the African Union Border 
Programme” Executive Council Fourteenth Ordinary Session” 29 - 30 January 2009 Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia  EX. CL/459 (XIV)  p. 1. 
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implementation of the AUBP. These measures and strategies appear to be in line with good 
practice. However, whether they are effective and sufficient to achieve the purposes of this 
elaborate project, remain to be seen considering the time frame left for performance. 
It needs be mentioned that a number of years were initially lost after the 
announcement of the AUBP. Inaction in the next few years after the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government announcement of January 2002 has been as disruptive of the process as 
it has perhaps been surprising given the tight schedule of the initial completion date and given 
the apparent enormity of the tasks. It is hardly possible to overestimate the negative effect of 
these lost years on the possibility of a comprehensive and qualitative attainment of the tasks 
set before the AUBP, certainly within the regulation time. The most obvious reason for the 
delay appears to be the difficulties of raising enough monetary support for the programme. It 
may be fair to say that real work started in 2007 when the AU Commission, with the financial 
support of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ),55 organized a workshop in Djibouti, on 
1 and 2 December 2007, to assist it in elaborating a three-year plan of action for the 
implementation of the AUBP. Representatives of RECs and other African integration 
organizations, African river basin institutions, the African Development Bank (AfDB),56 the 
UN Secretariat and other UN institutions, the European Union (EU), the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and a number of specialized institutions and experts brainstormed on 
the programme. 57  It is not insignificant that the period after this successful workshop 
represents the beginning of real implementation as the vigorous discussions helped to develop 
strategies based on a synergy among the African and foreign experts and technocrats. 
Experience shared with those outside the continent focused the attention of decision makers 
within the AU and African governments to the financial and logistic requirements of their 
aspirations. 
In pursuance of the Accra Decision 58  and based on this highly complex 
implementation matrix, the AU Commission has undertaken the following activities: a) Pan-
African Survey of Borders involving principally the formulation of a highly detailed 
questionnaire to be sent to all Member States, in order to facilitate the delimitation and 
demarcation of African borders.59 On 15 April 2008 the erstwhile Chairperson of the AUBP 
                                                         
55  The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH is an international 
cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwide operations. It supports the German 
Government in achieving its development-policy objectives and provides viable, forwardlooking 
solutions for political, economic, ecological and social development in a globalised world. GTZ has 
operations in more than 130 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern regions, as well as in Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. It maintains its own offices in 87 
countries. The company employs nearly 13,000 staff, almost 10,000 of whom are national personnel. 
Materials and information about the GTZ are available at http://www.gtz.de/en/ 
56 Visit http://www.afdb.org/ 
57 The workshop made it possible for the Commission to elaborate an implementation matrix, which 
covers a number of areas: capacity building; popularization; delimitation and demarcation, including the 
survey of African borders, the mobilization of resources and exchange of experiences; cross-border 
cooperation, including the elaboration of the required legal frameworks and the establishment of 
regional funds; partnership and resource mobilization. African Union, “Report of the Commission on 
the Implementation of the African Union Border Programme” Executive Council Fourteenth Ordinary 
Session p. 3. 
58 At its 11th Ordinary Session held in Accra, Ghana, from 25 to 29 June 2007, the Executive Council 
endorsed the Declaration on the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) and its Implementation 
Modalities, as adopted by the Conference of African Ministers in charge of Border Issues, held in Addis 
Ababa, on 7 June 2007. 
59  See Appendix II: AU Boundary Questionnaire -Boundary Survey for the African Union Border 
Programme. 
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Alpha Oumar Konaré, wrote to all Ministers of Foreign Affairs/External Relations of Member 
States, to forward the questionnaire to the appropriate Ministries and/or departments in their 
respective national territories, highlighting its importance in the overall implementation of the 
AUBP. The questionnaire covers issues relating to the status of Member States’ continental 
and maritime boundaries, as well as the contact details of the institutions responsible for 
border issues (See Appendix I). By the end of 2009 only ten Member States had responded to 
the questionnaire. The respondent states are: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia. It is recognisable that the rate of 
response to the questionnaire is slow and that this will certainly make the tight deadlines 
imposed by the AU on the AUBP even more difficult if not impossible to achieve. Only one 
out of 5 countries have filled their questionnaire. Reasons for the slow responses that may be 
suggested include difficulties in pinpointing which precise governmental agencies/department 
is in a position to fill in responses; unavailability of required data; political interference; loss 
of data as a result of civil or other wars and conflicts such as in the Sierra Leonean experience 
and perhaps sheer disinterest.60 Although there are not really many of such instances there are 
also factors such as the peculiar situation of Mauritania which would like to settle its northern 
lateral maritime boundary in the light of massive offshore oil resources but face serious 
problem of the uncertain status of Western Sahara whose statehood has yet to be recognised 
internationally and especially by Morocco.61 
The second aspect of the progression of the AUBP is the establishment of a Boundary 
Information System (BIS) that aims to analyse and facilitate the utilization of the information 
received in response to the questionnaire. On 15 July 2008, the Commission organized, in 
Addis Ababa, a technical meeting on the establishment of the BIS which brought together 
experts from the RECs, the UN, GTZ and relevant African and international institutions. The 
core functions of the BIS are to provide an overview of the status of all African borders based 
on the questionnaire returns. The information received so far has been used to monitor 
progress towards the delimitation and demarcation of national boundaries inter se. Other 
functions of the BIS include the formulation of a database of African border experts and cross-
border cooperation initiatives in the continent.62 The value of such a resource is inestimable in 
a continent with perhaps a predictable active future of territorial determination and 
redetermination. The Commission has been mobilizing the required expertise, as well as 
acquiring the IT equipment needed to facilitate the operation of the BIS. The value of a 
centralised database of boundary positions and markers in the possession of the AU cannot 
also be overestimated. In a continent that has been prone to destabilising internal and 
international conflicts and wars a dependable and trustworthy custodian of important territorial 
records is inestimable. 
The third aspect of the AU Commission’s work involves the sensitization of the 
governments and institutions of African states about the goals and aspirations of the AUBP. 
This aspect has taken the shape of (i) Regional workshops on the AUBP; ii) Publication of a 
                                                         
60 The delegate of Sierra Leone pointed out at the Regional Workshop on African Border Programme 
(Windhoek 22-23 October 2009) held in Namibia that his country lost a lot off its geographic data 
during the civil war and that they are still in the process of shoring up that database by recourse to the 
AU records. 
61 Daniel op.cit p. 3429. 
62 African Union, “Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the African Union Border 
Programme” opcit., p.  5. 
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brochure on the AUBP63; (iii) Elaboration of an Outreach Strategy. Between 2008 and 2009 
five regional workshops have been concluded. The workshops targeted the various 
stakeholders across the continent on the AUBP and sought to mobilise their support for its 
implementation. The African RECs of which there are eight were particularly targeted in order 
to elaborate regional action plans within the framework of the implementation of the 
Programme. The RECs are expected under the process by the AU to have security plans to 
assist with the prioritisation of boundaries marking and management. The security plans are 
expected to be presented before the council of ministers in the near future and to receive 
approval. After such ratification each of them are expected to sign the plan and the process 
will be accelerated. The problem with this is the principle of subsidiarity operating within the 
AU which devolves responsibilities to states and therefore the bulk of the work can only take 
place meaningfully bilaterally.64 The goal of the outreach programme is to create awareness 
and support for the AUBP among Member States and other actors, including civil society 
organizations and border communities. The strategy, thus aims to build a sustainable dialogue 
with key stakeholders by highlighting the potential benefits of the programme as a platform to 
transform African borders from barriers to bridges. The elaborate plans for information 
dissemination, some of which are clearly unique in the history of territorial demarcation law 
and practice are perhaps summed up in the following statement: 
 
In the coming months, the Commission will embark on the 
implementation of the pan-African aspects of the strategy. Among other 
activities, it is planned to feature articles and place adverts in in-flight 
magazines of major African airlines, especially given their role in 
connecting the African countries and allowing exchanges between 
nations; carry out specific activities with pan-African TV broadcasters; 
and work with existing African film festivals to introduce awards for film 
making competitions on border issues.65 
 
One of the ways the AUBP has been presented to stakeholders is that it contains 
measures that are aimed at facilitating cross-border cooperation of local initiatives. The basic 
framework of a database on legislation relating to border cooperation and the outlines of a 
continental legal framework for the engagement of cross-sector initiatives involving both the 
                                                         
63 In mid-August 2008, the Commission, with the assistance of UNHCR, published in a booklet format 
the Declaration on the AUBP and its Implementation Modalities. This booklet was circulated to all 
diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa, as well as to a number of institutions in the continent and outside 
Africa. It has also been posted on the AU website. FIND 
64 The first regional workshop took place in Kampala, from 24 to 25 September 2008, under the joint 
auspices of the AU and the EAC. The workshop was attended by the following members of the Eastern 
Africa region: Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania 
and Uganda. Other participants included CENSAD, COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS and IGAD, the 
United Nations, GTZ and other partner organizations. The second regional workshop took place in 
Algiers, for the Northern African Region, from 16 to 17 October 2008. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, SADR 
and Tunisia participated in the workshop. Other participants included representatives of CENSAD, 
COMESA, EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS, as well as the UN, GTZ and other institutions. The three 
other regional workshops were held in 2009. The workshop for Central Africa took place in Libreville 
from 19 to 20 February 2009; the one for Southern Africa in October 2009 and the one for West Africa, 
in Ouagadougou, in April 2009. African Union, “Report Of The Commission on the Implementation of 
the African Union Border Programme” Executive Council Fourteenth Ordinary Session 29 - 30 January 
2009 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia EX. CL/459 (XIV) pp. 5-6. 
65  African Union, “Report of the Commission on the Implementation  of the African Union Border 
Programme” Executive Council Fourteenth Ordinary Session 29 - 30 January 2009, opcit.,  p. 7. 
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public and private sector are for the first time in African history emerging. The AU 
Commission, has also taken steps aimed at facilitating the communication by the former 
colonial powers of all information in their possession concerning the delimitation and 
demarcation of African boundaries, in line with paragraph 5 (a - iii) of the Declaration on the 
AUBP and its Implementation Modalities. Certain preliminary conclusions may be reached on 
these developments. Whether or not the AUBP succeeds in its objectives within the specified 
time is certain to be a subjective assessment but the continent can not but benefit tremendously 
from the strategic and systematic exercises conducted under the AUBP. The law, diplomacy 
and politics of the AUBP and its current direction is an indication of the political maturity and 
coming of age of African states. This process and its modest achievements deserve closer 
study and attention than is currently accorded to it by lawyers, social scientists and other 
scholars -even those on the African continent itself. 
 
4. FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION  
 
It is necessary to set the ambition of Africa to successfully demarcate and delimit its 
independent and sovereign territories within the context of international law and international 
relations. Terms like boundaries, border, frontiers, delimitation demarcation and territory are 
often used interchangeably in language without much deference to their technical legal 
connotations. It is necessary to formulate clear distinctions between these terms, which 
sometimes even in legal literature, are treated as synonyms and are virtually indistinguishable 
to the layman while recognising at the same time the interconnectedness of the pertinent 
concepts. 
Sovereignty in law is often considered to be the essence of the state. It explains the 
powers of a state over its entire territories and its inhabitants. The normal complements of 
state rights including the typical case of legal competence are described commonly as 
sovereignty. 66  The concept is political in conception and is popularly symbolised by the 
Leviathan of Hobbes. It implies the supreme authority of a state, which recognises no higher 
authority in the region. 67  Bodin developed the concept in terms of internal strength and 
external limitation of power.68 Jowitt picks up on this theme and defines sovereignty as: “[t]he 
power in a state to which none other is superior”.69 As the respected jurist Max Huber wrote in 
his opinion in the Island of Palmas Arbitration between the U.S.A and the Netherlands, 
“[s]overeignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regards 
to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein to the exclusion of any other the 
functions of a state...”70 In modern literature the term sovereignty has been employed in four 
different ways, which do not necessarily overlap in the sense that a state can have one and not 
necessarily the other.  
They are namely -international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic 
sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. Reference to international legal sovereignty 
                                                         
66 lan Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1998) p. 106. 
67 G.S. Sachdeva “Sovereignty in the Air - A Legal Perspective”, 22 Indian Journal of International 
Law (1982), p. 398. 
68 lmre Anthony Csbaffi, , The Concept of the State Jurisdiction in International Space Law: A Study in 
the Development of Space Law in the United Nations, (Hague: Martinus Nijthoff, 1971), p. 50. 
69 Jowitts Dictionary of English Law, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2 John Burke (ed.), (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd., 
London, 1977) p. 1678. 
70 lsland of Palmas Case (1928) R.l.A.A.; 2 829.  
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denotes the practices that are associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial 
entities that possess formal juridical independence. Westphalian sovereignty refers to political 
organisation, which is based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures 
within a specific territory. Domestic sovereignty explains the ability of a state to exercise 
effective control within its territory and the competence to construct formal organisation of 
political authority within the polity. Lastly, interdependence sovereignty is used in reference to 
the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods people, 
pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.71  
 
The Chinese view on state sovereignty is that it is tantamount to territorial integrity 
and that ascertainment of territorial boundaries is a factor necessarily “conducive to the sound 
development of relations with neighbours” and “peace and stability in the border regions”72 A 
likely model in terms of legal and political attitude to boundary cooperation and management 
is that expressed by a Chinese delegate who asserted: 
 
We would continue to uphold the policy of friendship and partnership 
with all neighbours and concurrently promoting security and 
development in the border regions, so as to create an East Asia of 
everlasting peace and common development.73  
 
This Westphalian conceptualisation of sovereignty constitutes the predominant 
approach of African states and is in many ways based on their shared history of colonial 
experience and hard fought independence struggles. Territorial jurisdiction is seen as the sum 
total of the state’s powers in respect of a portion of terra firma under its governmental 
authority including all persons and things therein, and the extra-territorial activities of such 
persons.74 It denotes the power of legislation, executive and judicial competence over a defined 
territory.75 It is generally derived from territorial sovereignty, but it may also be derived from 
treaties, as in the case of mandated, trust or leased territories. It may also derive from 
occupatio pacifica or bellica.76 The principle of territorial supremacy arises from the view that 
a state has absolute and exclusive authority over people, things and events within its own 
territory and therefore may exercise jurisdiction over them in all cases.77 But the problem of 
                                                         
71 International legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty centre upon issues of legitimacy and 
authority but exclude control. However, they are both based on what Krasner calls “certain distinct rules 
or logic of appropriateness”. The rule for international legal sovereignty is that recognition is extended 
to territorial entities which possess formal juridical independence while the rule for Westphalian 
sovereignty is the exclusion of external actors both de facto or de jure, from state territory. On the other 
hand domestic sovereignty involves both authority and control in the sense that it encompasses the 
specification of legitimate authority within a given state and the extent to which that authority may be 
exercised. Interdependence sovereignty is exclusively concerned with control and not authority as it 
explains the inherent capacity of the state to regulate movements across its borders. See Stephen D. 
Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999) pp. 3-4. 
72 Fengshan op.cit., p. 14. 
73 Ibid p. 56. 
74 B. Cheng, “The Extra-Territorial Application of International Law,” Current Legal Problems (1965), 
p. 135.  
75 See U.O. Umozurike, Introduction to International Law Lagos: Spectrum Law Publishing (1993) p. 
86. 
76 Cheng, op. cit., p. 135. 
77 Some authors like Starke choose to refer to these overwhelming powers as territorial sovereignty. The 
question then arises as to whether there is a possible distinction between territorial sovereignty and 
territorial jurisdiction. Oppenheim seems to have effectively answered this query by stating that he sees 
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what may properly be considered state territory for purposes of jurisdiction is not always clear. 
This brings us to the concept of territory itself. 
The corpus of state territory and its appurtenances (airspace and territorial sea together 
with the population and government), comprise the physical and social manifestations of the 
state, which is the primary type of an international legal person.78 The territory of a state is 
separated from those of other states by boundaries. A boundary may be natural or artificial.79 
Apart from land territory, which is permanently above low-water mark, territorial sovereignty 
may be exerted over all the geographical features associated with or analogous to land territory. 
Permanence, accessibility and natural appurtenance are naturally essential qualities. 
Furthermore, it is clear that, no one knowledgeable in international law can deny that the 
territory of a state including its earth surface, “... a sector of the earth below and a sector of 
space above”80 are within the areas of exercise of jurisdiction permitted by international law. 
Indeed, the tridimensionality of state territory is recognised in customary International Law. A 
state’s territory is considered to consist of three sectors;81 (1) legitimately owned land mass 
within its borders, including the internal water territories, rivers, lakes, reservoirs, canals and 
the territorial sea; (2) the land mass below the surface of the soil (including its mineral 
resources) down to the centre of the earth and; (3) the airspace and atmosphere above the 
ground level up to an extent which is still the subject of intense debate in academic circles.82  
The tridimensionality theory of territorial jurisdiction received judicial assent in 
relation to African situation in the reasoning of the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute (Benin / Niger) 
2002. The Chamber took note of Niger’s claim that its boundary with Niger in a particular 
sector is situated at the middle point of each of a set of bridges given that the construction and 
maintenance of these structures has been financed by the Parties on an equal basis and that the 
bridges are their joint property. Benin, for its part, submitted to the Court that a difference 
between the location of the boundary on the bridges and the course of the boundary in the river 
beneath would be incoherent.  
The Chamber observed that, in the absence of an agreement between the Parties, the 
solution would be to extend vertically the line of the boundary on the watercourse and noted 
          _________________________ 
“Independence and Territorial as well as personal Supremacy (which Starke seems to have referred to as 
territorial sovereignty) as aspects of Sovereignty”. (Brackets mine). Cf. Brownlie (1998), op. cit., pp. 
105-106. See J.G. Starke, Introduction to International Law (London: Butterworths 1984) pp. 151-152. 
Oppenheim op. cit., p. 286. See also D.H. Ott, Public International Law in the Modern World, (Britain: 
Pitman Publishing, 1987), p. 135. 
78 Brownlie (1998), op. cit., p. 107. 
79 Umozurike, op. cit., p. 107. 
80  J.C.Cooper, “High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty”, Explorations in Aerospace Law: 
Selected, (Montreal: McGill Univ. Press, 1968) p. 157. 
81 G.l. Tunkin, ed. International Law, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), p. 400. 
82 In spatial terms the law knows two other types of regime, which must be highlighted. They are the res 
nullius and the res communis. The res nullius is that land territory or environment legally susceptible to 
acquisition by states but not as yet placed under any state’s territorial sovereignty. The European 
powers made use of this concept which though legal in form was often political in application in that it 
involved the occupation of areas in Asia and Africa which were often in fact the seat of previously well 
organised communities.82 There have also been some unsuccessful attempts to forge a link between this 
concept and outer space territory. In fact it would appear that with or without the use of the technicality 
of res nullius certain states are set to embark on the introduction of property rights over outer space 
based resources for national and private ends despite the position of current international law on this 
issue. The res communis is that territory or environment such as the high seas or Antarctica, which is 
not capable of being legally placed under state sovereignty. In accordance with customary international 
law and the dictates of practical convenience, the airspace above and subsoil below each of the three 
categories, state territory, res nullius and res communis are included in each category.82 Ian  Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1966), pp. 98, 118. 
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that this solution accords with the general theory that a boundary represents the line of 
separation between areas of State sovereignty, not only on the earth’s surface but also in the 
subsoil and in the superjacent column of air.83 Moreover, the solution consisting of the vertical 
extension of the boundary line on the watercourse avoids the difficulties which could be 
engendered by having two different boundaries on geometrical planes situated in close 
proximity to one another. Following this line of reasoning, the Chamber concluded that the 
boundary on the bridges between Gaya and Malanville follows the course of the boundary in 
the river.84 
 
5. SYNTHESIS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES 
 
Sovereignty and territorial sovereignty are thus, key concepts of public international 
law. They define essential attributes of a state, the primary subject of international law. 85 
Sovereignty is said to constitute “the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which 
governs a community constituting primarily of states having a uniform legal personality”86 
The presence of sovereignty imposes a duty of non-intervention in the exclusive jurisdiction of 
other states. In this way territorial integrity is an integral part and a “necessary corollary to the 
principle of territorial sovereignty”87 Very importantly the existence with respect to a state of 
“territorial sovereignty extends to the mineral resources in the soil and subsoil of their land 
territory and territorial sea to an unlimited depth”.88 It follows, therefore, that no state may 
exercise rights over mineral resources of other states without their consent.89 
There are a total of 351 separate geographic entities in the world today. This includes 
194 independent States90; several dependencies and areas of special sovereignty, such as the 
                                                         
83  
84 This finding was made without prejudice to the arrangements in force between Benin and Niger 
regarding the use and maintenance of the road in issue. The Chamber specifically observed in particular 
that the question of the course of the boundary on the bridges is totally independent of that of the 
ownership of those structures, which belong to the Parties jointly. The logic of the Courts jurisprudence 
in this area is particularly useful for those tasked with the role of demarcation according to the courts 
decision. This is in that even where the delimitation achieved by the Court deprives a state of the 
ownership of a boundary road, bridge or maintained track it may still access to that feature for the 
purposes of maintenance and/or use. Similar issues have cropped up at the demarcation stages of the 
Cameroon-Nigeria process in relation to the implementation of the Courts judgment in the Northern 
sector. 
85 J.P. Bouvet, L’Unite de Gisement (Jan 13, 1997) Doctoral Thesis at Univaersite Pantheon-Assas-
Paris, vol. 15. 
86 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287 (4th ed. 1990). 
87 Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas deposits Across National Frontiers, 73 Am. J. Int’l Law 215-16 (1979) p. 
217. 
88 L. Oppenheim, International Law 462 (H. Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955); See also P. Fauchille, Traite De 
Droit International Public 99 (H. Bonfils, 8th ed. 1925)); Lagoni op. cit., p. 216. 
89 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ 1969 ICJ at 22. 
90 The independent states are as follows: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, 
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Australian - Ashmore and Cartier Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Coral 
Sea Islands, Heard Island the McDonald Islands; and areas of indeterminate sovereignty such 
as Antarctica, Gaza Strip, Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, West Bank, and Western Sahara.91 
The land boundaries in the world total add up to approximately 251,060 km (if care is taken 
not to count shared boundaries twice). There is a high incidence of states with multiple 
neighbours with which they share boundaries.92 Just slightly under a quarter of all independent 
states are landlocked and two of these, Liechtenstein and Uzbekistan are in fact doubly 
landlocked.93  
This rich diversity has led to a variety of conflict situations ranging from traditional 
bilateral boundary disputes to unilateral claims of one sort or another. Adjudication over 
disputes relating to international terrestrial and maritime boundaries has occupied the attention 
of numerous international courts and tribunals particularly in the last hundred years. 
Nevertheless a staggering number of wars and military conflicts have arisen due to border, 
frontier and territorial questions. Because many of these remain unresolved and as a result of 
pending geopolitical questions, or irredentist issues the comment attributed to Verzijl remains 
apposite. He wrote: 
 
“Political reality shows ad nauseam how much weight is still in the 
present time attached to the frontier as a strict line of separation between 
territorial sovereignties and how necessary it remains to keep arms at the 
ready with the object of defending the national territory against 
treacherous foreign invasions, intrusion of spies, infiltration of subversive 
propaganda etc. Frontiers as defensive partitions remain indispensable.”94 
 
Boundaries whether natural, geographic, strategic, secure or artificial should at all 
time remain ascertainable. They should be difficult to violate and strongly defensive and 
verifiable in character as nature, art, agreement or convention can make them. The importance 
of international boundary delimitation however transcends the defence and security factor. In 
          _________________________ 
North Korea, South Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, NZ, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, UK, US, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. See the CIA, The World Factbook available at  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html visited 10 
December 2008 
91 See The World Factbook ibid. 
92China and Russia, for instance each border 14 other countries.  
93 The list of presently recognised 45 landlocked states and territories include: Afghanistan, Andorra, 
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, Holy See (Vatican City), Hungary, Kazakhstan, 
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Swaziland, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, West Bank, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
94  JHW Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, Vol. III (Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff 
Leyden, 1970) pp. 516-7. 
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the long run a boundary may determine for millions the language to speak and the laws that 
govern their lives. Even mundane aspects of municipal existence such as the books and 
newspapers which people will be able to buy and read, the kind of money they shall use, the 
markets in which they must buy and sell and perhaps the kinds of food they may be permitted 
to eat are all factors of the territorial boundaries in which they belong95 The boundaries of a 
State also determine the lateral limits of the airspace appertaining to that State. However the 
inherent difficulties that attend human efforts to develop infallible boundaries or frontier is 
revealed in the existing accounts of border villages in South East Asia which indulge in 
removing or shifting boundary pillars at the time tax collectors of their own government arrive 
in autumn and voluntarily and temporarily placing their area in a neighbouring country. Many 
such opportunistic approaches to boundaries exist in Africa. In the tripoint between Cameroon, 
Nigeria and Chad around the area of the Lake Chad the local populations simply move along 
with the increasingly declining valuable resource of the Lake water without regard to national 
sovereignty.96 
The placement or misplacement of borders has traditionally presented grave problems. 
Till date there exists no consensus as to what constitutes a boundary in international law. 
Neither is there clear guidance as to the criteria for measurement or delimitation. There is 
however a distinction between ‘boundary’ and ‘frontier’ which is necessary to mention here 
because of its possible relevance in the emerging African process. In its geographical sense a 
natural boundary consists of such features as water, a range of rocks or mountains, deserts, 
forests and the like. 97  In contrast ‘artificial boundary’ includes such signs as have been 
purposely put up to indicate the way of the imaginary line. Natural boundaries would apply 
mostly to land territories, whereas artificial boundaries are prima facie more suited for the 
delimitation of airspace and maritime zones. However, the distinction between natural and 
artificial boundaries in the geographical sense has been criticised on the ground that it is not 
sharp, in so far as some natural boundaries can be artificially created. Thus a forest may be 
planted and desert may be created, as was the frequent practice of the Romans of antiquity for 
the purpose of marking frontiers. In essence, qualities, which really belong merely to the 
surveyor’s lines of demarcation, have been attributed to boundaries as political lines of 
separation and given legal significance.  
In reality the regional movements of civilisation have not in fact conformed 
themselves in all cases to the physical contour line of nature.98 This is particularly true of 
African states. Indeed, the utility of natural features as a marker of natural boundaries breaks 
down irretrievably in the delimitation of certain environments such as great ocean expanses, 
air space and outer space. Indeed natural boundaries are difficult to determine in a totally 
natural environment where there are no visually perceptible differences in features. Thus, most 
                                                         
95 S.W. Boggs, International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems (1940) p. 5. 
96 Nigeria handed thirty one (31) villages in the Lake Chad area to Cameroon.  The Nigerian population 
had been following the receding water in the direction of Cameroon.  The villages are: Aisa Kura, Ba 
Shakka, Chika’a, Darak, Darak Gana, Doron Liman, Doron Mallam, Dororoya, Fagge, Garin Wanzam, 
Gorea Changi, Gorea Gutum, Jibrillaram, Kafuram, Kamunna, Kanumbari, Karakaya, Kasuram Mareya, 
Kalti Kime, Kolaram, Logon Labi, Loko Naira, Mukdala, Murdas, Naga’a, Naira, Nimeri, Njia Buniba, 
Ramin Dorina, Sabon Tumbu and Sokotoram.  Nigeria also gained the village of Dambore in this sector.  
All these exchanges and transfers between the two countries took place in December, 2003 as a result of 
the Judgment of the ICJ in the Cameroon Nigeria case. See UNOWA, Cameroon–Nigeria Mixed 
Commission: Background (www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/ 
africa/office_for_srsg/cnmc/bkground.htm) visited 14 December 2008. 
97 Oppenheim and Lauterpacht, International Law Vol. 1 8th edition (1955) p. 531. 
98 C. Fenwick, International Law 4th ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (1965), p. 437. 
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boundaries today result from conscious and arbitrary delimitation exercise. For this reason 
certain jurists are of the view that nowadays no boundaries can be regarded as ‘natural’ 
boundaries and that consequently all boundaries are artificial. According to this view, rivers, 
mountains, deserts etc. are ‘derived artificial boundaries’ as distinct from the more commonly 
referred to ‘artificial boundaries’ -such as Parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude. 
These latter categories are, therefore, artificial boundaries properly so called.99 It is important 
to highlight the limitations of reliance on natural boundaries. Simply because a line is marked 
along natural or geographical lines does not necessarily imply that it is a ‘natural’ line of 
separation between neighbouring peoples or territories. There are a host of other 
considerations, which must be given effect to in arriving at a consensus with legal significance. 
 
‘Frontier’ on the other hand cannot be used interchangeably with ‘boundary’ because  
(a) boundary denotes a line whereas a frontier is more properly a region or zone having width 
as well as length and therefore merely indicates, without fixing the exact limit, where one 
State ends and another begins. In effect a boundary girds a frontier and more often than not, it 
is the expansion of a frontier owing to pressure from within which so frequently renders a 
boundary necessary.’’100 A frontier is but a vague and indefinite term until a boundary is set 
putting a hedge between it and the frontier of a neighbouring State. The term ‘Boundary’, 
therefore, denotes a line such as may be defined from point to point in an arbitral award, treaty 
boundary commission report agreement etc. A frontier is more properly a region or zone 
having width as well as length. Therefore, while delimitation and then demarcation of 
boundary were the central tasks before the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary Commission, and the 
Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission,101 it is more apt to speak presently in terms of the 
frontiers of airspace and outer space - for there exists in the present no specific boundaries 
between the two in international law.102  
One may, however, observe that the wide acceptance of the existence of a frontier 
makes the establishment of a boundary possible but not necessarily easy. In fact in many 
instances it may be the seeming impossibility of establishing a boundary or the lack of 
satisfactory technical details that makes States and international lawyers settle for the 
recognition of frontiers. It is in this category that majority of African ‘frontier-boundaries’ 
exist. 
The importance of clearly defined borders, boundaries and frontiers becomes more 
discernable when ‘boundary disputes’ or ‘frontier disputes’ occur. As a matter of principle the 
determination of the location in detail of boundaries is distinct from the issue of title to 
territory. This is because considerable dispositions of territory may take place in which the 
grantee enjoys the benefit of a title derived from the grant although no determination of the 
precise frontier line is made. On the other hand precise determination of the frontier may be 
made a suspensive condition in a treaty of cession. On occasion the distinction between 
cession and the fixing of a boundary involves considerations of convenience rather than logic. 
Nevertheless there is no gainsaying the fact that questions of territory and frontiers are quite 
                                                         
99 See Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontiere 1928 p. 175; see Yehuda Z. Blum, Secure Boundaries and 
Middle East Peace: In the Light of International Law and Practice (Jerusalem: Hanakor Press, 1971. 
100 O. Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (Manchester University 
Press, 1967) p. 11. For the distinction between boundaries and frontiers see further Surga P. Sharma, 
Delimitation of Land and Sea Boundaries between Neighbouring Countries, (New Delhi: Lancers 
Books, 1989) et seq. see also Blum, ibid, p. 15. 
101 See Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea to the Security Council of 13 
December 2001 available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/UNSG%20Report3.pdf 
102 See further on this issue Gbenga Oduntan, (2003) op.cit., et seq. 
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interrelated and at times it may be difficult, and perhaps serve no useful purpose to determine 
whether a frontier or boundary dispute is in fact a territorial one or vice versa in as much as the 
relevant legal criteria are applicable to either class of the dispute.  
Sometimes the distinction between disputes that concern international boundaries and 
disputes arising out of the acquisition of territory are blurred. Indeed both boundary and 
territorial questions are part of the larger question of territorial sovereignty.103 In the Temple of 
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) even though the dispute in principle involved 
conflicting claims to sovereignty over the disputed regions the I.C.J. nevertheless dealt at 
length in its decision on the legal boundary line between the two.104  
 
From a strict legal point of view however, factual and legal differences exist between 
the two types of disputes. Boundary issues are involved when two (or more) adjacent 
governmental entities contend about the line to be drawn between their respective territorial 
domains. In such cases it is common ground that both (or more) States have lawful claims to 
adjacent territory. The real question to be decided is how the territory can be divided between 
them. For instance, in accordance with the provisions of the 12 December 2000 Agreement 
Between The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the 
Government of The State of Eritrea, the mandate of the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary 
Commission is to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial 
treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law (Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary 
Commission Arbitration 2000)  
On the other hand territorial disputes may not always involve the drawing of lines 
between adjacent territorial communities. In fact disputes relating to territorial acquisition will 
involve the intent by one party to exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over either the entire 
territory or large parcels of it, belonging to another State including a denial of the rights of the 
competing party to that territory. Even though disputes about the acquisition of territory are 
strictly competitive as between the claimants, in the sense that one must lose completely, a 
boundary dispute on its own may not involve the complete suppression by one entity of 
another in relation to the particular region. There is the possibility of a boundary dispute 
involving more than two parties in. The Somali claims in the 1970’s incorporating as it did all 
Somali dominated adjoining areas involved a four-way controversy between Kenya, Ethiopia, 
the French, and Somali land. Similarly disputes relating to territorial control may involve more 
than one State and may occur in a territory, which historically belongs to no State, such as the 
overlapping claims over Antarctic sectors made by Chile Argentina and the United Kingdom. 
Territorial questions would ordinarily involve the traditional rules governing modes of 
acquisition of title (e.g. discovery, occupation, conquest, cession or prescription) whereas 
boundary questions involve only those rules, which are relevant to specifying functions 
performed in the fixation and maintenance of boundaries (e.g. determination, delimitation, 
demarcation and administration.. The Iraqi attempt to annex Kuwait in 1990 is a classic case 
of a dispute relating to territorial acquisition. So also is the continuous challenge in recent 
times by Turkey of the sovereignty of several hundred Greek islands, Greek territorial waters, 
and of Greek national airspace. The Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria case is an example of a boundary dispute that involves territorial (Bakassi Peninsula) 
and boundary (land and maritime) aspects. 
                                                         
103  Surya P. Sharma, “Boundary Dispute and Territorial Dispute: A Comparison”, Vol. 10 Indian 
Journal of International Law (1970) No. 2 (1970). 
104 ICJ. Rep. 1962 p. 14. 
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Certain principles assist international courts and tribunals in the resolution of 
boundary and territorial disputes. In the words of the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case, 
“the act of peaceful and continuous display (of sovereignty) is still one of the most important 
considerations in establishing boundaries between States.” To this extent territorial disputes 
and boundary or frontier disputes are interrelated. In most cases boundary changes imply the 
diminution or enhancement of territory and jurisdiction for the affected states. The principle of 
uti possidetis operates to ensure that boundaries have a compelling degree of continuity and 
finality. In order to avert numerous boundary conflicts and wars among the African States, in 
1963 and 1964, the founding fathers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) found it 
appropriate to adopt the principle so as to preserve the territorial status quo.105 The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration established this as far back as 1909 in the Grisbadarna case when it 
stated that “it is a settled principle of the law of nations that a state of things which actually 
exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as little as possible.” 106  The 
International Court of Justice has followed this principle in the Temple case107 as well as the 
Frontier Land Case108 Furthermore a party’s statements and actions with respect to a boundary 
may preclude it from asserting inconsistent claims or contesting the sovereignty over the 
territory at a later stage.109 Acquiescence however is not to be lightly presumed and each case 
will be examined individually with due consideration of all the facts (La Palena case).110 
In sum it is clear that matters of delimitation and demarcation of boundaries and 
frontiers between territories are important in law and in fact. The saying that good fences 
make good neighbours holds true in international relations and has particular significance in 
terms of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. Settling disputed borders on a mutually 
acceptable basis removes an important irritant to relations and the means and methods as to 
which this can be achieved must continue to receive scholarly attention. 
 
6. SECURITY, POWER AND POLITICAL DIFFERENTIALS IN AFRICAN 
BOUNDARY MANAGEMENT 
 
International borders are a security issue for all governments but particularly so in 
Africa because of its porous national borders. Free movement across national boundaries is not 
necessarily a negative development especially in a continent that was carved up rather 
insensitively as recently as the last century. However what is witnessed is that border 
communities have become host to people smuggling, drugs, illegal weapons and contraband, 
organized crime syndicates, cattle rustling, wildlife poaching, insurrection, incursion and 
terrorist activity, auto theft, Illegal and undocumented immigrations as well as illegal border 
crossings. It is ironic that the same states that have such sever problems are have a reputation 
for excessive red-tape, that slows down if not render impossible genuine legal international 
and cross border trade.  It is estimated that it takes an average of 40 paper documents and 200 
data elements to undertake one customs transaction across an African border. While it takes 
one day to clear customs in Estonia, it takes 30 days on average in an African country. The 
                                                         
105  See Article III (3) of the OAU Charter and resolution AHG/Res. 16(1) adopted 
by the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964 
106 Scott, Hague Court Reports (1916), p. 122. 
107 ICJ Reports 1962, p. 6. 
108 ICJ Reports 1959, p. 209. 
109 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.LJ. (ser. AB) No. 53, at 193-94 
110 La Palena case (Argentina-Chile), 38 I.L.R. 10 (1966) 
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insecurity surrounding boundary posts ought therefore to be of paramount interests to the 
existing RECs.111  
Clearly there is a need for more policing and security presence but this alone will not 
solve the many security problems posed by borders. A more innovative and progressive 
approach is for the states and the RECs to provide more investments and targeted economic 
help to the boundary communities to spark economic activities. This will make such areas less 
a5ttractive to criminal elements that prey in the present shadowy ‘no man’s land’ that 
boundary areas have been turned into since the colonial era and to the present time. 
Power and political differentials between neighbouring states can make boundary 
conflicts difficult and rather intractable. The difference between Anglophone and Francophone 
traditions, democracies and military dictatorships, resource rich and resource poor states can 
assume profound importance in boundary issues. Yet the destinies of big and small countries 
are in many ways shared when they are contiguous territories and to this extent boundary 
justice save in very limited circumstances must be blind. It is, therefore, imperative that the 
AU Border Programme develop means and methodologies that are designed to level the 
playing field for smaller and economically least developed states that may have to undergo 
delimitation and demarcation exercises. One of the issues that have dogged the land and 
maritime dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria even before it was brought before the 
International Court is the political reality of the power differentials between the parties. 
Cameroon is a smaller state in size population and economic circumstances in comparison to 
its giant of Africa neighbour a veritable and long standing member of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with substantial oil reserves as the 7th leading 
producer of oil in the world. The delicate balance that has had to be achieved by all concerned 
has therefore been how to adhere to the equality of states principle without necessarily 
creating disenchantment among the Nigerian government and peoples in furtherance of 
executing a judgment which has caused the loss of sizeable population to a smaller state.  
As geographical neighbours with an approximately 2000 long common land boundary, 
a shared colonial history and the experience of a UN referendum which reshaped both 
countries it is impossible to overemphasise the fact that more factors connect the two states 
together than divide them. It can be recalled that despite the many years of boundary tensions 
in certain sectors and particularly in relation to Bakassi Peninsula, children on both sides of 
the boundary communities attended schools that are based in the neighbouring country without 
let or hindrance and farmers relied on regular vaccination of their livestock from whichever 
state that was close enough. In 2004, some 17,000 Nigerian refugees were reported to have 
fled ethnic conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in 2002 and found refuge in Cameroon 
where many of them still reside.112 
The ties between both States run very deep and cut across all strata of their societies. 
There are currently an estimated three million Nigerians permanently resident in Cameroon. 
The pattern of settlement of these Nigerians is quite diverse and spread not only in the urban 
centres but also in rural areas. They are engaged in many professions from trading to farming 
and fishing. A census was recently conducted by Cameroonian officials, which revealed that 
out of an estimated 20,000 fishermen plying their trade in a region of Cameroon 19,000 of 
them were Nigerians. It is, therefore, easy to see that both parties must retain a view of the big 
picture of things and must maintain good and cordial relations. 
                                                         
111 Okumu op.cit., pp. 14, 19, 26, 36.  
112  See the discussion on Nigeria transnational issues in World Fact Book available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html visited 2nd April 2006. 
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Another boundary regime of long and complex history with power differentials 
between the parties that show the importance of keeping both the less and more powerful 
states in full confidence of the fairness of the process and negotiations is that of Shatt-al Arab 
river. Kaikobad wrote: 
 
The history of the Shatt question has shown that the distribution of power 
between Iran and Iraq has frustrated a final and conclusive settlement of 
all the issues, and has on every occasion prompted an agreement which 
the weaker State was less inclined to accept. Yet in legal terms there were 
no outstanding problems: the alignment had, in every case, been 
‘conclusively’ settled.113 
 
It is indeed true that the politico-historical provenance of a frontier question is 
perceived as assuming considerable legal significance by those placed in charge of resolving 
the situation. It is important not only because it provides perspective to the dispute, but also 
because details of the political history tend to reveal the incidents and distribution of power 
between the parties and the role played by it in the development of the frontier. 114 Without a 
proper analysis of the political and power differentials the appropriate solutions may elude 
mediators, negotiators and those charged with resolving territorial or boundary disputes 
between states. The role that the particular colonial experience of African states has on their 
national geographic image and their attitude towards irredentism deserves closer cross-
disciplinary studies. Both set of facts, viz. the questions of power and of the historical sources 
of difficulties, tend to create problems for legal analysis and featured largely in the Cameroon-
Nigeria process. It is to the credit of the Mixed Commission that it minimised as much as 
possible these power differentials at the very stage where it tends to afflict the parties most –
outside the Court and away from the protection of the equality of arms principle of the 
adversarial system practiced therein. 
It helps if the neighbouring states involved in a border implementation and/or 
demarcation process do their best to reassure each other of their support on the broadest issues 
of foreign and domestic policies in which they agree. Cameroon and Nigeria sent messages of 
good will to each other before major events such as elections. Sessions of the CNMC were 
sensitively scheduled to avoid allowing the meetings to clash with national celebrations and 
elections. Important concessions to delay or accelerate the process were granted on both sides 
to coincide with major national elections in which the incumbent government sought an 
advantageous impression in the minds of the electorate or to manage parliamentary crisis. 
Similarly after 40 years of negotiations China and Russia in 2006 heightened their level of 
diplomatic relations with visits and favourable pronouncements at the highest levels around 
the period they attained the difficult task of resolving boundary disputes along their 4,300-km-
long border. Russia expressed its strong support for the one China policy and opposed Taiwan 
joining the United Nations and other major international organizations. Russia was also in 
agreement with China that the Tibet Autonomous Region is as an inalienable part of China.115 
                                                         
113 Kaikobad p. 103. 
114 Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad “The Shatt-Al-Arab River Boundary A Legal Reappraisal” LVI BYIL 1985 p. 
103. 
115 The Russian President announced during a visit to his Chinese Counterpart "The Russian side will 
continue to adhere to the one-China policy and recognize the government of the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China," the statement says. And "Taiwan is an 
inalienable part of the Chinese territory." See Xinhua News Agency March 21, 2006, China Internet 
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It is indeed important that states maintain the best of diplomatic relations with each 
other since the existence of a clearly delimited and demarcated border does not constitute the 
end of cooperation in boundary matters. As the experts to the 2nd International Symposium on 
Land, River and Lake Boundaries Management rightly concluded: 
 
Delimitation, demarcation, mapping and management are essential steps 
towards creating peaceful and prosperous borderlands, but on their own 
they will not achieve these goals. Hence, the need for sustained efforts to 
promote cross-border cooperation and set targets to be achieved within a 
specific period of time, including the establishment of joint border 
management mechanisms between Member States. Reaffirmation of 
boundaries (e.g. erection of intermediate markers) and their maintenance 
will facilitate the achievement of this objective.116 
 
7. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 
 
Costs are doubtless a factor deterring African states with limited resources from 
addressing their delimitation and demarcation needs. Where the matter has been allowed to fester 
enough to demand third party adjudication or arbitration the costs of appearing before 
international courts are certainly not negligible.117 Its been recognized that “the cost of boundary 
delimitation will run into the millions of dollars (US Currency) if pursued via negotiations and 
may exceed tens of millions of dollars if achieved via third party settlement, as in the 
Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago case”.118 The African Boundary Programme must as a matter 
of utmost priority keep the economics of two separate set of issues in mind. First the cost of 
resolving disputes through the various mechanisms known to law. Second the costs of actual 
demarcation. The imperative actions are again two fold. First the AU may position itself to 
          _________________________ 
Information Center, “China, Russia Sign Joint Statement” available at www.china.org.cn accessed 5 
August 2007. 
116 Management and regular clearing of the vista are also reasons for which continuing peace and 
cooperation between neighbouring states sharing common boundaries. See the AU, “Conclusion of the 
2nd International Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundaries Management” Maputo, 
Mozambique 17 – 19 December 2008 AUBP/EXP/3(VI) p. 3. There is no reason why joint policing 
cannot be engaged in by cooperating states to increase transparency and ‘espirit de corp’ between 
security services. Indeed juxtaposed control zones which are a feature of some western European states 
may where applicable be introduced. See generally Gbenga Oduntan, Arriving Before You Depart: 
Separating Law and Fiction in the Development and Operation of International Juxtaposed Control 
Zones. In: Shah, Prakash, ed. Migration, Diasporas and Legal Systems (London: Cavendish Publishers, 
2006). Note also that arrangements towards joint inspection and management is standard practice all 
around the world. Even where boundary markers are diligently fixed teutonic plate shifts lead to 
changes in the exact position of beacons. By a special Agreement the Finnish-Russian Boundary is 
jointly repaired and inspected. Field inspection is done every summer and boundary markers are 
renovated or replaced. A boundary corridor is maintained on either side or trees and bushes in this 
corridor are cleared. Both parties pay their own costs. See Pekka Tatila, “Inspection of the Finnish-
Russian Boundary” paper presented at the Paper Presented at 2nd International Symposium on Land, 
Maritime River and Lake Boundaries: Maputo, Mozambique 17-19 December 2008 p.  5. 
117  David H. Anderson, “Trust Funds in International Litigation” N. Ando, E. McWhinney & R. 
Wolfrum (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 793-794"; 
P. Bekker, "International Legal Aid in Practice: The ICJ Trust Fund", 87 AJIL (1993) 659. Charles C. 
Okolie, International Law Perspectives of Developing Countries: The Relationship of Law and Economic 
Development to Basic Human Rights, (Lagos: MOK Publishers, 1978) pp. 50-51. 
118 Clifford Griffin, The Race for Fisheries and Hydrocarbons in the Caribbean Basin (Ian Randle 
Publishers, 2007) p. 152. 
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provide free or subsidised services in both areas above such as by creating a well endowed 
trust fund for such purposes. Secondly the AU may have to provide diplomatic clout to 
concerned African states to access the existing trust funds that exist and/or attract fresh 
sources.  
Just as in the municipal setting the financially well to do find it easier to institute civil 
action to address their grievances and defend themselves in criminal cases, so also in the society 
of nations those with better financial resources appear to have a better chance at seeking adequate 
justice. It is therefore, the case that some States cannot litigate or arbitrate for financial reasons. 
For as Castaneda rightly noted of litigation before the ICJ, it makes little difference whether the 
case is a contentious suit or one requiring an advisory opinion, the costs are comparable and 
frequently too high.119 Litigation at the ICJ, depending on the nature of the dispute may require 
several millions of dollars even before the cost of implementation are considered. In many cases 
the cost of implementation will be several times fold the cost of litigation. Maritime boundary 
litigation for instance, involves exceptionally high open and hidden costs.120 There would usually 
be the need for experts on geography, cartography, oceanography, geologists, and other 
specialists in addition to costs for exhibits, memorials and lawyers. Land boundary demarcation 
may also be equally prohibitive. Acquisition of satellite imagery, ground surveys, mapping and 
erection of boundary pillars would require immense sums to accomplish. In many cases both land 
and maritime issues are at stake from litigation through to implementation. Even for wealthy 
nations there is the problem of competing priorities and considerations of opportunity cost.121 The 
implications are certainly more dire in relation to developing states. 
The administrative cost of instituting proceedings at an international court is just the 
beginning of a series of serious expenditure. Ironically in comparison to the hidden financial cost 
of litigation the administrative fees appear modest. In the PCA a non-refundable registration fee 
of 2000 Euro is accruable to the Institution to perfect the commencement of proceedings.122 
However the cost of the services of each key staff can go up to as much as 250 Euro per hour. 
Several Registry staff may be needed at a time and the hours to be paid for may run into thousand 
of hours.  This of course does not include the cost of use of facilities for each period of use and of 
                                                         
119 . Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes: An International Symposium. New York: Max Planck Institute, 1974.p. 30. 
120 Ironically because of the relatively daunting problem of costs facing African states particularly in the 
delimitation of their maritime boundaries, decision taking suffers from a unique double handicap. 
Where the maritime sea does not disclose apparent mineral riches negotiations are hindered due to the 
absence of a compelling case to invest scarce financial resources and the time of few available technical 
experts in light of competing national and bilateral issues. Where, however, studies reveal a rise in 
prospects of off-shore drilling for oil and other mineral resources found on the subsoil and seabed, and 
possibly the Extended Continental Shelf then negotiations get bogged down in political wrangling and 
disputes. The net effect of this paradox, therefore, is that the delimitation of the African seas may in 
time prove to be the most intractable part of the work of the AUBP. 
121 The Australian government, for instance, has on many occasions resorted to US law firms to advise 
it on matters relating to litigation before the WTO as a result of a dearth of home grown expertise. US 
firms have also been resorted to where there is a need to research into domestic law aspects of the US 
domestic sugar program and to prepare the lamb meat case. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Australia’s Relationship With The World Trade Organization (WTO): Submission to the Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade September 2000 p. 58. available 
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/wto/aust_wto.pdf    
122 The designation of an appointing authority pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules requires 
Non-refundable processing fee of € 750. Acting as an Appointing Authority Pursuant to the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules requires a non-refundable processing fee of € 1,500. The Schedule of 
Fees of the PCA including the fees structure for guest tribunals that use the PCA facilities are available 
at the PCA website http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1028 
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course the remuneration of Arbitrators. It is usual that each party to a Commercial dispute pay for 
the arbitrator(s) they nominate whereas the cost of the presiding arbitrator/umpire will be shared 
between the parties. Since the average PCA case lasts several years it becomes clear then that the 
costs of proceedings before this court is also prohibitive. For poorer and developing states, the 
risk of defeat might carry far greater financial weight especially since it is for sure that "there 
was always a winner and a loser"123 in any such legal encounter. Thus the problem of costs 




8. THE RELEVANCE OF LEGAL AID IN DELIMITATION AND DEMARCATION 
ACTIVITIES 
 
The first fifty years of the World Court’s life was characterised by a relatively poor 
number of appearances by developing States. It was thought that a major reason for the poor 
turn out at the Court is that some states cannot just afford the rising cost of justice. It is thus no 
wonder that the Secretary-General of the UN in 1989 announced the creation of a legal aid 
scheme to financially assist developing states in litigating before the ICJ.124 It comes as no 
surprise either that the first beneficiaries of this very laudable scheme were two African states 
involved in a boundary dispute. 125  The trust fund idea might also have been inspired by 
Switzerland's commendable $400,000 assistance to Burkina Faso and Mali to help them 
implement the ICJ boundary decision in the Frontier Dispute Case.126 In the final analysis, 
however it was the UN Secretary General, Senor Javier Perez de Cuellar who took the 
                                                         
123  Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes op.cit., p. 30. 
124 UN Doc. A/44/PV.43, at 7-11 (1989). This was based upon a directive of the U.N. General Assembly. 
See Provisional Verbatim Record of the Forty-Third Meeting, 44 UN GAOR (43rd Mtg.) at 7-11 UN 
Doc./44/PV.43 (1989). It is necessary to note laudable initiatives such as the Secretary-General’s Trust 
Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice (document 
A/59/372). The Trust Fund was established in 1989 under the Financial Regulations and Rules of the 
United Nations.  It provides financial assistance to States for expenses incurred in connection with a 
dispute submitted to the Court by way of a special agreement or the execution of a judgement of the ICJ 
resulting from such a special agreement.  The Fund is open to all States parties to the Statute of the Court, 
as well as non-member States that have complied with the conditions stipulated in Security Council 
Resolution 9 (1946). 
125 The many accounts of where the greatest impetus for the introduction of the various legal aid schemes 
came from attest to the success of the idea. Many states, writers and jurists have been known to jostle for 
primacy of position in the chronology of the creation of the schemes.  The non-aligned states majority of 
which are indigent sensibly pushed through the agenda for the creation of a trust fund in order to enhance 
the use of the Court by member States. Ministerial Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries, U.N. Doc. 
A/44/PV.59, at 2 (1989); the Hague Declaration of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to discuss the Issue of Peace and the Rule of Law in International 
Affairs, U.N. Doc. A/44/191 (1989); Bien-Aime, Enhancing the Role of the World Court: An Examination 
of the Secretary-General's Trust Fund Proposal," 22 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Practice (1991), p. 671. 
126 Burkina Faso v. Mali 1987 I.C.J. Rep. 7 (Nomination of Experts, Order of 9 April 1987). The dispute 
was so contentious that an outbreak of military hostilities ensued during the case. However, when the court 
ruled, the two States found they could not afford the cartographers needed to actually turn the Court's 
decision into a useable map. Switzerland’s financial help supplied the needed experts. See O'Connell M. 
op. cit., p. 235. 
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initiative in 1989 to create the Trust Fund.127 In 2004 the Fund received one joint application 
from Benin and Niger to defray the expenses incurred in connection with the submission of 
their boundary dispute to the Court (Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger)). Subsequently, on 24 
May of that year, $300,000 were awarded to each applicant to defray the staffing, production 
and legal expenses incurred in the demarcation of the border of the two countries. In the same 
year Finland, Norway and Mexico contributed $34,665 to the Fund. 
 
Similarly the PCA has commendably created a Financial Assistance Fund for 
Developing States. 128  In October 1994, the Administrative Council agreed to establish a 
Financial Assistance Fund and approved the Terms of Reference and Guidelines for the operation 
of the Fund. This Fund, to which contributions are made on a voluntary basis, provides financial 
assistance to qualifying states to enable them to meet, in whole or in part, the costs involved in 
international arbitration or other means of  dispute settlement offered by the Hague Conventions. 
Qualifying states are state parties to the Conventions of 1899 or 1907 that: (1) have concluded an 
agreement for the purpose of submitting one or more disputes, whether existing or future, for 
settlement by any of the means administered by the PCA; and (2) at the time of requesting 
financial assistance from the fund, are listed on the “DAC List of Aid Recipients” prepared by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A qualifying state may seek 
financial assistance from the fund by submitting a written request to the Secretary-General of the 
PCA. An independent Board of Trustees decides on the request.129  
Since the establishment of the fund, Norway, Cyprus, the United Kingdom, South Africa, 
the Netherlands, and Costa Rica have made contributions, and four grants of assistance have been 
made: one to a Central Asian state, one to an Asian state, and two to African states. These grants 
have allowed the parties to defray the costs of arbitration."130 
Even after litigation is complete it is clear that the costs of implementation are 
significant. First there are structures of implementation to be created and the time scale for 
implementation is not negligible. The normal practice is that both states contribute equally 
towards the entire costs of demarcation and pay incidental costs for visits to sites on their side 
of the border. In the Rio Palena Arbitration, (Argentina-Chile Frontier Case (1966)), the two 
countries split the $168,000 cost of the arbitration.131 In the Cameroon-Nigeria process the 
implementation process started in December 2003 and continues till the present. The Eritrea-
Ethiopia process is even one year older and progress is much slower. Example of the costs of 
demarcation alone without reference to the costs of diplomatic activities and party controlled 
technical costs (surveyors, technical staff and field visits) are over 12 million Dollars. To 
ensure the demarcation of the boundary, both countries had by 2004 contributed the sum of 
                                                         
127  On the occasion of the consideration of the Report of the Court 1989, the Secretary-General 
announced the initiative to the General Assembly, referring to his responsibility to promote the 
settlement of disputes by the Court. In a very rare move whereupon there was no proposal, debate or 
decision in the General Assembly, the Secretary-General established by his own motion a permanent 
Trust Fund with its own terms of reference. Annex to United Nations Document A/47/444 of 7 October 
1992. See also 28 ILM (1989) 1589. 
128 Article 47 of the 1907 Convention states: “With the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to 
arbitration for international differences, which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, the 
Contracting Powers undertake to maintain the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as established by the 
First Peace Conference, accessible at all times.” 
129  PCA Annual Report 2005 p. 7, Documents and materials relating to the PCA are available at 
www.pca-cpa.org 
130 Ibid. 
131  “Two Queens to the Rescue” Time Magazine Friday, Dec. 30, 1966 available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901916,00.html visited 7 August 2007. 
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three million US Dollars (US$3m) each. The United Kingdom contributed one million pounds 
sterling (£1m) while the European Union donated four million, four hundred thousand Euros 
(€4.4m). The total sum so far collected is about twelve million US Dollars ($12m). This sum 
is currently in a Trust Fund with the United Nations. The costs however continue to rise as the 
demarcation continues and the funds collected diminish in value due to devaluation of the 
currencies as well as rise in costs of services and equipments.  
Legal aid certainly has a pride of place in the ongoing AUBP processes. It is ironic 
and poetic that the very states that are blamed for the balkanization of the African continent 
and its carving up into sometimes inconvenient and/or indefensible political units are the states 
that have financially aided the AUBP process.132 It is particularly gratifying that the Federal 
Republic of Germany the host nation of the historical Berlin Conference which carved Africa 
into colonial fiefdoms is at the vanguard of the financial rescue of the AUBP.133 The aid which 
was structured through the GTZ is designed to provide financial and technical support for the 
development of the BIS; human resource capacity of the Commission; development of a 
handbook covering methodology and best practices in the area of delimitation and 
demarcation; convening of meetings and workshops relating to the AUBP; and financial and 
technical support to relevant African institutions and individual AU member States for the 
implementation of the AUBP. 
In 2008, the German Government, through the GTZ, gave about 3.35 millions Euros 
to support AUBP related activities; out of this amount, 800,000 were directly allocated to the 
AU. These resources were used to support the convening of activities such as the preparatory 
meeting with the RECs, held in Addis Ababa on 13 and 14 July 2008; the technical meeting on 
the BIS held in Addis Ababa on 15 July 2008; the two regional workshops held in Kampala 
and Algiers; and the 2nd International Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundaries 
Management, held in Maputo from 17 to 19 December 2008. 134  GTZ has also provided 
equipment and financial support for the payment of salaries of the staff working on the 
implementation of the AUBP. Additional funds were allocated in 2009 with some part of the 
budget having been provided as direct support to individual AU member States. These include 
monies for the demarcation of parts of the Mali/Burkina Faso boundary, as well as activities 
relating to the delimitation and demarcation of Mozambican borders with some of its 
neighbours.  
Financial aid has also been offered and received from Italy another state with a 
controversial and irredentist past in relation to Africa with the dubious record of having 
invaded a fellow League of Nation member. As part of the implementation of the Italian-
African Peace Facility (IAPF), the Italian Government committed itself to funding some 
components of the AUBP to an amount of about US$1.8 million.135 Aside from individual 
state donations from some of the erstwhile colonial powers the EU has allocated a total 
amount of about 8 billions Euros for cross-border cooperation. It is particularly comforting to 
                                                         
132 Supra footnote 19. 
133  On 13 February 2008, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 
extended the German States offer of technical and financial support towards the AUBP. In his letter to 
the AU, the Minister stressed the importance of the delimitation and demarcation of African borders, as 
well as the promotion of cross-border cooperation, for the overall efforts aimed at preventing conflicts 
and ensuring the economic development of the continent. African Union, “Report of the Commission on 
the Implementation of the African Union Border Programme” op.cit. pp. 8-9. 
134 See the AU, “Conclusion of the 2nd International Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundaries 
Management” Maputo, Mozambique 17 – 19 December 2008 AUBP/EXP/3(VI). 
135 An exchange of letters to this effect took place, on 30 June 2008, on the margins of the sessions of 
the Executive Council and the Assembly of the Union in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in June 2008. 
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note that support has also been promised in principle by the International Monetary fund and 
the World Bank for border area initiatives in furtherance of the aims of the AUBP. In addition 
to all these the UN itself commits extra budgetary and budgetary resources to the process.136 
More generally there is much scope for assistance from all friendly states and regions 
of the world in relation to the AUBP. It is not in all cases that money is required but there is 
much need for targeted or purpose built technical aid. For instance those African states that 
have as a result of many years of civil and/or international crises faced particular challenges in 
boundary demarcation due to the presence of landmines in border areas need urgent assistance 
and aid from the international community. Scientific and other targeted assistance are required 
to clear mined areas in order to facilitate demarcation exercises and other cross-border 
activities. 137 A very simple but important form of aid that will be very useful to smaller 
African states that are presently charged with the task of demarcation of their boundaries 
under the AUBP may take the form of assistance in the acquisition of documents relevant to 
boundary delimitation and demarcation exercise from colonial archives. For smaller African 
states accommodation for researchers in the major cities of Europe and/or free access to 
archive buildings and copying or borrowing facilities will go a long way to granting access to 
much needed information without which the necessary documents that are needed for 
demarcation exercises will be difficult or even impossible. 
The donations received from the European states are commendable and important for 
at least three reasons. First, it has provided the pump funding for what is a costly and highly 
technical exercise which would have degenerated into a white elephant project but for the 
provision of much needed funds at crucial stages. Second, in a sense the donating European 
states had contributed to the African territorial quagmires by interfering with the political 
destinies of the continents peoples sometimes with significant brutality. It is, therefore, 
equitable that they assist in abating the problems that have resulted from the colonial creations. 
Third, such targeted assistance will arguably prevent many of the tensions and conflicts over 
land and maritime boundaries in Africa which would cause much displacement and refugee 
problems for the international system. 
 
 
9. AFROCENTRIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF DELIMITATION AND 
DEMARCATION 
 
It is necessary that home-grown legal and judicial expertise on boundary matters must 
be developed. What is advocated here is not protectionism or restraint of trade but it must be 
realised that there is abysmal participation of African lawyers and judges in the area of 
boundary cases. The EEBC has only one African on board as an Arbitrator. The lawyers that 
present cases on behalf of African countries at the World Court are invariably Western 
lawyers. Whereas the facts and incidences that will generate dispute on the continent from 
now till eternity will be invariably African. The potential for this skill gap to continue or grow 
                                                         
136 Letter by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to the President of the Security Council Mr Neven 
Jurica in 2008 in UN Secretary General’s Memoranda to the Security Council. See A.I. Asiwaju 
“Getting Bordered to be De-Bordered: The African Unioun Border Programme in Global Focus” Paper 
Presented at 2nd International Symposium on Land, Maritime River and Lake Boundaries: Maputo, 
Mozambique 17-19 December 2008 p. 4. 
137  AU, “Conclusion of the 2nd International Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundaries 
Management” op.cit. See paragraph VII, pp. 3-4. 
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in this century is real.138 The AU border programme thus, presents an opportunity to address 
this deficit of legal and technical skills base.  Strategies ought to be put in place to encourage 
the training of African boundary experts in all relevant fields. It is indeed possible to plug the 
skills deficit and reverse the trend towards reliance on foreign experts within a generation. 
Particular emphasis should be made to encourage the bespoke training (in boundary studies) of 
lawyers and judicial officers that will form the bar and bench of the pertinent courts 
particularly the African Court of Justice. There are certain facts and elementary considerations, 
which a Court composed, of persons with local geographical or customary knowledge would 
very easily take judicial notice of. This would save time and reduce the possibility of the Court 
inadvertently endorsing the disputants’ claims that are obviously unnecessary, mischievous or 
inflated. Africa has to put to good use its peculiar advantage of multiculturalism in its legal 
heritage. This rich heritage can only serve it well if it is harnessed and recognised as strength 
rather than a hindrance to the resolution of boundary marking and resolution of disputes. 
African rivers and lakes boundaries create special challenges in terms of (a) delimitation and 
demarcation; and (b) the management of shared water and other resources. Just as there have 
been severe problems, there are also many instances of Afro centric solutions and approaches 
to the sharing of common aquatic bodies that have to be studied. The sharing of experiences 
and best practices is, therefore, of paramount importance for African states.139 
The call for home-grown expertise in all aspects of boundary making and boundary 
marking is justifiable on many grounds. In certain instances the close involvement of nationals 
is an essential; part of boundary delimitation exercise. The United Nations Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf insist on the involvement of citizens from a State making 
submission in all phases of the Continental Shelf Claims Project, since nationals, and not the 
contractors or consultants they employ, are allowed to participate in the conduct of oral 
submissions and respond to interrogatories before the Commission during the examination of 
submissions.140 
 
10. RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES INVOLVING AFRICAN NATIONS: 
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 
 
The argument has often been made by African scholars that resort to Eurocentric 
adjudication and arbitrary mechanisms is unsuitable for resolving African disputes because of 
the inadequate attention that is paid to significant regional peculiarities and realities. Without 
prejudice to the importance of the main international courts and tribunals that deal with 
boundary and territorial disputes, there is no convincing reason to believe that many of the 
African boundary and territorial disputes cannot be satisfactorily resolved through other means 
                                                         
138 The skilled gap pertains to nearly all areas of delimitation and demarcation practice but it is most 
revealing in the area of maritime law and scientific practice. Technical experts, notably hydrographers 
and cartographers, are invariably used in negotiations for a new boundary. A jurist wrote “…it would be 
unthinkable to undertake negotiations for a new boundary, for instance, without first conducting a 
hydrographic study”. It is possible however, that technical experts are supplied by intergovernmental 
organisations such as the UN and the Commonwealth Secretariat (David Anderson, Resource, 
Navigational and Environmental Factors in Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation in Charney, 
Colson and Smith (eds.), op.cit., p. 3219. 
139 This was also one of the conclusions of African experts in AU, “Conclusion of the 2nd International 
Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundaries Management” op.cit. para VIII, pp. 3-4. 
140 Supra note 25. 
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of dispute resolution. 141 One such means that is highly recommended for resolving territorial 
disputes is the use of carefully conducted plebiscites, preferably organised and monitored by 
the new African Union. This might prove a more pragmatic solution in comparison with the 
dogmatic adherence to colonial treaties upon which many such disputes are decided presently. 
This argument is particularly resonant for Africa and other parts of the New World due to 
whose collective efforts the principle of self-determination was specifically developed in the 
last century. It is relevant to note that even the colonial powers appreciated and resorted to the 
mechanism of plebiscites in the resolution of territorial questions in Africa.142 This of course is 
not to say that colonial treaties would have no further relevance in the determination of 
disputes by international courts. There is in fact no reason why colonial treaties cannot 
delineate the geographic scope (features and coordinates) of the territory and indicate other 
relevant issues while the ultimate decision as to whose sovereignty prevails should be decided 
directly by the population affected. This is probably the point that was made by the Attorney 
General of one of the states in the Nigerian federation, which is directly affected by the 
Bakassi decision of the Court. She stated: 
 
 “It is shocking to note that the ICJ would disregard the impact of its 
decision on the people of Bakassi in particular, and deliver a 
judgment …The failure or omission to conduct plebiscites in Bakassi is not 
only discriminatory but offends against the Purposes and Principles of the 
UN and the Charter of the African Union with regard to self determination. 
All persons have the right to their abode, within their ancestral territory, 
and should not be subjected to unjustifiable consignment of their ancestral 
land to a foreign government, country and alien culture without their 
consent or due consultation”.143 
 
In the short term, it is advisable that when African States enter into agreements 
regulating the resolution of boundary disputes and in drafting compromis clause submitting 
                                                         
141  The argument has been made elsewhere that perhaps the ICJ and the PCA have in the past been 
incapable of handling African affairs as well as those of the developing world, it is necessary to bring 
certain facts, figures and historical accounts into analytical perspective. Examining two major issues or 
charges will do this. The first is that throughout their existence the Courts have either by institutional design 
or inadvertently been applying an Eurocentric international law in a manner that compromises the interest of 
African and other developing States. Second, it is argued that the composition and staffing of these two 
institutions is inherently insufficient and probably biased against the overall interest of African and other 
developing states. Gbenga Oduntan, “How International Courts Underdeveloped International Law: 
Economic, Political and Structural Failings of International Adjudication in Relation to Developing 
States”, African Journal of International and Comparative Law (2005). 
142 As a result of a plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations in October 1961, the 
Southern Cameroons joined the Republic of Cameroon while the northern portion of the Territory of the 
Cameroon under the administration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland joined 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. T.O. Elias The International Court of Justice and Some Contemporary 
Problems, (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1983) p. 322; Note however, Cameroun Government 
White Paper alleging irregularities in the Northern Cameroons plebiscite and arguing for its nullification. 
Republic of Cameroon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of State for Information. 
Position of the Republic of the Cameroon following the plebiscite of 11th and 12th February 1961 in the 
northern portion of the Territory of the Cameroon under the administration of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Yaoundé, 1961. 48 pp. Cameroun Government White Paper 
alleging irregularities in the Northern Cameroons plebiscite and arguing for its nullification. 
143  Nella Andem-Ewa ‘Bakassi:Legal Options for Nigeria’ This Day (Lagos) December 3, 2002 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200212030216.html 
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disputes to the main international courts they should (a) insist upon a regional international 
court with competent jurisdiction or arbitration tribunals with their seat in Africa (b) infuse the 
applicable laws with the needed flexibility such as ability of the tribunal to decide ex aequo et 
bono or with reference to African traditional law. Only in this way would African states 
escape the deleterious effects of arguing their cases before courts that at best may have 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of their peculiar interests and history in international 
relations and at worst have consistently by their jurisprudence established a bias against the 
collective interest of developing states. 
There are also other ADR techniques, which may be better suited for the resolution of 
certain kinds of disputes between African States, which have already proven themselves very 
useful in resolving many conflict situations but remain under-utilised.  
The African Border programme and the law and practice it will set into motion is a 
veritable opportunity for African scholars, judges, lawyers, civil servants to reengineer 
international law and make it more user friendly to the needs of their continent. It is certainly 
not the time to engage in undue conservatism despite the alluring nature of the ‘stability’ it 
appears to offer. Africans do have a way of settling disputes and even land disputes and this 
must reflect in the AU Border programme. It must rely on what has been achieved by the 
universalist sentiments of international laws but it must not be slavish to same. It will not be 
the first time Africa has set or established trends that become acceptable worldwide. African 
states have given a new life to the concept of reconciliation after events or periods of national 
trauma. Examples exist in South Africa, Rwanda, Nigeria and others. It is easy to predict that 
the development of this method would be yet another innovation and contribution to world 
legal traditions emanating from the African continent. 144  It may also be envisaged that 
Afrocentric solutions would provide the necessary panacea to many of the festering boundary 
related disputes all over Africa.145 
                                                         
144 The inter ethnic fragmentation and ethnic rivalry that was produced by the colonial experience in 
Africa and which in many cases was carefully engineered by the colonial power makes reconciliation a 
particularly valuable means of dispute resolution on the African Continent. There is no reason why such 
mechanism may not find usefulness even in disputes of an inter-continental nature. It may also be noted 
that the concept of reconciliation is a very important theme in Christian theology. The term 
reconciliation is derived from the Latin root word, ‘conciliatus’, which means to come together, to 
assemble ... Reconciliation refers to the act by which people who have been apart and split-off from one 
another begin to stroll or march together again. Essentially, reconciliation means the restoration of 
broken relationships. For a clearer exposition of reconciliation as an ADR technique, see: Kader Asmal, 
Louise Asmal & Ronald Suresh Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid’s 
Criminal Governance, (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1996) p. 47. Joseph V. Montville, "The 
Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution", in Dennis J. D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe, 
Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993) pp. 112-127; Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, “Consultation on 
Reconciliation II: Final Report”, Washington, DC: IMTD, July 28-29 1995. 
145 The need to critique the law has been echoed by Professor Issa G. Shivji. He wrote “whatever the 
achievements of Western bourgeois civilisation, these are now exhausted. We are on the threshold of 
reconstructing a new civilisation, a more universal, a more humane, civilisation. And that cannot be 
done without defeating and destroying imperialism on all fronts. On the legal front, we have to re-think 
law and its future rather than simply talk in terms of re-making it. I do not know how, but I do know 
how not. We cannot continue to accept the value-system underlying the Anglo-American law as 
unproblematic. The very premises of law need to be interrogated. We cannot continue accepting the 
Western civilisation's claim to universality. Its universalization owes much to the argument of force 
rather than the force of argument. We have to rediscover other civilisations and weave together a new 
tapestry borrowing from different cultures and peoples”; See Issa G. Shivji, Law's Empire and Empire's 
Lawlessness: Beyond the Anglo-American Law International Conference on: Remaking Law In Africa: 
Transnationalism, Persons, And Rights, 21ST-22ND May, 2003 – Edinburgh p. 5. 
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It is possible to envisage that the African States may more frequently avail themselves 
of the mechanism of the Court of Justice of the AU, which is the principal judicial organ of the 
African Union.146 Of particular significance are the provisions of the Protocol on Eligibility to 
Submit Cases (Article 18), Competence/Jurisdiction (Article 19), Sources of Law (Article 20), 
Summary Procedure (Article 55) and Special Chambers (Article 56). Article 18 would 
arguably also be useful to the extent that it also recognizes the right of ‘third parties’ to submit 
cases to the Court of Justice under conditions to be determined by the AU Assembly and with 
the consent of the State Party concerned (Article 18 (d)).147 Furthermore, the assembly is 
empowered to confer on the Court of Justice power to assume jurisdiction over any dispute 
(Article 19 (2)). 
 
It is desirable that the Court of Justice develops and establishes clear jurisprudence in the area 
of boundary disputes, resource exploitation, maritime delimitation and environmental disputes. 
If indeed judicial settlement proves to be the favoured mechanism by African states in 
resolving boundary matters it would be desirable if not crucial that the Court of Justice makes 
good use of the unique provisions allowing (inter alia) the general principles of law recognized 
by African States (Article 20 (d)) to form part of its jurisprudence in deciding territorial and 
boundary matters. 
It is also noteworthy that the provisions establishing the Court of Justice share many 
similarities with those that establish the jurisdiction of the ICJ. For instance, the provision on 
competence of the court and sources of law are drafted largely along the lines of Articles 36 
and 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. Apart from the controversial compulsory jurisdiction 
mechanism in Article 36 (2 a–d of the Statute), the jurisdiction of both courts includes (a) the 
interpretation of treaties; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact 
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or 
extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
Both courts have as their function the making of decisions in accordance with 
international law through the application of: (a) international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by  the contesting States; (b) international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; and (d) the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law and the ability to 
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. African scholars and critics of the 
perceived ‘eurocentricity’ of public international law would follow the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice very closely to see what principles it would recognize as ‘general principles of 
law recognized by African States’ and indeed how much diffidence it would pay to this 
invitation to enrich international judicial practice. The power of the Court of Justice to appoint 
experts and commission enquiries under Article 30 are also useful mechanisms of the court 
which may assist it to quickly attain world class judicial competence. 
 
11. THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES ADR, 
LITIGATION OR ARBITRATION 
 
                                                         
146 The Court was established in consonance with the Constitutive Act of the Court of Justice of the 
African Union. See Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union in (2005) 13 African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 115–28. 
147 It is arguable that in time this could be a basis for the eventual acceptance of Multinationals into the 
Courts jurisdiction as parties. 
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Dispute resolution mechanisms and procedures are certainly some of the more 
important aspects of any serious enquiry into the future of delimitation and demarcation of 
African territories. Africa undoubtedly has produced most of the recent territorial and 
boundary disputes that have captured the attention of the World Court. Of the 17 separate 
contentious cases between African states submitted to the Court, 12 of them concern territorial  
and/or boundary disputes.148 Four of the remaining five contentious cases were instituted in the 
same year and relate to the armed activities on the territory of Congo.149  
The AU Border Programme will in time accelerate the introduction of new boundary 
related treaties among African states. Dispute resolution clauses naturally constitute a crucial 
part of any such treaty. It is, thus, necessary that this is the stage that serious thinking must be 
done as to the best Afrocentric procedures to encourage and promote among African states 
considering the quite prevalent view of African scholars and statesmen that pre-existing 
mechanisms that have been dogmatically adopted by African states in the past have produced 
poor and unsatisfactory results in African international relations.150  
Reference may be made here to the recent attempt by some African states to act 
decisively and imaginatively in creating specific dispute resolution routes and institutions for 
their recent collaborations in territorial and boundary matters. Examples must be made here of 
regional cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea leading to the recent establishment of the Gulf of 
Guinea Commission. The recently concluded Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission151 outlines the framework of the Gulf of Guinea Commission and prescribes its 
objectives powers and responsibilities. With the huge interests generated among the major oil 
producing multinational corporations (MNCs), the newer Independent producers and the 
                                                         
148 Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa: (South West Africa) 1960-1966; Cameroon v. 
United Kingdom (Northern Cameroon) 1961-63; Tunisia v. Libya (Continental shelf ) 1978-1982; Libya 
v. Malta (Continental shelf ) 1982-1985; Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali (Frontier Dispute) (Case 
referred to a Chamber) 1983-86; Tunisia v. Libya (Applications for Revisions and interpretation of the 
judgment of 24 February 1982 in the case concerning the Continental Shelf) 1978-1982; Guinea Bissau 
v. Senegal (Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989);  Libya Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad (Territorial Dispute 
1990-94); Cameroon  v Nigeria (Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute); Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana/Namibia); Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case 
concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 
Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon); Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger). 
149 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda 1999); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda 1999); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda 1999); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Burundi 1999). 
150 Professor Abbink noted, for instance, that the decisions of the EEBC ignore “the deep-rooted mutual 
suspicion still reigning between the two countries as well as the scepticism and distrust of citizens of 
their national governments on the issue”.  He identified Badme an apparently insignificant village as the 
fons et origo of the Ethiopia Eritrea Conflict and describes how it has acquired the status of a highly 
symbolic prize. President Isayas Afeworqi of Eritrea is quoted, as having said after the conquest of the 
village of Badme in May 1998 that giving up Badme would be like saying that the sun would set in the 
east. For the government and people of Ethiopia, however, serious damage to national pride has been 
perceived by the potential loss of a territory that has been administered as part of national territory since 
the founding of the state. This is guaranteed to make recapture of Badme by any means highly desirable. 
These are problems, which a court ruling simplicta cannot resolve. See Jon Abbink, Badme and the 
Ethiopian–Eritrean Conflict: Back to Square One? (2003) (www.erpic.org/Badme.html) 
151 Hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. A Bill for an Act to Enable Effect to be given in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria to the Treaty Establishing the Gulf of Guinea Commission has been placed before 
the National Assembly of Nigeria. The bill is sponsored by the Executive and has had its first reading 
on Tuesday, 1/2/05. See further http://www.nassnig.org/bills/BILLS%20PAGE%202004.htm visited 6 
March 2006. 
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participating states it was clear to the participating states that the treaty to govern this massive 
rich and strategic littoral zone which is largely un-demarcated must apart from facilitating a 
sustainable and responsive regime for the anticipated explosion of exploitative activities, 
prepare a reliable dispute resolution mechanism. The parties to the Treaty stated they are 
“[a]nxious to settle our disputes by peaceful means” (Preamble). Article 20 of the Gulf of 
Guinea treaty thus provides: 
 
Member States shall act collectively to guarantee peace, security and 
stability as prerequisites to the realization of the objectives set forth in 
this Treaty. To this end, they undertake to settle their disputes amicably. 
Failing which either party shall refer the matter to the Ad Hoc Arbitration 
Mechanism of the Treaty or any other mechanism for peaceful resolution 
of conflicts stated by the Charters of the United Nations, the Organisation 
of African Unity and the African Union. 
 
State members are, thus, generally enjoined to act collectively to guarantee peace, 
security and stability as prerequisites to the realization of the objectives set forth in the Treaty. 
To this end the member States are enjoined to settle their disputes amicably. Where a dispute 
persist the State parties may refer the matter to the Ad Hoc Arbitration Mechanism of the 
Treaty or another mechanism for peaceful resolution of conflicts stated by the Charters of the 
United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the African Union. The formulation of 
Article 20, therefore, arguably suggests a hierarchy of dispute management techniques for the 
member states. Attempts should first be made to reach amicable settlement and by this the 
drafters appear to refer to bona fide negotiation. Secondly, Ad Hoc Arbitration may become 
applicable. Thirdly, parties to the dispute may make reference to any of the means of 
resolution contained in the UN Charter. The principal means are to be found in Article 33 of 
the Charter.  
It is, however, doubtful that reference is being made here to Article 33 because the 
provision therein largely refers to methods which form part of the ‘amicable means’ already 
envisaged in the first sentence of Article 20.152 It appears, therefore, that reference is being 
made to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ is the principal 
judicial organ of the UN and its basic instrument is the Statute of the Court, which forms an 
integral part of the Charter and is annexed to it. It must, however, be noted that reference of 
the dispute to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the UN under Article 34 and 
35 (1) of the Charter is also a possibility. 153  Fourthly, the matter may be dealt with in 
accordance with the African Union (AU) Charter. It is however possible to also argue that the 
parties to the Treaty being African states themselves would have a preference for the 
mechanisms under the AU Charter and would prefer to seek resolution of the dispute under the 
AU regime before the UN regimes. Indeed it may be suggested that the provisions of Article 
20 are somewhat sketchy and clumsily drafted.  The formulation of this article ironically 
                                                         
152 Article 33 provides that: “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger 
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”. 
153 Indeed Article 34 and 35 make provision for any Member of the United Nations to bring any dispute, 
or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute or endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council or of the 
General Assembly. 
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appears to make all structures of dispute resolution it recommends appear not to be part of the 
initial requirement that parties “settle their disputes amicably”. The question this raises is 
whether or not judicial settlement, mediation or arbitration is not amicable or peaceful means. 
It is important to mention the pride of place that arbitration has also played in the 
resolution of territorial and boundary disputes. As hazel Fox eloquently stated of the 
arbitration route: 
 
“The first element, and the one which historically has induced States to 
submit disputes to arbitration, is the necessity for consent of the 
arbitrating parties to every stage in the arbitration. Selection of judges of 
their own choice is only one aspect of the very wide powers of 
supervision and control given to States under the usual arbitration 
agreement”154 
 
The idea that consent, not only given at the beginning of the arbitration proceedings, 
but that which “...continues throughout the proceedings until the tribunal retires to make its 
award, is therefore, an essential ingredient to the completion of any arbitration” is certainly 
true. However, this does not assure a party that it can withdraw consent so as to disrupt the 
arbitration opportunistically and forestall an unfavourable award.155 
Boundary experts are beginning to converge on the position that there is a possible 
hierarchy of dispute resolution mechanisms to be resorted to for territorial and boundary 
disputes.156 This position falls in line with the demands of the LOSC (1982) that negotiations 
should be the principal means of resolving maritime delimitation.157 Although clearly each 
case would be unique and may deserve a different conclusion it has been observed that the 
preponderance of practice is in favour of bilateral negotiation, conciliation and mediation.158 
The results of any of these are capable of being binding by signature to a document or treaty. 
This is followed by judicial settlement, which includes arbitration and ad hoc tribunals. 
Preference for negotiation is borne out of the need to avoid the perceived arbitrariness of 
judicial decisions or the rigidity with which legal principles are followed in a situation, which 
may call for sensitivities unknown to law. Negotiation also reduces or even removes the costs 
of legal representation. Negotiation is also viewed as being in line with the instinct of states to 
engage in international politics.  
In many cases even after the long and expensive route of adjudication has been 
completed parties find themselves returning to the table to negotiate raising the presumption 
that that is perhaps where the matter would have been best resolved. Although technically 
                                                         
154 Hazel Fox “Arbitration” International Disputes: The Legal Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 
1972) p. 101.  
155 Fox, op.cit., p. 100. 
156  Derek Smith, “Principles of Dispute Resolution: A practical Route to Follow” International 
Boundary Disputes in Oil & Gas Houston Texas (2004); Justin Stuhldneher, “Steps You Need to Take 
to Negotiate and Operate Within a Production Sharing Agreement: A Roadmap to Success” 
International Boundary Disputes in Oil & Gas Houston Texas (2004). It is indeed possible to locate this 
commendable development within the provisions of Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter which arguably 
betrays a possible hierarchy Article 33 (1) reads: The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
157 Griffin, op.cit. pp. 151-152. 
158 On occasion, the UN itself will, at the request of the parties, appoint a mediator in an attempt to 
resolve matters (for instance in the Guatemala/Belize; Guyana/Venezuela disputes). 
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speaking the dispute has been decided upon by the ICJ, it is clear that there is no unanimity as 
to how to give effect to all aspects of the Court’s judgment and the Court itself has enjoined 
the state parties to enter into further negotiations with respect to certain issues.159 With these 
considerations in mind it is necessary that full weight is given to recommendation of the 
conference of African ministers in charge of border issues that concluded “encourage the 
States to undertake and pursue bilateral negotiations on all problems relating to the 
delimitation and demarcation of their borders”160 Clearly Africa does not lack “very heavy 
weight and competent representatives” who can conduct international negotiations in the best 
traditions of the term.161  
 
Recent examples in the Cameroon-Nigeria and Namibia-Botswana and other processes 
denote certain commonalities and peculiar trajectories. The parties must set up joint 
negotiation teams comprising of equal numbers of high level officials and experts as much as 
possible of coordinate grade levels.162 One of the first tasks that the negotiating team will have 
to deal with is to agree on the common treaty instrument and compare their interpretations of 
such instruments.163 Effort must be made to identify areas of agreement. Regarding such areas 
agreement may be made as soon as practicable in relation to the demarcation specifications. 
This include agreement as to pillar types, pillar interval mapping corridor, map scales etc. The 
attention of the teams will inexorably have to shift to areas of differences where the parties 
have opposing or divergent views. Consensus would have to be reached on how to delimit and 
demarcate these areas. Where necessary compromises and agreements have been made on the 
above, the parties must then produce final demarcation maps with all boundary pillars and 
coordinates to be domesticated by each party and circulated to all stakeholders. Parties may 
then set up joint Boundary Management and Transboundary activity related structure164 
Where parties have, however, taken the judicial settlement route, in all likelihood they 
would still have to resort to many aspects of the foregoing in that the decision of the Court or 
arbitration panel will in practice be referred to a joint commission with (preferably) or without 
a facilitator of the process who will be part of the Commission. In the case of the Eritrea-
Ethiopia process the decision was taken by the State parties to retain the same Commission 
that decided this process as the demarcators. Joint commissions usually work out the 
                                                         
159 See our discussions on straddling villages below. 
160 Paragraph 5 (a )(i), Declaration On The African Union Border Programme, supra note 3. 
161 (See Opening Remarks By The Chairman Of The Mixed Commission And Special Representative 
Of The Secretary-General Of The United Nations, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah Yaoundé, 1 December 
2002 available at  
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/africa/office_for_srsg/cnmc/speeches/spchlist.htm). 
162 This factor does admit of the introduction of experts who may have difficulty fitting into known 
governmental or civil service grade structure. The equivalence of such person will in fact depend on 
their reputation or expertise value. In many cases this will be easily explicable by the nature of the 
specialism or added value they bring to the process. It is highly discouraged that countries use any slots 
available in boundary negotiation/implementation commissions to advance the course of political 
appointments as the matters at hand are of grave importance and it is in the interest of all that only 
competent persons of value to the process practical, theoretical or doctrinal are brought on board. 
163 Where as in the 17 cases completed on territorial issues by the ICJ the matter having been already 
decided through a judicial process, the parties would already in all probability have this task 
accomplished for it by the Court and demarcation is all that is left to the parties.  
164 S.M Diggi, “Negotiation and Demarcation of International Boundaries-The Experience of National 
Boundary Commission of Nigeria” p. 4. 
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modalities for the implementation of the decision of the judicial process. 165  Although 
theoretically the Court or arbitral body should have resolved the dispute and all that should 
remain is an implementation plan it turns out that in practice what the Court or panel does is to 
‘decide’ or ‘award’. Resolution in the true sense of the word belongs to the parties thus, an 
implementation party will in all likelihood find itself having to work out modalities to resolve 
knotty issues and lingering problems between the parties. This phenomenon should be seen as 
strength rather than a shortcoming of boundary determination processes. It is, therefore, 
possible to argue that for future African ‘state versus state’ boundary disputes the following 
applies: 
  
(a) good faith negotiations must be pursued diligently at first.  
(b) Where that is insufficient or concomitantly mediation and/or conciliation with the 
assistance of good offices within the AU should be employed.  
(c) Where the dispute turns strictly on the reading of a point of law and the ultimate effect of 
a judgment will not jeopardise national interests, litigation may be a desirable route. 
Where however the points of law are subsidiary to crucially matters of national interests, 
such as the loss of an indigenous population negotiations assisted by plebiscites if 
necessary is still the most desirable routes with the possible assistance of a composite of 
mediation-arbitration. In this way the process can accommodate better than litigation does 
the factual, historical, sentimental or other issues to arrive at sensitive or holistic results. 
This sensitive treatment of issues and bottom line drawing can be attained in many ways 
and particularly through carefully drawn out submission or arbitral clause.   In all cases, 
however, it is the position that decision, judgments and consent awards are to be final and 
binding. It is important to note that the litigation route via the ICJ enjoys the privilege and 
possibility of enforcement via the Security Council intervention or other coercive 
diplomacy through the UN system.  
(d) Nothing in the above commendations may, however, be interpreted to prevent African 
states that are parties to a dispute from adopting any of the general ADR mechanisms 
found in national and/or international law including use of African traditional methods. 
 
12. STRATEGIES AND MODALITIES TO RESOLVE STRADDLING COMMUNITIES 
AND RESOURCES WITHIN THE AFRICAN BOUNDARY PROGRAMME.  
 
                                                         
165 The funding for the activities of Joint Commissions are usually by equal contributions of the parties 
and/or assistance or grants from donor agencies and friendly countries supra note 121; see also Diggi, 
ibid., p. 6.  
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Delimitation of boundaries is rendered more difficult where villages and communities 
straddle the boundaries of two states. The existence of these straddling communities in many 
cases complicates the situation and prevents agreement between state parties. In many ways 
the situation is worsen where valuable economic resources straddle the boundaries between 
the states. The very existence of a boundary dispute may have emanated from the discovery of 
valuable hydrocarbons or other such important minerals. It is predictable that acceleration of 
delimitation and demarcation activities under the African Boundary Programme will 
precipitate the discovery or reigniting of these issues on a large scale. The potential for 
conflict or perpetuation of injustice in both cases is great. Certainly there is no unanimity in 
state practice on the issues and there is very little guidance in international law in dealing with 
the problems that may arise. In light of this it is necessary to consider the issues with the 
intention of offering Afro-centric positions and solution which ought to guide these important 
issues from the very inception of the programme. 
 
13. BOUNDARY DEMARCATION AND THE PROBLEM OF STRADDLING 
COMMUNITIES AND ENCLAVES 
 
Interestingly, Africa has so far produced a lesser number of controversies in relation to 
international straddling villages despite the predominant number of such occurrences all over 
the continent.166 In many cases the inhabitants of straddling communities continue to live 
peacefully side by side while the states they belong to engage in hostile political posturing, 
litigation or worse still military skirmishes. It is perhaps remarkable that there are not many 
examples of enclaves in the classical sense (i.e. territory belonging to one state in the foreign 
territory of another) in Africa at all. Indeed enclaves exist on only two continents: Europe and 
Asia.167 Africa is, however, host to at least one successful case of complete enclosure of one 
state in another. Reference is here made to Lesotho’s existence as an enclave inside South 
Africa.168 
Fortunately the pattern that reveals itself so far is that African States hesitate to dissect 
settlements into two during boundary demarcation despite the contents of the delimitation 
instrument. Where the main path of the boundary is parallel to a road or along a 
meridian/parallel, it is diverted around villages which otherwise straddled the boundary. A 
good instance is the Benin/Nigeria at 10 deg N, which has semi-circular offsets to let Nigeria 
retain villages along the road the boundary follows. Similarly, the Ghana/Burkina Faso 
boundary along the 11deg N parallel between 1deg W and the Red Volta River was 
demarcated by rectangular offsets in order to leave straddling villages to either country.169 As 
                                                         
166 Only further research can reveal whether this is because the existence of straddling villages, and de 
facto enclaves are largely ignored by governments in the light of other pressing economic and political 
problems or perhaps this is as a result of the relative recentness of the making of African Boundaries. 
See above footnote …  
167  In the main these have a feudal origin and date back several hundred years. Whyte, n.34, 43. 
168 Note, however, that this is a different legal and political situation from the cases discussed below 
relating to enclaves of independent states that are planted in another, (usually neighbouring) state. Note 
also the ten self-governing territories for different black ethnic groups which were established as part of 
the apartheid policy of the erstwhile apartheid South Africa. Four of these were granted “independence” 
by the infamous South Africa regimes although (they were recognized only by South Africa and each 
other). These former South Africans Homelands or Bantustans ceased to exist 27 Apr 1994 and were re-
incorporated into South Africa, and all were absorbed into the new provinces. 
169 Maps and descriptions of the boundary treaties can be had in Ieuan Griffiths, The Scramble for 
Africa: inherited political boundaries, 152 Geographical Journal, 2 (1986), 204-216, especially 207-8. 
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a result of the dependence of African traditional societies on communal or customary lands 
and property there is also the problem of straddling customary lands recognized by the 
customary communities but ignored or disputed by the state parties. This issue, however, is yet 
to receive the academic attention it deserves in African legal jurisprudence.  
As a general rule, however, it would appear that African States are more inclined 
towards the view that ‘good fences make good neighbours’ but would in the event of boundary 
demarcation adopt a clear boundary demarcation which leaves whole communities and 
villages intact. It appears, however, that the inclination not to separate or split existing 
communities in the name of demarcation is far more likely where the demarcation does not 
follow military hostilities and protracted litigation as was unfortunately the case in the recent 
history of Cameroon and Nigeria. It is for this reason that the parties to that process have 
continued to be handle issues surrounding straddling villages with reasoned diplomacy.  
The implementation of post boundary dispute decisions and awards is a desirable end 
in itself but a close eye must be placed on the larger picture in light of past experience on the 
African continent. Nothing less than a sensitive implementation of ICJ and arbitral decisions is 
required and concerned parties as well as demarcation commissions ought not to be limited by 
a slavish attitude to judicial decisions where such decisions imply an insensitive dissection of 
lives and organic communities. There is no shortage of condemnable practices elsewhere 
outside of Africa which the implementation plan of the AU Border Programme must actively 
seek to avoid taking root in Africa. Such identifiable ‘bad practices’ in state practice along 
boundary communities include the creation of impenetrable barriers,170 inordinate creation of 
visa regimes,171 the use of armed village militias172 intermittent exchange of gunfire at frontier 
          _________________________ 
For the Ghana/Burkina boundary see the Russian 1:200,000 map C-30-xii available at 
http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/EART/ghana/200k/03-30-12.jpg 
170 On 9 January 1999 the state government of West Bengal (India) set the target of fencing 900km of 
the border with Bangladesh during. 500km out of the total of 1600 km had been fenced with barbed 
wire, with central government funding. The West Bengal state government also favoured the creation of 
a 150 mile ‘no man’s land’, affecting 450 villages in the border area, in its attempts to stem the influx of 
migrants from Bangladesh. India is currently building a fence along its 4,000-km (2,500 miles) border 
with Bangladesh.  See “Border tense over push-in, fence erection bids by BSF” New Age Dhaka Sunday 
March 6, 2005 available at http://www.newagebd.com/2005/mar/06/front.html visited 30th December 
2005; M. Rama Rao, India’s interior ministry favours fencing more stretches of border with Bangladesh, 
Asian Tribune New Delhi available at http://www.asiantribune.com/show_news.php?id=11656 visited 
30 December 2005. The Russian border, with Estonia was also fortified with watchtowers and barbed 
wire presenting problems among people who were accustomed to moving freely across the border. 
Estonian - Russian Border Troubles The Baltic Observer 13 March 1994, 5.  It may be noted that 
despite the long history of enthusiastic self preservation strategies and irredentism that are available in 
human history at least within the last century the idea of boundary fences and walls between states have 
not retained any appreciable acceptability in law and public perception.  
171 Witness the introduction of visa regime between Russia’s Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad and its 
neighbouring states with which it had coexisted in peace prior to their joining the European Union. 
Peoples Daily Online “Russia Criticizes Visa Regime between Kaliningrad, Neighbouring States” 
Tuesday, June 11, 2002 http://english.people.com.cn/200206/11/eng20020611_97585.shtml visited 30th 
December 2005. Similarly a visa regime was introduced for persons travelling between Russia and 
Poland on October 1 2003 consequent upon Poland’s upcoming entry into the European Union. Prior to 
this time rural populace in both Russia and Poland conducted large-scale formal and informal trade 
across their common boundaries freely.  The resultant situation is long and debilitating ques and the 
hampering of trade between the neighbours. See further RIAN, “Russia, Poland introduce visa regime” 
Pravda 01-10-2003 available at http://newsfromrussia.com/world/2003/10/01/50268.html 
172 Consider the reports of Turkish Militia actions against Kurdish populations along the Iraq-Turkey 
border Owen Bowcott, Buffer Zone Proposal, The Guardian (LONDON) 11 Feb. 1997, 11. 
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positions.173 Other unsupportable antecedents which have been employed with debilitating 
effect include policies, which serve to freeze the natural development and spread of the 
citizens of the other state. This may involve restrictive use of building permits, enforced by 
selective house demolitions, arrests, fines and daily harassment, all designed to confine such 
population to small enclaves.174 
In place of this the AU Border Programme must actively promote and where possible 
help arrange international funds for bilateral and multilateral projects designed to bridge the 
border regions into regenerative zones of economic and cultural revival. Examples include the 
joint development of resorts, parks, and “international villages” along part(s) of thee common 
boundary of states. Other viable options include the unitisation of the straddling oil fields 
(discussed below), joint Eco-tourism, territorial trade off, and land for oil trade-off, among 
others.175 
 
There is much precedent for innovative thinking and cooperation among African states 
in post boundary dispute implementation. In the Cameroon –Nigeria situation immediate post 
litigation processes included negotiations regarding the revival of projects under the Lake 
Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The CNMC is in continuous discussion relating to the 
reactivation of the work of the LCBC. An extraordinary Summit of all the member states was 
held recently in Abuja. The World Bank has also approved a grant for the work of the 
                                                         
173 Exchange of fire between Indian and Bangladeshi border guards at a frontier outpost is a feature of 
the tense border relations between the two countries since the partition of the subcontinent into India 
and Pakistan in 1847. The ownership of several villages on both sides of the border are disputed and 
claimed by both countries.   BBC News, “India-Bangladesh border battle” Wednesday, 18 April, 2001, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1283068.stm visited 1st January 2006. Note also long 
standing Isreali-Lebanon problems. See BBC News, Fighting erupts on Lebanon border Sunday, 26 
November, 2000 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1041319.stm visited 1st January 
2006. 
174 Such an unfortunate regime has been described as the matrix of control in relation to Palestinian 
villages bordering Israel (i.e. within the context of Isreali dominance). See Jeff Halper, The Key To 
Peace: Dismantling The Matrix Of Control, June 28.2002 available at 
http://www.jerusalemites.org/facts_documents/peace/28.htm.; See also Habitat International Coalition, 
Housing And Land Rights Committee Statement Before The Committee On Economic, Social And 
Cultural Rights 24th Session, Geneva, 13 November 2000 General Item: Follow-up Procedure (Israel) 
Available at http://www.cesr.org/programs/palestine/hicgeneva.pdf. 
175 One such laudatory example which may be adopted with respect to one or more of the straddling 
communities is the International Peace Garden created to commemorate over 150 years of peace 
between the United States and Canada. This feature straddles the world’s longest unguarded 
international boundary and is situated in the scenic Turtle Mountains between North Dakota and 
Manitoba, and half way between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Situated at the mouth of this feature are 
the flags of both nations, and on a boundary marker is inscribed, “To God in his glory, we two nations 
dedicate this garden and pledge ourselves that as long as man shall live, we will not take up arms 
against one another.” The most prominent structure, the Peace Tower, with its four pillars, stands over 
100 feet tall astride the exact geographical coordinates separating the international boundary. Inspiration 
for the idea came through the private efforts of a certain academic (Dr. Henry Moore of Islington, 
Ontario) and culminated in the gathering of 50,000 people on July 14, 1932 to dedicate the territory to 
peace. Spreading over 2,339 acres, the territory displays a spectacular mosaic of flowers, trees, 
fountains, and paths. Visitors can stroll through the formal gardens, camp under aspen and oaks, or even 
get married in the Peace Chapel. Concerts, arts festivals, and renowned youth summer camps in music 
and athletics are also held in there. Over 250,000 people visit the Garden during the summer months 
alone to help renew the pledge of friendship between Canada and the United States. See Green, 
Sheldon. A Garden for Peace,. Vol.21 North Dakota Horizons, No.3 (1991); See also Sonja Rossum, 
International Peace Garden Centre for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska, - Lincoln available 
at http://www.unl.edu/plains/publications/egpentries.html#peace. 
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LCBC.176 Note may also be taken of certain bilateral confidence building efforts the parties 
have embarked upon, such as; the upgrading of the Mamfe-Abakaliki road to Kumba and 
Mutengene on the Cameroonian side and the development of early warning system to alert the 
relevant local authorities and affected populations about potential natural or other disasters. It 
may be suggested that if the two states exhibit high levels of political resolve, significant 
financial help could be expected for innovative territorial arrangements such as parks and 
conservation gardens from the international donor community which has already responded in 
various ways to the positive attitude of the parties after the ICJ judgment.177 
In the situations where a boundary decision or award has been given by an 
international court, it is advocated here that the spirit of the Yoruba philosophical and legal 
maxim be adopted as the guiding principle. As the maxim goes; “bi a ba ran eniyan ni ise eru 
ologbon afi ti omo je” (Where instructions are insensitive and befitting of a slave, reasonable 
men must amend it sensitively and deliver it in a manner befitting the free). 
It is particularly crucial that post adjudication negotiations regarding straddling 
villages are as comprehensive and as honest as possible given the fact that both family and 
economic life of the inhabitants of these villages may become disrupted as a result of 
insensitive ‘line in the sand’ approach to the demarcation tasks. The reasonable policy which 
ought to be encouraged by the AU Border Programme  is that, as much as possible, post 
adjudication demarcation must proceed along the lines determined by the Court but that where 
it would occasion manifest injustices or absurdities such as splitting a school compound into 
two halves or separating families from their means of subsistence, the legal boundary would 
cease to be useful and will only be indicative of the direction in which the demarcation must 
follow for as long as the manifest absurdity is avoided.178  
If the option of splitting of straddling villages is eventually adopted it is necessary to 
point out that the right of inhabitants of straddling villages to leave the country should be 
guaranteed in a watertight agreement. Human rights NGOs have for long noted discrimination 
in the treatment of groups wishing to exercise freedom of movement within straddling 
communities. Often whole populations would be equated with the activities of one individual, 
a particular regime or incidents which occurred during previous political disputes between the 
neighbouring states. At other times when the communities have been split up into two states 
the right of freedom of movement would only be extended to those regarded as coming from 
the favoured side.179 
It is perhaps important at this stage to advance certain criteria by which the 
demarcation of straddling villages may be resolved. The extent to which a settlement straddles 
the state(s) in question would naturally differ from case to case. Rarely will the straddling 
                                                         
176  See Communiqué adopted at the second meeting of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission 
established pursuant to the Joint Geneva communiqué of 15 November 2002, Abuja, 4-5 February 2003. 
177 See Para 8 and 11 Communiqué adopted at the Third meeting of the Cameroon –Nigeria Mixed 
Commission established pursuant to the Joint Geneva Communiqué of 15 November 2002, Yaoundé 2-
3 April 2003. See  also Communiqué adopted at the fourth meeting of the Cameroon –Nigeria Mixed 
Commission established pursuant to the Joint Geneva Communiqué of 15 November 2002, Abuja, 10-
12 June 2003. 
178 Gbenga Oduntan, The Demarcation of Straddling Villages in Accordance with the International 
Court of Justice Jurisprudence: The Cameroon-Nigeria Experience. 5 Chinese Journal of International 
Law, (1). (2006)  pp. 79-114 
179  International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), Fight against Discrimination and Protection of 
Vulnerable Groups available at 
http://www.ishr.ch/About%20UN/Reports%20and%20Analysis/Sub%2052%20-
%20Discrimination.htm. 
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village/community or city be geometrically spread equally over the territories involved 
because human settlements as organic phenomena rarely have such natural symmetry. A 
straddling settlement may therefore ‘straddle’ with respect to one of the territories with only a 
few dozen houses, houses or homesteads. It is, suggested that permanence of the structures 
that straddle into foreign territory would be a relevant factor in the consideration of the rights 
and interests of the affected people and states in the search for an equitable solution.  
Where only tents, caravans or other moveable architectural structure are at issue 
especially where they are few, it may be suggested that a court can afford to carry out 
delimitation exercise in a much more stricter fashion. It may however, be that a straddling 
settlement straddles not by virtue of human habitation but by virtue of the fact that the 
farmland or other economic or vital resource such as river upon which the human settlement 
depends is to be found within the territory of another state. In such cases the appurtenance and 
close geographical relation to the human settlement, the crucial importance of the resources, 
the length of time that the settlement has spread into foreign territory as well as other 
“effectivité”-oriented criteria would all be relevant facts.180 In such cases there is a strong 
basis for the exercise of judicial discretion to vary the line in the interest of human justice even 
where no single dwelling is in issue. It is argued that this view is supportable especially where 
there is no adjacent settlement that competes for the use of the river or fertile land on the other 
side. Where significant economic resources are at stake such as oil and gas or fisheries it is 
suggested that the issue is no longer that of merely protecting the indigenous people and the 
territorial state into which the settlement has spread into ought to retain full rights over such 
resources (subject to our discussions on sharing mineral resources and fisheries below). 
Where just few compounds or farmlands spreads into another territory a court may 
decide not to treat this as an instance of the existence of a straddling settlement and strict 
delimitation may be exercised. But when, for instance, the majority of the village’s farmland is 
now to be excised away into another state then perhaps this will raise the presumption that 
some form of exchange of coaxial or proportionate territory may be arranged. Boundary 
demarcators in such cases may also adopt a strict adherence to the delimitation line. Where an 
international court has not exercised discretion along the lines suggested above and this would 
lead to manifest injustice to a significant population, there is much credence for the view that 
those charged with the implementation of the judgment should seriously explore possibilities 
of ameliorating the harshness of the delimitation.181  
The centre of the village, the location of its religious places (such as shrines mosques, 
churches, ancestral groves) the palace of the king or chiefs (in the case of the affected 
Cameroon Nigeria boundary villages the Bullama) or its oldest quarter may be a useful 
indication of which state may claim ownership but these features do not offer conclusive 
evidence of the ownership of one state or the other to the extent that the people themselves 
may consider themselves to be rightfully the citizens of another state in spite of where the 
centre of the village or its oldest parts lie. It is indeed not inconceivable that villagers may 
                                                         
180 Note should be taken that effectivité remains a potent consideration in determination of boundary 
and territorial issues despite the courts disregard of the principle in the Cameroon-Nigeria case. This 
conclusion is clear from the Court’s conclusion in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of 
Mali) case that “where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administered by a 
state other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given to the holder of the title. In 
the event that the effectivité does not co-exist with any legal title, it must invariably be taken into 
consideration” (emphasis added). Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) 586-587, para. 63.   
181 Note should however, be taken that the discussion so far is in relation to straddling villages the 
sovereignty over which is not dispute. A dispute over the determination of which state can lay claim to a 
straddling settlement as a whole is a territorial dispute and not a boundary dispute. 
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move around frequently creating confusion as to where the origins of the village or settlement 
began and where the locations of the many places mentioned above actually were. Natural 
causes (war, drought, landslides, earthquakes, infestation by locusts, wild life etc.) may cause 
a settlement to shift around in such a way that it becomes difficult if not impossible to 
determine the pattern of spread of a straddling settlement.  
It is for this reason that the oral history of the particular people and their wishes as 
may be determined by consultation and plebiscites are crucial factors to be taken into 
consideration by demarcators. It is also for this reason that African international courts are 
perhaps more suited to hearing these sorts of cases. A court that is without close knowledge of 
the people and places involved or has not received extensive evidence on a straddling 
community and/or the workings of an African village must hesitate to prescribe a delimitation 
that definitively splits the community.  It is the position of this paper that those that are 
entrusted with the function of delimitation, in fact have the power if not a duty in the exercise 
of that function (barring an express and specific limitation by the parties to the contrary) to 
consider the wishes of the affected people in a straddling settlement and other factors such as 
the previous history of administration and to vary the line of delimitation in the overall interest 
of human justice. It hardly needs be mentioned that the exercise of this function in any 
delimitation exercise must be used within very strict limits. It is not also without 
contemplation that after consultation the people of a straddling settlement may not be opposed 
to a strict division along treaty lines especially where the treaties concerned have an 
unquestionable legitimacy in the estimation of the people. The important consideration 
however is that diligent consultation with the concerned population ought to be a desirable 
task of an African delimiting tribunal and a central task of the demarcation team.  
 
It is suggested that the power to vary the delimitation line around straddling settlements in 
Africa must be exercised very carefully and such exercise of jurisdiction is justifiable upon the 
existence of certain conditions: 
 
(a) The exercise of this power is pleaded by one of the states involved and the there is a 
finding that there is indeed a straddling community in existence. 
(b) The exercise of this power is pleaded by the affected people and the request is not 
opposed by at least one of the states involved and there is a finding that there is a 
straddling community in existence. 
(c) There has been no express and specific limitation by the parties that this power may not 
be exercised. 
(d) The exercise of the power is fair, just and equitable in view of the overall circumstances 
and merits of the case.  
(e) The ownership of the straddling settlement is not judged by the court to be central dispute 
between the parties.182 
                                                         
182 This differentiation in relation to the Cameroon-Nigeria dispute is perhaps discernible in the way the 
dispute unfolded before the court.  On 29 March 1994 Cameroon filed the suit against Nigeria and 
defined it as “relat[ing] essentially to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi” (para 1 and 25 (a)).  
Later on the 6th of June 1994 Cameroon filed in the Registry of the Court an additional application “for 
the purpose of extending the subject of the dispute to a further dispute” described in that Additional 
Application as “relat[ing] essentially to the question of sovereignty over a part of the territory of 
Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad” (para 3). Cameroon then also requested the Court, in its Additional 
Application, “to specify definitively” the frontier between the two States from Lake Chad to the sea, and 
asked it to join the two Applications. It is arguable that a pecking order may be established as to the 
crucial areas in dispute. 
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Relevant factors that will determine the extent to which such discretion may be 
exercised include the relative size of the states facing the boundary dispute. In the case of 
relatively large states such as Cameroon and Nigeria, the varying of a line of delimitation by a 
few dozen meters is good policy if it can keep settlements together where the people and at 
least one of the states involved are desirous of that result. Justification for this position exists 
in the annals of jurisprudential thinking and practice.   
The fifth condition mentioned above perhaps deserves further explanation. It refers to 
the need to make a distinction between a settlement that forms part of the central dispute 
between the litigating states and those which are only to be dealt with as a consequence of the 
general task put before a court or tribunal. Thus, disputes over territories such as Bakassi 
Peninsula (Cameroon-Nigeria dispute) and Badme (Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute) would not 
necessarily fall within the scope of the argument presented here. In reality the entire frontier 
between two states may be drawn into issue whereas only specific places are crucial to the 
dispute between the two states. While the Court must apply all due diligence in its work of 
delimiting the boundaries between the two states it is clear that varying the line with respect to 
small straddling villages in the interest of human justice especially in those areas outside Lake 
Chad and Bakassi Peninsula was arguably a desirable consequence of its work especially in 
situations where both states stood to potentially gain from this approach. Courts of law should 
be held to a higher requirement and standard of justice which go beyond the demands of the 
litigating states. An institution that arbitrates or adjudicates matters between sovereign states is 
first and foremost an international temple of justice and is no way obliged to maintain a 
positivist approach in the execution of its tasks in the face of possibility of putting in jeopardy 
human and generational rights of indigenous peoples.183  
 
14.  VARYING DEMARCATION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND 
ACCOMMODATING LOSERS INTERESTS 
 
The process of implementation of a delimitation judgment/award is certain to be 
momentous and indeed painful to persons on both sides of the boundary. Sentiments and 
feelings are aroused on a very personal level even up to the very echelons of power in both 
countries. It is, for instance, a fact which has been repeated on many occasions by my 
counterpart on the Cameroonian side of the ongoing negotiations, the present Minister of 
Justice and Keeper of the Seals of the Republic of Cameroon, Mr Amadou Ali, that he has 
extensive Nigerian antecedents and that many of his living relatives are now confirmed to be 
                                                         
183 It is notable that the ICJ approach in this matter is in no way different to the general attitude of other 
international courts. The refusal of international courts and international law practitioners to adopt a 
more flexible approach to the resolution of disputes noted by older authorities like Han Morgenthau (in 
relation to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)) remains unchanged till date. 
Morgenthau regretted the predominance of “time-honoured pseudo-logical method of traditional 
positivism which prevailed in the jurisdiction of the domestic supreme courts at the turn of the (19th) 
century” (parenthesis added). He wrote “…resistance to change is uppermost in the history of 
international law. All the schemes and devices by which great humanitarians and shrewd politicians 
endeavored to reorganize the relations between states on the basis of law, have not stood the trial of 
history. Instead of asking whether the devices were adequate to the problems which they were supposed 
to solve, it was the attitude to the problems which they were supposed to solve, it was the general 
attitude of the internationalists to take the appropriateness of the devices for granted and to blame the 
facts for the failure”.  Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 
American Journal of International Law (Apr., 1940), 260, 263. See also generally, P.S. Wild, “What Is 
the Trouble with International Law?” Vol. XXCII Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (1938). 
African Journal of Law and Criminology Vol. 1 Number 1 (2011), pp. 140 - 203 
 189
Nigerian as a direct result of the Judgment. The current Cameroonian Prime Minister, Ephraim 
Inoni, also has close relatives in Nigeria. The former Nigerian Vice-President, Atiku Abubakar, 
at one of the joint sessions if the CNMC also related his closeness to the boundary issue by 
virtue of the proximity of his own village to the international border. 
There can be very few defensible arguments against the finality of international 
judgments and awards and such arguments will succeed in the most limited circumstances. 
This is indeed why resolution of boundary disputes through the route of negotiations and 
opportune use of mediation and good services are perhaps preferable to the adjudicative or 
arbitral routes. The Court on previous occasions has also stated that in its task of delimitation, 
it will not consider as of direct legal significance a claim that is ‘‘based on historic titles (or) is 
also based on reason of crucial human necessity’’. 184  Inequality of natural resources or 
consequential injustices as would occur where a family is separated from its farms have also 
been summarily dismissed as irrelevant for the determination of a land frontier which came 
into existence after independence.185 Yet it is clear that although African States do have a very 
good record of compliance with the decision of the World court in boundary disputes is 
generally impressive the rigidity of judgments does pose a danger of perpetuating perceived 
injustice and gets in the way of agreement. This characteristic is in itself dangerous to 
international peace and stability. The quagmire surrounding the ongoing Eritrea-Ethiopia 
process since 13 April 2002 Eritrea-Ethiopia award186 is indicative of the problem. 
The Eritrea-Ethiopia implementation has suffered more prevarification and increasing 
reluctance of the parties to co-operate with the commission in the demarcation phase of its 
work. A view has it that this is mainly as a result of Ethiopian dissatisfaction with the loss of 
parts of its territory. 187  Similar to the Nigerian situation, the delimitation attained by the 
demarcators of the EEBC produced a situation whereby large numbers of people were cut off 
from their rivers, farms and other means of livelihood.188 Despite this fact, the EEBC stated in 
                                                         
184 17 See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening) 
ICJ Reports, 1992, 396, para.58. 
185 See Continental Shelf, Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahirya, ICJ Reports (1982), 77, para.107. For a 
critique of this rigid approach to justice and a critical reappraisal of the uti possidetis principle by which 
many colonial boundaries remain sacrosanct, see Gbenga Oduntan, (2005) above n.92, 3, 14–16, 23. 
See further Judge Bola Ajibola’s separate opinion in the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Chad) in which he appeared to argue that it appeared as if territorial issues relating to Africa 
are constantly being judged from Eurocentric eyes. 
186 20 The Commission’s Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary (Merits), Decision on Delimitation, 13 April 2002 
was followed by demarcation arrangements, paralleled by the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary (Interpretation) 
Decision of 24 June 2002, which dismissed Ethiopia’s Request for Interpretation of the former Decision, 
as well as by the Eritrea/ Ethiopia (Interim Measures) and Eritrea/Ethiopia (Demarcation) Orders of 17 
July 2002, and the Eritrea/ Ethiopia (Determinations) Decision of 7 November 2002. Copies of all of 
the Commission’s Decisions were deposited with the Secretaries-General of the African Union 
( formerly the OAU) and the United Nations. For the texts and related UN Statements, see the websites 
of the PCA (www.pca-cpa.org) and of the United Nations (www.un.org/NewLinks/eebcarbitration). See 
also UN doc. S/RES/1398 of 15 March 2002, which extended the UNMEE until 15 September 2002, 
with a view to facilitating the implementation of the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Decision; UN docs 
A/57/1, 2002, para.39; S/2002/744; S/RES/1430 and A/ RES/1434 of 14 August and 6 September 2002, 
which further extended the UNMEE until 15 March 2003; and S/2002/977. See also Jon Abbink, op.cit. 
pp 1-2. 
187 John Donaldson and Martin Pratt, “International Boundary Developments International Boundary 
Developments in 2003” 9 Geopolitics (2004) pp. 501-503; “Ethiopian, Eritrean Border Conflict 
Resolution Deadlocked”, The Guardian (Nigeria) available at 
http://community.nigeria.com/newsroom.html accessed 12 September 2007. 
188 The controversy surrounding the Decision is reflected in a letter written to the EEBC arbitrators to 
mark the first anniversary of the verdict. It reads, inter alia: ‘‘On April 13, 2001, when the governments 
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paragraph 14A of the Commission’s Demarcation Directions of 8 July 2002 that with respect 
to the division of towns and villages: 
The Commission has no authority to vary the boundary line. If it runs 
through and divides a town or village, the line may be varied only on the 
basis of an express request agreed between and made by both Parties.189 
 
The written comments submitted by Ethiopia on the draft of this provision had 
expressed the hope that it could be made more flexible so that demarcations could be more 
practical and mitigate hardships. The Commission, however, rejected this suggestion based 
largely on the expectation that aggrieved States must respect the finality, which the parties had 
agreed to attach to the Delimitation Decision. This is, however, difficult to reconcile with the 
Commission’s view that: 
 
A demarcator must demarcate the boundary as it has been laid down in 
the delimitation instrument, but with a limited margin of appreciation 
enabling it to take account of any flexibility in the terms of the 
delimitation itself or of the scale and accuracy of maps used in the 
delimitation process, and to avoid establishing a boundary which is 
manifestly impracticable.190 
 
Despite this and perhaps with the full realization that getting the parties to jointly 
request that a line should be varied in the interest of protecting the citizens of either party 
would be very unlikely to say the least in a dispute with such a difficult and long gestation 
period, the Commission seems to have determined a priori that there would be no need for it to 
be flexible in its work because it is ‘‘not of the view that there is to be derived from that 
practice a settled rule of customary international law to the effect that demarcators not so 
expressly empowered nonetheless possess such power’’.191 In other words, it is reasonable to 
expect that the ongoing demarcation would suffer from the same rigidity and commitment to 
formalism that typified the delimitation stage and has exposed the Commission’s work to the 
          _________________________ 
of Ethiopia and Eritrea announced their victory regarding their common border, thousands of Irobs 
woke up to find their history and their heritage suddenly altered by five judges that had never set foot in 
the boundary region. They were initially confused by the Commission’s decision because the decision 
placed the term ‘Irob’ entirely in Ethiopia, yet numerous Irob villages and hamlets were now placed in 
Eritrea. They were confused as to why Ethiopia declared absolute victory because Eritrean radio 
stations in the Washington D.C. area and apparently in Eritrea were bragging that they won one third of 
Irobland. Slowly, our fears became true. It became clear that despite the many pleas made by the people 
of Irob, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission had shockingly sacrificed the people of Irob for the 
sake of political compromise.’’ See Tesfamariam Baraki, Beyond the Badme Debate: The Forgotten 
Case of Irobland, 10 March 2003 (www.unitedethiopia.org/BeyondtheBadmeDebate.html). 
189 Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Observations, 21 March 2003, published as an addendum 
to the Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, UN doc. S/2003/257 of 6 
March 2003 (www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/Obs.EEBC.pdf). 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid., pp. 2–3. In classic and unrelenting fashion symptomatic of the conservative jurisprudence of 
the main international courts and tribunals, it is stated that ‘‘the Commission is, as already noted, 
constrained by the terms of the December 2000 Agreement. The Commission is unable to read into that 
treaty language, either taken by itself or read in the light of the context provided by other associated 
agreements concluded between the Parties, any authority for it to add to or subtract from the terms of 
the colonial treaties or to include within the applicable international law elements of flexibility which it 
does not already contain.’’ This is very difficult to reconcile with paras 1 and 2 of Eritrea/Ethiopia 
Boundary (Determinations), supra note 131. 
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strongest criticism by all sides to the dispute and by other commentators. It is suggested that 
the Commission’s work would have better chances of success had it adopted the more holistic 
view of the entire exercise as a process. 
It is for this reason that African demarcation must wear a human face. The 
jurisprudence of the African Court of Justice and other International Arbitral institutions based 
in Africa should be progressive. It behoves of African lawyers and statesmen to move beyond 
bare geographic legalism in the resolution of delimitation and demarcation problems and to 
adopt a specifically Afrocentric jurisprudence based less on ‘a winner takes it all’ logic and 
more on people centred approach and the precepts of generational justice. A possible direction 
to explore in this respect is whether leases and long term servitudes should be encouraged in 
African practice to perhaps reduce the shock of territorial loss. In this way property rights (to 
territory, chattel, real property, and farmland) and the economic benefits therefrom may be 
retained or transferred by negotiated agreement while preserving the sentimentalities of 
peoples and groups. It may for instance be that agreement over the Bakassi Peninsula would 
have been easily secured if it had been open to Nigeria to lease the territory from Cameroon. 
A good pre-emptive strategy which ought to be explored by the AU immediately and 
to accompany the initial stages of the African Boundary Programme is to encourage the 53 
African member states to ratify where they have not done so already the major international, 
African and regional human and peoples rights conventions and treaties. If and when a state 
loses territory during demarcation to another state the existence of multifarious treaties and 
conventions that prevent the arbitrariness of power against minority groups and all persons 
would prove invaluable to those nationals and their erstwhile states. It would also prove useful 
to governments to be able to assure an emotive national population that a neighbouring state 
will be bound to respect the rights and privileges of the affected population. It is worthy of 
note that there are numerous international instruments to which both Cameroon and Nigeria 
are parties and which are definitive of their obligations towards the affected population and 
have been informing their common approach to the overall implementation task. These include 
(a) at least one pertinent bilateral treaty; (b) 9 leading multilateral treaties to which both states 
are parties. These instruments can also be relied upon in the protection of the individual and 
group rights of the affected population. It may also be noted that the constitutions of both 
States contain specific provisions guaranteeing the protection of human rights and freedoms. 
In addition to this, both Nigeria192 and Cameroon193 have within their domestic spheres an 
                                                         
192 Land Use Act, Cap.202, Vol. XI; Legal Aid Act, Cap.205, Vol. XI (Legal Aid Council); Immigration 
Act, Cap.171, Vol. X; Penal Code, Cap.345, Vol. XIX; Criminal Code Act, Cap.77, Vol. V; Criminal 
Code Act, Cap.80, Vol. V; Criminal Procedure Act, Cap.80, Vol. V; Women and Children’s Rights Act, 
2003; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Chapter II Fundamental Objectives and 
Directives and Directive Principles of State Policy; Chapter IV Citizenship; Fundamental Rights; 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules; Fifth Schedule, Pt I: Code of Conduct for Public 
Officers, s.9: Abuse of Powers; Code of Conduct for Public Officers, s.9: Abuse of Powers; Code of 
Conduct for Public Officers, s. 9: Abuse of Powers; Code of Conduct Bureau, s.15; Code of Conduct 
Tribunal, s.17. 
193 Act No.97/012 of 10 January on the Conditions for Entry into, Residence in and Departure from 
Cameroonian Territory, and Decree No.2000/286 of 12 October specifying the Conditions for the Entry, 
Residence and Departure of Foreign nationals; Act No.90/ 052 of 19 December 1990 on Freedom of 
Social Interaction; Act No.90/053 of 19 December 1990 on Freedom of Association; Act No.90/054 of 
19 December 1990 on the Maintenance of Public Order; Act No.90/055 of 19 December 1990 on 
Governing Public Events and Meetings; Act No.90/058 of 19 December 1990 modifying Act No.89/019 
of 29 December 1989 on the Organisation of the Judicial System; Act No.90/060 of 19 December 1990 
on the Establishment and Organisation of the Court of National Security; Act No.90/060 of 19 
December 1990 on the Establishment and Organisation of the Court of National Security; Act 
No.90/061 of 19 December 1990 modifying certain provisions of the Penal Code; Act No.97/009 
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extensive body of legislation that is directly related or relevant to the protection of human 
rights. Both States are also proud participants in international law and international 
relations.194 It is, thus, necessary to conclude that there is adequate protection of the interests 
of individuals and groups within the scope of the applicable law relating to both states. Indeed 
both states have on a number of occasions openly expressed a firm commitment to ensure that 
no action taken in the implementation of the decision of the ICJ judgment would put them in a 




15.  STRADDLING RESOURCES AND HYDROCARBON FIELDS 
 
The potentials of straddling resources to continue acting as flash points on the African 
continent is a clear and present danger. The phenomenon deserves closer scrutiny than it gets 
in legal and political literature. It certainly does deserve closer study under the AUBP and as 
received mention but it is not clear exactly how the states parties to the process are expected to 
engage with the legal issue. The problem as accurately described by the African Union is as 
follows: 
 
Since African countries gained independence, the borders – which were 
drawn during the colonial period in a context of rivalries between European 
countries and their scramble for territories in Africa – have been a recurrent 
source of conflicts and disputes in the continent. Most of the borders are 
poorly defined. The location of strategic natural resources in cross-border 
areas poses additional challenges (emphasis added).195 
 
The very concept of joint and cooperative development rests on the factual 
geophysical nature of hydrocarbons in their natural states as fluid substances that subsist 
          _________________________ 
modifying and supplementing certain provisions of the Penal Code and penalizing torture; Act 
No.90/031 of 10 August 1990 on Commercial Activities in Cameroon; Act No.90/063 of 19 December 
1990 modifying and supplementing certain provisions of Acts No.69/LF 18 of 10 November 1969 and 
No.84/001 of 4 July 1984 establishing a system covering insurance, old-age pensions, disability and 
death; Order-in-council No.90/1459 of 8 November 1990 establishing the Commission Nationale des 
Droits de L’Homme et des Liberties (CNDL)/National Human Rights and Freedoms Commissions; 
Order in Council No.91/287 of 21 June 1991 establishing the Conseil National de la Communication 
(CNC)/National Communication Council. 
194 International organisations in which Cameroon participates include ABEDA, ACCT, ACP, AfDB, 
AU, BDEAC, C, CEMAC, FAO, FZ, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt (signatory), ICFTU, ICRM, 
IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, ITU, MIGA, MONUC, NAM, OIC, 
OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIK, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, 
WMO, WToO, WTO. Information available at  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cm.html#People . International organisations in 
which Nigeria participates include: ACP, AfDB, AU, C, ECOWAS, FAO, G-15, G-24, G-77, IAEA, 
IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, 
IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, MIGA, MINURSO, MONUC, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, ONUB, OPCW, 
OPEC, PCA, UN, UNAMSIL, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNMEE, UNMIL, 
UNMIS, UNMOVIC, UNOCI, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTO. Information 
available at  http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html. 
195 African Union, “Report of the Commission on the Implementation  of the African Union Border 
Programme” Executive Council Fourteenth Ordinary Session 29 - 30 January 2009 op.cit., p. 1. 
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underground without any respect whatsoever for man made political geography based on the 
territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction that exists above ground. The irreverent nature of 
hydrocarbon deposits is further compounded by the reality that whenever a single owner 
extracts hydrocarbons from a point presumably within its own jurisdictional claims the 
potential share of the other claimant(s) is damaged. Resorting to free for all exploitation will in 
most cases irresponsibly reduce the viability and vitality of the deposit(s) beyond repair. In 
such circumstances and for these reasons cooperative crossborder upstream management is not 
only reasonable but resort to this device is fast crystallising into customary international 
law.196 
  
Agreement on joint development is often a product of the tortuous process of 
agreement on delimitation and demarcation. Before concluding the agreement on their 
maritime boundary in 1997, Thailand and Vietnam had also discussed the possibility of joint 
development for their overlapping claims area. 197  Fortunately there is ample evidence of 
cooperation in the sharing of cross boundary resources in the maritime sector among African 
states. It may still be recommended that state practice in this direction may have to be studied 
in a closer fashion to discover any Afrocentric trends and strategies that may be developed 
further. It may indeed be predicted that much of the practice in the immediate future will be in 
Africa in view of developments such as the Gulf of Guinea cooperation.198 
A specific instance has resulted out of the ICJ judgment and the agreed maritime 
boundary formally demarcated by Cameroon and Nigeria recently. It became evident that 
some oil fields/blocks belonging to Nigeria have been affected by the new maritime boundary.  
It, therefore, became imperative upon the parties to determine how to manage these straddling 
oil fields. From very early in its work the Maritime Working Group had expressed agreement 
                                                         
196 Writers that agree with the customary rule argument include: Onorato, WT “Apportionment of an 
International Common Petroleum Deposit” 17 ICLQ 1968 101; Onorato, WT, A case Study in Joint 
Development: The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Partitioned Neutral Zone” in Valencia (ed.) Workshop II 1985; 
Shihata, I.F.I and Onorato, W.T. Joint development of International Petroleum Resources in Undefined 
and Disputed Areas” Paper presented at the International Conference of the LAWASIA Energy Section, 
Kuala Lumpor (October 18-22, 1992) pp. 3-4. Writers that disagree with the customary rule argument 
include: Miyoshi see Masahiro Miyoshi, “The Joint Development of off shore Oil and gas in relation to 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation” Vol. 2 Maritime Briefing No. 5 Durham: IBRU 1999 p. 4.  Note also 
the conclusion of a group of experts at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law as at 
1989 that “…in contradiction to agreed boundary areas where a known field straddles the boundary, 
there is at present as regards disputed areas no clear rule of customary law which requires a State to 
inform and consult other interested parties”. H. Fox et. al., “Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas, 
Vol. II London: BIICL, Joint Development I” 1989 quoted in Miyoshi op. cit., p. 4. 
197 See Protocol of the first meeting of the Thai-Vietnamese Joint Committee on Culture, Economic, 
Science and Technical Cooperation in October 1991. Note the eventual Agreement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on 
the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 9 August 
1997 Delimitation Treaties Infobase (accessed on 18/03/2008) Available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/THA-
VNM1997MB.PDF 
198 The development of a joint development zone (JDZ) or unitisation in the maritime sector is a time 
consuming and potentially politically hazardous process. The scientific determination of the extent of 
the oil fields alone may take years to appreciate. More and more interlocking fields may be discovered 
than are presently envisaged. Furthermore there is lurking in the background the fact that most scholars 
on the topic are of the opinion that there is no rule of customary international law that states that joint 
development of hydrocarbons must be embarked on even in the most apparent cases of straddling 
resources. See Thao, Nguyen Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand in 7, Boundary and Security 
Bulletin No. 3 (1999) p. 85. Miyoshi op.cit., p.  
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on the need to study the extent to which the existing hydro-carbon resources that overlap could 
feasibly be regulated within a sharing regime for straddling resources.199  
Joint development or what we prefer to call Cooperative Crossborder Upstream 
Exploitation has been ably described as “an inter-governmental arrangement of a provisional 
nature, designed for functional purposes of joint exploration for and/or exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources of the seabed beyond the territorial sea”.200 R. Lagoni and Churchill 
offer perhaps more elaborate descriptions which may deserve separate consideration and 
enrich our understanding of the subject area. For Lagoni it refers to: 
 
The cooperation between States with regards to the exploration for and 
exploitation of certain deposits, fields or accumulations of non-living 
resources which either extend across a boundary or lie in an area of 
overlapping claims”.201   
  
This definition encompasses the Cameroon-Nigeria situation to the extent that the 
resources lie across an agreed boundary. The definition, therefore, appears to be more 
technically sound in that it avoids the fallacy in Churchill’s conception which implicitly 
presupposes that two states can ordinarily possess sovereignty at the same time in a specific 
area. Churchill wrote:  
 
“JDZ will be considered as being an area where two or more states, have 
under international law, sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural 
resources of the area and where the states concerned have agreed to engage 
in such exploration and exploitation under some form of common or joint 
arrangement”.202 
 
The idea that joint sovereignty will be exercised in the cross border cooperative 
between Cameroon and Nigeria would be ignoring several legal and political realities 
including the decades of boundary bickering between the two states and the existence of a 
valid ICJ judgment on their maritime dispute. 
 
16. STRADDLING FISHERIES  
 
In relation to fisheries the recognition of common artisanal fishing rights is clearly a 
favoured option for African states. The jurisprudence of the ICJ in relation to fishing rights of 
indigenous population reveals that the court is indeed sensitive to the duty upon it to preserve 
the livelihood and interests of indigenous populations affected by its judgments. In relation to 
                                                         
199  It is important to note that the parties have, however, not yet achieved the significant task of 
determining the form of cooperation suitable for their purpose (unitisation or Joint Production Zone) nor 
have they decided upon an exact sharing formula. 
200 Miyoshi op.cit., p. 3. Admittedly this definition does not cover those instances as when a government 
and a private multinational or consortium goes into joint ventures in the exploration of hydrocarbons. 
Ngueyen also points out that “…the definition of joint development is not uniform in conventional 
international law and jurists have many explanations”. Ngueyen p. 85. 
201 R. Lagoni, Report on Joint Development of Non –Living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
(Warsaw Conference of the International Committee on the Exclusive Economic Zone, International 
Law Association , 1988) p. 2. 
202 Churchill quoted in Hazel Fox, Joint Development of offshore Oil and Gas, vol. II, The British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1990, p. 55. 
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maritime disputes the court strictly construes its delimitation tasks but has always strongly 
expressed in its jurisprudence that a regime of jointly exercised fishing rights. It is this sort of 
specificity that ought to be introduced to the language of the African Court of Justice and 
those arbitrators and negotiators called upon to decide upon straddling fisheries stocks and the 
fate of straddling villages. 
It is also notable that there are important obligations under Articles 61-65 of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)203 that mandate states to cooperate on a global, 
regional or sub-regional basis. This includes in its purview instances such as the Cameroon - 
Nigeria situation where there are ample stocks shared by the two states along their internal 
boundary rivers as well as the conservation of stocks that straddle the high seas and the EEZ of 
the two states.  These obligations also create the imperative to protect and preserve the marine 
environment.204  
Areas of cooperation to be worked on both as a result of the judgment as well in 
accordance with prior regional and international commitment include: exchange of fisheries 
data creating bilateral/regional patrols of fisheries including the use of surveillance aircraft. 
Now that Nigeria has launched a series of indigenous satellites the possibility of satellite 
tracking and monitoring of large fishing vessels is not remote and ought to be explored.205  
One of the central issues to determine from the start by the parties to the Cameroon-
Nigeria process, therefore, is whether the regime of maritime cooperation should be all 
encompassing and include both hydrocarbon and fisheries resources. Examples of such 
inclusive regime, which covers oil and gas as well as living marine resources, include the 
Guinea-Bissau - Senegal Agreement of 14 October 1993,206 which is a joint development 
agreement, based on a previous maritime boundary agreement between the parties’ respective 
colonial powers signed in 1960. There will be instances where it will make perfect sense to 
simultaneously deal with the hydrocarbon and fisheries regime in a single legislation and there 
will be instances where it will be wiser to have different regimes. 
 
17. SHOULD THERE BE AN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY RULE IN FAVOUR OF 
SHARING STRADDLING RESOURCES? 
 
In many cases the world over the discovery of valuable resources is what catapults 
sleepy frontier lands into the scene of intense territorial and boundary conflict. This realisation 
is one which ought to be instructive to the jurisprudence that must accompany the AU 
boundary programme. 207  When a reservoir straddles the boundary between two sovereign 
                                                         
203 Convention on the Law of the Sea (21 ILM (1982) 1261; Misc 11 (1983), 8941; 1833 UNTS 3 
(1994); Brownlie, Basic Documents in International Affairs, 3rd edn 129). 
204 Article 197 of the LOSC. See generally Gbenga Oduntan, “Maritime Pyrrhic Victories: Evaluation of 
the de facto Regime of Common Fishing Rights in the Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v 
Nigeria)”, 37 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, (1) (2002). 
205 Many fishing vessels can now be equipped with GPS, and the requirement to have the means of 
accurately fixing a vessel’s position can be built into the fishery regulations of both states or into a 
bilateral treaty. Roberts op.cit., p. 112.  For similar arrangements already being utilised among the EU 
states see generally Oduntan, G., "The Evidentiary Issues Arising From The Proposed Use Of The 
Satellite Based Vehicle Monitoring System And Electronic Logbooks In The Fishcam Project Within 
The European Union" Vol. 12 International Journal Of Law And Information Technology, Issue 1 
Spring 2004, pp. 74-100. 
206 See text of the Exchange of Notes in Charney and Alexander (1993: 873-874). 
207 If press reports are anything to go by the ‘oil rich’ nature of the Bakassi Peninsula is the fons origo 
of the Cameroonian crises and many years of litigation at the Hague. The Nigerian government has 
however been at pains to deny this idea on many occasions.  
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states, the common nature of petroleum resources dictate that the ideal strategy to undertake 
their development from a legal, technical conservationist and environmental perspective is 
either unitisation in the case of delimited and demarcated land boundaries or joint production 
zones in the case of undelimited/undemarcated maritime boundaries.208 The writers who have 
argued that joint development could constitute a rule of customary international law, base their 
conviction upon three main points. They are: First that no state may unilaterally exploit the 
common international petroleum deposit over the timely objection of another interested state; 
second, the method of exploitation of such a deposit must be agreed upon by the states 
concerned and third, that concerned states must enter into good faith agreements at least of a 
provisional nature until full and final agreement is reached.209 Similarly Zhiguo Gao relying 
upon sections of the ICJ judgment in the Libyan Continental Shelf case, state practice and the 
general principles of soft law argued that joint development has become a binding rule of 
international law.210  
 
It suffice to say that irrespective of which school of thought eventually wins the 
argument on the bindingness of joint development of straddling resources the fact is that 
among African states there is no evidence of opinio juris sive neccesitatis that will create a 
customary principle of law on this issue. That, however, does not mean that it is not indeed 
necessary to examine whether Cameroon and Nigeria are bound to adopt cooperative cross 
border upstream hydrocarbon exploitation in this instance. The first important query to solve 
this riddle is whether the statements and acts of the parties during the ongoing negotiations of 
the Mixed Commission and particularly in the Maritime Working group  may be enough to 
estoppe any of the parties from refusing to conclude a joint development agreement. 211 
Certainly there is enough in the records of the process in recent times as discussed above to 
show that the parties are seriously considering Cooperative Cross Border Upstream 
Hydrocarbon Exploitation but does this mean they are bound under international law to 
conclude and successfully implement a JDZ or unitisation? 
The answer to this question is debateable and the distinction on this issue made by a 
research team at the BIICL between situations where there is an agreed boundary and those 
where there is none is helpful but the better view from our perspective is that the parties to the 
present process are not bound to do so as they may indeed not come to an agreement for varied 
                                                         
208  A.E. Bastida, Ifesi-Okoye, Salim Mahmud, James Ross and Tjhomas Walde, “Cross-Border 
Unitization and Joint Development Agreements: An International Law Perspective” Vol. 29 Houston 
Journal of International Law no. 2 (2007) p. 357. 
209 See T. Onorato, “Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit: A Reprise” 26 
ICLQ 1977, p. 324.  
210 Zhiguo Gao,  The Legal Concept and aspects of Joint Development in International Law Vol 13 
Ocean Yearbook, 1998 p. 123.  
211 The principle of Estoppel developed principally as a rule of common law. Up till the late 1920s it 
was observed to have garnered little attention in the field of public international law but as MacGibbon 
puts it as at 1958 “the marked increase since then in international judicial and arbitral activity  has 
provided substantial grounds for the modern tendency to consider estoppel as one of the ‘general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ ” The main justification and basis upon which 
estoppel survives in international law is the requirement that a State ought to be consistent in its attitude 
to a given factual or legal situation. See I. C. MacGibbon, “Estoppel In International Law” The Vol. 7 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly No. 3 (1958) pp. et seq. Note also the early recognition 
given to this principle by Professor Bin Cheng. Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law Recognised by 
International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press London, Stevens, 1953) at 
pp 137 et seq. 
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reasons.212 It is impossible to come to the conclusion that there may be no valid reasons why 
states may not be able to conclude a joint development agreement. If mutual distrust is so high 
between states as to make it too difficult to agree on joint development or prevent them from 
successfully concluding negotiations then either wastage due to non exploitation or wastage 
due to inefficient exploitation method whilst regrettable is a likely if not legitimate outcome. 
The intensity of previous rivalries and conflicting interests should not be so readily 
discountenanced without caution. 213  It is for instance not to be forgotten that traditional 
perceptions of the immediate  neighbours of Nigeria are that the country poses a deep concern 
because of its competitive capacity to appropriate valuable resources particularly 
hydrocarbons and fisheries which abound in the maritime boundary areas. In other words even 
in the case of agreed boundaries between two states, joint development may be customary 
practice based on what Miyoshi calls “correct and scrupulous logic” but it has not and may not 
concretise into a customary rule of international law. 
It is in this light that African states need to establish a consistent policy and practice. 
The onus to develop this presumption that joint production and sharing of hydrocarbon and 
fisheries resources is the African legal practice will largely fall on African arbitrators and 
judges. The African Court of justice will also have to develop jurisprudence in this area for in 
it arguably lays perhaps the solution to many hotly contested resource disputes which may 
threaten international peace. This argument is made here not without consideration of the fact 
that economic resources are the reason of great obstinacy by national governments. The fact, 
however, remains that there is something of a fascination for the communal as opposed to the 
allodial nature of land and in its resources in most African traditional cultures. Rivers and 
water resources are shared without rancour across the length and breadth of boundary lines 
and sometimes watering holes and infrastructure based in a neighbouring country are used by 
the citizens of the neighbouring state. Although there is the possibility of individualised 
ownership and ‘propertisation’ of land and resources, the central thrust of much of African 
understanding is that of common ownership through allocation by the sovereign or Chief.214 
Thus a principle of law that allows the governing authority to share resources without 
                                                         
212 The experts concluded: “…it would seem that international law only entails an obligation to consult 
and negotiate where States have broadly agreed on the delimitation of their maritime boundaries. There 
would seem to be no body of State practice upon which to underpin such a general obligation in the case 
where no boundary has been drawn in a disputed area …It would seem in these circumstances that a 
disputant State may carry out unilateral prospecting in the disputed area. Our conclusion, therefore, is 
that in contradiction to agreed boundary areas where a known field straddles the boundary, there is at 
present as regards disputed areas no clear rule of customary law which requires a State to inform and 
consult other interested parties”. Fox (1989) op.cit, p. 35.  
213 Note may be taken of the fact that the fear of the loss of Nigeria’s vital offshore oil installations was 
one of the reasons why General Murtala Muhammad a Nigerian Head of State condemned the Maroua 
Accord, which was one of the treaties  relied upon by the Court in coming to its decision. It remains true 
however that the suspicions are mutual and Cameroon perhaps like some other neighbouring states of 
Nigeria is fearful of Nigerian paternalism. With a vibrant and fast improving economic base and a 
population that is at least three times the size of the five states it shares boundaries Nigeria certainly 
evokes in the national memory of its neighbouring governments what an author describes as “the 
potentialities of a sub-imperial state…masking an innate covetousness and potential threat to their 
territorial integrity”. Bassey E. Ate, “Introduction: Issues in Nigeria’s Security Relations with its 
Immediate Neighbours”, Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects Of Sub 
Regional Security in the 1990s Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa eds. (Lagos: Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs) 1992 pp. 2 and 6.  
214 Olawale Elias,. The Nigerian Legal System. (London: Routledge, 1963); Olawale Elias, Nigerian 
Land Law and Custom (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962); Bonny Ibhawoh, Imperialism and 
Human Rights (State University of New Yor Pess, 2007) pp. 89-90.  
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alienating same is arguably well within the ‘proto-culture’ of African states and societies. This 
presumption towards the unitisation and/or JPZ would arguably immunise African states to the 
deleterious activities of divisive multinational companies who may want to exploit 
international divisions between weaker states. 
It is possible and indeed hoped that State parties may frequently avail themselves of 
the mechanism of the Court of Justice of the AU215 which is the principal judicial organ of the 
African Union.216 Of particular significance are the provisions of the Protocol on Eligibility to 
Submit cases (Article 18), Competence/Jurisdiction (Article 19), Sources of Law (Article 20); 
Summary Procedure (Article 55) and Special Chambers (Article 56).217 Where the dispute in 
question is between the state parties there is no difficulty in locating the eligibility of the 
parties in accordance with Article 18.  Where, however, the dispute involves a multinational 
corporation or other corporate body and a state party or state parties, Article 18 would 
arguably also be useful to the extent that it also recognises the right of ‘third parties’ to submit 
cases to the Court of Justice under conditions to be determined by the AU Assembly and with 
the consent of the State Party concerned (Article 18 (d)).218  
 
18.  PRESCRIPTIVE CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is no doubt that because of the importance of the issues at stake to the survival 
of the economic and even security fortunes of Africa as a continent it is crucial that the law, 
policy and practice of African boundary delimitation and demarcation must develop fast if the 
noble aims of the AU Border Programme are to be achieved. There is a balance to be struck 
between implementing a very detailed legal and political process and the invitation to chaos by 
inadvertent reawakening of irredentism and inordinate territorial and boundary claims across 
the continent. The danger is particularly true of the maritime boundaries and zones –areas that 
                                                         
215 Hereinafter referred to as Court of Justice 
216 Hereinafter referred to as the Protocol. The Court was established in consonance with the 
Constitutive Act of the Court of Justice of the African Union. See Protocol of the Court of Justice of the 
African Union in Vol. 13 African Journal of International and Comparative Law Part 1 2005 115-128. 
217 It is perhaps necessary to mention that virtually all the state parties to the Gulf of Guinea commission 
are all member states to the African Union and therefore parties to the Protocol. 
218 There is much justification for the position that MNCs may in a similar manner be admitted before 
the Court. It must however, be admitted that an amendment to the existing rules would be necessary to 
admit MNCs as parties in their own right unless of course use is made of the time honoured concept of 
amicus curiae.218 It is notable that this interpretation indeed falls well within the increasing treatment of 
MNCs as subjects of international law. It is perhaps a shortcoming of the Protocol that it does not 
expressly spell out the possibility of a concerned State party instituting proceedings against a ‘third 
party’ before the court with the latter’s consent. However, the fact that the article does not expressly 
govern this particular situation does not mean it is not possible especially where the jurisdiction is 
accepted by the respondent State. This interpretation is also in consonance with the intention of the 
drafters is to increase access to the Court of Justice rather than to restrict it. It must, however, be 
emphasised that following the logic of subparagraph (d) the consent of the third party would be crucial 
to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. It is notable that the competence/jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice includes disputes relating to “the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a 
breach of an obligation owed to a State party to the Union” (Article 19 (f)). Furthermore, the assembly 
is empowered to confer on the Court of Justice power to assume jurisdiction over any dispute” (Article 
19 (2)). Taken on the whole it is the intention of the drafters to make it easier for State parties (to both 
the Treaty and the Protocol) to institute actions than for a Multinational or non state party to institute 
claims against state party(ies). In light of previous practice it would, however, be a peculiar scenario 
indeed whereby a multinational operator would choose an African international court as its preferable 
institution.218 G. Oduntan, Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice a Critique of the 
Contentious and Advisory Jurisdictions, (Enugu, Michigan: Fourth Dimension Publishers, Michigan 
State University Press 1999). 
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are usually rich in resources but very expensive and technical to decide upon. This is not to 
suggest that the demarcation of land boundaries is not fraught with significant difficulties. 
Even where all the concerned states in the AUBP move expeditiously to resolve the 
demarcation problems, the difficulties that may be encountered by the parties include the 
disappearance or obliteration of certain features as mentioned in the applicable treaties; 
inaccuracy of the initial surveying or mapping effort; the inclusion of sensitive areas of 
religious, 219  traditional, ethnic 220  or economic importance in the areas of dispute and the 
possibility of areas of indeterminate sovereignty (such as Western Sahara).  
There is a sense in which the finality of judicial and arbitral awards may have 
encouraged uncompromising attitudes and frequent resort to military conflicts among African 
states. It is recommended that there ought to be as a feature of African boundary delimitation 
and demarcation practice, a presumption that the party that loses a contested territory should 
have a right if it so chooses to enter into lease agreements with the eventual winner of the 
territory. While a duty to agree to international leases will be going too far – the duty to at 
least negotiate on this point ought to be permitted and is good policy. There is a possible 
argument that the six year long implementation of the Cameroon-Nigeria process would have 
been halved if the negotiations had included firmly from the beginning the possibility of an 
international lease of Bakassi by Nigeria from Cameroon. Similarly the very slow progress 
that has typified the Eritrea-Ethiopia process would have been prevented if the possibility of 
leases and territorial exchanges was injected into the proceedings.   
It is true that the distances across Africa's boundaries are daunting and this must be 
taken into account in formulating the implementation of the AU borders programme. The time 
scale that is required for a qualitative delimitation and demarcation process across the 
continent in all the areas that have not been so delimited and demarcated is significant and 
clearly beyond the period earmarked under the current programme. It is recommended that a 
30 year plan is put into place in which a phased approach will be used to attain the aims and 
objectives of the African Boundaries Programme. This phased approach preferably based on a 
sub regional timetable will allow for more qualitative concerted effort required to analyse and 
formalise the process of delimiting territories in particular regions.  
A realistic time frame will allow the member states to cover all aspects of the best 
practices in boundary work from including recovery, delimitation, demarcation and 
reaffirmation. It also accords better with the view that boundary work is a continuous 
phenomenon –a means to an end and not an end in itself. In this way supervision of boundary 
management according to best practices may eventually fall under the African Union 
Boundary Programme. This is certainly not to suggest that rigorous demarcation is required 
                                                         
219 This case even shows that many years after definitive judgment severe problems may flare up as a 
result of religious and cultural implications on the affected population. The Temple of Preah Vihear 
case concerned a boundary conflict between Cambodia and Thailand (formerly known as Siam). The 
disputed area contained an old temple of great archaeological significance. It had been built by the 
Khmer Peoples, the ancestors of the present Cambodian population, at the high point of their power; 
since then the Khmer Peoples have been forced back into smaller areas. The considerations the parties 
wished the Court to pronounce upon included: to which of the two countries’ history is the temple more 
related. Despite the Courts decision in 1962 conflict persist between the parties in relation to the temple 
(ICJ. Rep. 1962 p. 14). Military conflicts and skirmishes occurred as recent as 2008. See Thomas Bell, 
“Thailand steps back from Cambodia conflict” Telegraph Wednesday 06 January 2010 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/cambodia/3195213/Thailand-steps-back-from-
Cambodia-conflict.html visited 6 January 2010; Richard Lloyd Parry, “Thailand and Cambodia Teeter 
on Edge of Conflict at Cliff-top Temple” Times July 19, 2008 available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4360257.ece visited 6 Jan 2010. 
220 The Nigerians caught in the Bakassi judgment in the Land and Maritime Judgment.  
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along every inch. Boundary pillar emplacement programme, for instance, may be unnecessary 
along previously uncontested boundaries and along inaccessible mountain ranges or other 
dangerous places. Boundary pillars that are ‘intervisible’ will however be required along 
settlements and other border villages for ease of reference and to inform the largely illiterate 
population that live in the African border areas. 
The idea that clear demarcation of a state's boundaries is required only when economic 
resources are involved is counterintuitive to the prevention of conflicts, and promoting of 
integration. Yet African border areas ought to be assisted to become areas of opportunity and 
bridges between peoples rather than peripheral and divisive in all senses. Governments have to 
be made to realise that boundaries define both a state's rights to the resources of territory, as 
well as its responsibilities for the administration of populations within that territory. It ought to 
also be one of the aims of the African Boundary programme to encourage the creation in all 
member states of a Border Region Agency. These agencies are to have the function of 
bringing infrastructural, education, health and economic development to the border areas, 
which in most cases are located in far-flung parts of the States and the capitals. 
The popular conception that demarcation pre-empts an end to all cross border 
interaction/relationships is inherently ‘un-African’ and all effort must be made to keep things 
that way. It is hoped that the legacy of the African Boundary Programme would be the advent 
of greater cooperative management by neighbouring states in the border areas not only 
because ambiguities causing boundary disputes would have been removed but because an era 
of genuine cross border cooperation would have been created. Local stakeholders ought to be 
involved as direct initiators of cross border cooperation under the auspices of states. There is 
the need for states to understand that they have an interest in facilitating local initiatives.221 
Cross border cooperation remains a strong factor of peace, stability and development. Positive 
examples abound across the continent but these must be multiplied in the course of the AUBP 
processes and it must be seen as one of the aims of the AU to forge solidarity and good 
neighbourliness through local and national cross border cooperation.222 It is necessary that an 
African Boundary Commission be created to execute the African Union Boundary Programme. 
The African Boundary Commission as a permanent institution apart from executing the 
Programme would perform several other functions including: assisting national boundary 
                                                         
221 Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues, “Declaration On The African Union 
Border Programme and Its Implementation Modalities Addis Ababa, 7 June 2007” Preparatory Meeting 
of Experts on The African Union Border Programme Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 4-7 June 2007 
BP/MIN/Decl.(II) pp. 2-3; see also Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Issues, 
“Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Border Programme of the African Union, Bamako, Mali 8-9 
March, 2007” Preparatory Meeting of Experts on The African Union Border Programme Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 4-7 June 2007, p. 7.  
222  The development of transfrontier parks and transfrontier conservation areas is fast becoming 
common on the Continent. Examples include the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park - the largest 
wildlife park in the world - and the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, which comprises the Gemsbok 
National Park in Botswana and the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in South Africa.; the Ai-
/Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier Park between South Africa and Namibia (approximately 35 000 km²). 
These laudable initiatives are backed up by treaties that remove boundaries separating conservation 
areas and other protected areas in favour of integrated, jointly managed parks. Cameroon and Nigeria 
are also in talks to establish such a transnational park within certain areas along their newly 200 
kilometre common boundary. President Thabo Mbeki was quite forthright in denoting the positive 
effects of the African initiatives in integrating and unifying its communities towards prosperity. He 
stated "We are doing this because we have understood very well that all of us are interdependent, that 
the success of any one of our countries depends on the success of the others" SouthAfrica.info, “SA, 
Namibia cross-border park” available at http://www.southafrica.info/about/sustainable/sanamibia-
park.htm. Visited 7 Jan 2010. 
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commissions in attaining their goals. It should also host a world class academic and/or 
vocational institution –African Boundary Research Centre. This institution would engage in 
the provision of world standard training for delegations and professionals from African states 
in all areas of boundary studies. 
The creation of African Boundary Research Centre may also facilitate the training of 
high calibre engineers, drilling experts, geologists, geophysists, marine and fisheries experts 
and even business and management experts to service he demands of the continent. There 
ought to be an interest in achieving self sufficiency at least in the provision of skilled labour 
that would the management of African Boundaries and this task cannot in good conscience of 
present leadership be contracted out again to Europe and North American states only. The 
benefits of this to all states concerned are innumerable and of course include employment 
generation. In this way the region may also contribute to the international demand for high 
skilled expatriate workers in surveys, cartography, boundary ethnologists, and lawyers among 
others. If there is to be any chance at all of a successful and meaningful completion of the 
tasks set before the AUBP the competences within the AU itself must be increased drastically. 
This will at the very least require the injection of added specialist personnel to the Conflict 
Management Division of the Peace and security Department. Without a largely indigenous 
army of skilled workers in these key industries there can be no meaningful control of national 
boundaries and perhaps resource exploitation. Delay in developing these competences may 
ultimately prove fatal to national purses and even collective security. It is necessary to 
continue cataloguing existing capacities within the continent and putting such capacities to use. 
More frequent use should therefore be made of such regional institutions such as the African 
Organisation of Cartography and Remote Sensing (AOCRS).223 
The preparation of a practical handbook on delimitation and demarcation in Africa by 
the end of 2010 is a commendable development but it is not a sufficient condition to bridge the 
shortage of requisite literature on the law and practice of boundary making and maintenance. 
African scholars should be encouraged to contribute to scholarly literature in this area. Such 
contributions would highlight best practices in/guidelines for delimitation, demarcation, 
maintenance and of African boundaries reaffirmation. There is no reason why African scholars 
and practitioners may not introduce new lexicon of relevant terms to the continents situations. 
Other interesting and appropriate suggestions that deserve mention include the promotion of 
an “African Border Day”, to highlight the importance of the AUBP and encourage further 
efforts towards its implementation.224 The importance of synergy and continuous dialogue 
between border policy makers, scholars and boundary practitioners is irrefutable. The 
establishment by Member States, as soon as possible, of National Boundary Commissions or 
similar agencies (where they do not exist), and legal bilateral arrangements to handle boundary 
                                                         
223  The African Organization of Cartography and Remote Sensing (AOCRS) is an African 
intergovernmental organization, established in Addis Ababa in 1988 by the merger of African 
Association of Cartography (AAC) with the African Remote Sensing Council (ARSC). The AOCRS is 
the Principal national mapping and remote sensing organizations/agencies representing the governments 
of 24 African countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central, Africa, Congo, DR Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda; Visit 
http://www.agirn.org/documents/AOCRS_leaflet.pdf visited 7 Jan 10. See also Conference of African 
Ministers in Charge of Border Issues, the Report of the Meeting “Preventing Conflicts, Promoting 
Integration” Preparatory Meeting of Experts on The African Union Border Programme Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 4-7 June 2007. BP/EXP/RPT(II) pp. 4-5. 
224  AU, “Conclusion of the 2nd International Symposium on Land, River and Lake Boundaries 
Management” op.cit. pp. 3-4. 
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matters between them is recommended but the costs of such institutional arrangements will in 
the nature of things be considerably prohibitive. Within the course of the next decade the value 
of the important work been done under the AUBP will become transparent. If the historic tasks 
are well handled by all stakeholders, the work done by the participating states and 
organisations may emerge as evidence of best practice to be emulated and followed by other 
regions especially but not limited to states in the global south. The actual and lasting effects 













Appendix 1: TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN CONTENTIOUS CASES 
INVOLVING AFRICAN COUNTRIES AT THE ICJ 
 
Cases Issues  
Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. 
South Africa: (South West Africa) 
1960-1966. 
Territorial Sovereignty and 
Independence Mandate 
Cameroon v. United Kingdom 
(Northern Cameroon) 1961-63 
Territorial sovereignty and 
independence 
*Tunisia/Libya: (Continental Shelf) 
1978-82 
Maritime boundary and 
delimitation 
*Libya/Malta: (Continental Shelf) 
1982-85 
delimitation of the 
continental shelf; The 
Libyan "rift zone" argument; 
test  of proportionality; 
equidistance  line 
*Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali: 
(Frontier Dispute) (Case referred to a 
Chamber) 1983-86 
Delineation of frontier line; 
principles of intangibility of 
colonial boundaries and uti 
possidetis; French colonial 
law; distinction between 
village and hamlets 
Tunisia v. Libya: (Application for 
Revisions and Interpretation of the 
Judgement of 24 February 1982 in the 
Case concerning the Continental 
Shelf) 1984-85. 
Principles applicable to the 
delimitation of the areas of 
continental shelf; 
interpretation; admissibility; 
Request for an expert 
survey. 







Request for the Interpretation of the 
Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the case 
concerning the Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 
Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. 
Cameroon) (1998-1999). 
Admissibility of Nigeria’s 
request; Cost of the 
proceedings; interpretation of 
the Courts judgment 
regarding internationally 




Sovereignty, jurisdiction and 
control over Island and 
maritime boundary 
Armed Activities on the territory of 
the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Uganda) (1991-2001) 
Armed Intervention, 
territorial sovereignty, 
humanitarian law   
Armed Activities on the territory of 
the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Rwanda) (1991-2001) 
Armed Intervention, 
territorial sovereignty, 
humanitarian law   
Armed Activities on the territory of 
the Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Burundi (1991-2001) 
Armed Intervention, 
territorial sovereignty, 
humanitarian law   
Frontier Dispute (Benin / Niger) 
2002 
Delimitation; sovereignty 
over islands, boundaries 
following rivers 
Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (New Application: 2002) 
Armed Intervention, 
territorial sovereignty, 
humanitarian law     
 
Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal: (Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989) 
Validity of the Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989; 
Validity of Agreements 
concerning the delimitation 
of their maritime areas. 
*Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Chad: 
(Territorial Dispute) 1990-1994 
Frontier line; Treaty of 
Friendship and Good 
Neighbourliness between 
France and Libya; 
establishment of permanent 
boundaries ; subsequent 
attitude of the parties 
Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal: (maritime 
Delimitation between Guinea Bissau 
and Senegal) 1991 
Maritime delimitation line; 
negotiation over maritime 
territory 
Cameroon v. Nigeria (Land and 
Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria) 1994-2002 
Sovereignty over Bakassi 
peninsula, Maritime, river 
and water delimitation, 
straddling villages, Lake 
Chad Basin trespass issues 
etc. 
